The EDC was a failed attempt at European integration in military and defense. This thesis intends to examine how and why the EDC failed and what it means for today. This thesis aims to understand what are the implications for the EDC's failure in the EU's efforts to gain strategic autonomy. This issue is important to many with interests in the European region. The failure of the EDC will be analyzed as a case study utilizing the theoretical framework of Neoclassical Realism. Constraints include language, lack of government transparency, and inherent limitations of case study research. This thesis will outline different theories and why Neoclassical Realism is chosen to evaluate the EDC; then it will examine the EDC during its negotiation and writing; then it will analyze the case from the perspective of each of the EDC participants, and then it will describe the implications of the EDC for the present situation. This thesis will examine the EDC from a theoretical standpoint. Because the EDC is a unique case of failed European integration, a broader International Relations theory will be used in this thesis. There are a number of theories regarding European integration and broader theories on International Relations. This thesis will examine the EDC from the Neoclassical Realist perspective. The Pleven Plan was to allow for the rearmament of Germany under conditions acceptable to France. The Plan was to solve the German rearmament dilemma. Proponents had to deal with nationalists who resisted relinquishing control of armed forces while also nurturing the European idea that called for more integration. The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1952; the US and UK both called for its quick ratification. There were concerns among the treaty's signatories. Germany worried about a return of its army, its defense, and its acceptance in the West. Italy was concerned about integration, maintaining internal stability, and helping its economy. The smaller countries of the Benelux were in favor of the EDC to maximize their influence. France would struggle over ratification. Pierre Mendès-France had to deal with external pressure to get the EDC Treaty passed, and internal pressure to push for better terms. Gaullists were adamantly against the EDC. The French attempted to renegotiate the treaty to no avail. The National Assembly eventually voted against the EDC and the treaty failed ratification. The case of the EDC has implications for EU strategic autonomy. Russia presents a legitimate threat to the West. Globalization, technology, and non-traditional threats affect the security environment. The US is realigning its strategy to focus more on China, while Brexit removes the UK military assets from the EU. Finally, France has been driven to more seriously consider European strategic autonomy and a European Army after the AUKUS controversy. There are still obstacles to European defense. Strategic culture is a problem in Europe, especially in Germany. Nationalism and Euroscepticism continue to hinder further integration. The Europeans still rely heavily on US military might. EU efforts at strategic autonomy also cause consternation in NATO over redundancy. Finally, the EDC is an example of European integration taken too far, and a warning as to how difficult the EDU will be to achieve. The theoretical evaluation of the EDC reveals outcomes as expected in the theory. Each country calculated relative material power gain from the EDC, except France, which changed its calculation based on changes to the original Pleven Plan and popular pressure shaping leaders' perceptions. If there is going to be military integration and strategic autonomy in the EU, it will require a change in the strategic culture in Germany, so that the German military might be built up to ease the doubts of Eastern European EU members over the capability of such a European Army to supplant the US military in defense of the continent. / Master of Arts / The EDC was a failed attempt at unifying all European military forces into one. This paper wants to know the meaning of the EDC's failure for the EU's efforts to become an independent strategic actor; meaning, able to determine its own strategy. The thesis will look at the EDC's failure as a case study, using the theory of Neoclassical Realism. Neoclassical Realism is a theory in international relations that examines factors both inside and outside each nation that determine the outcomes of the interactions between those nations. The difficulties in doing this study include language barriers, government secrecy, and the fact that case studies are not perfect examples to stand in for other situations. This thesis will look at different theories and why Neoclassical Realism is best; then it will look at the EDC's history, and then it will talk about the impact of the EDC's failure for today. The Pleven Plan was a French proposal for the rearmament of Germany, with many limitations. The Plan tried to solve the problem of German rearmament: they wanted to re-arm Germany to defend against the Soviet Union, but they did not want Germany to turn around and threaten them. The Treaty of the EDC was signed in 1952; the US and UK both wanted quick approval. There were concerns among the nations that signed the treaty. Germany worried about a return of its military and being accepted in the West. Italy was concerned about integration, the stability of its country, and helping its economy. The smaller countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg wanted the EDC to grow their influence. France would struggle over ratification; they tried to change the treaty, but it did not work. The National Assembly, the chief French law-making body, voted against the EDC and the treaty was canceled. The case of the EDC says a lot about the EU's attempt to gain the freedom to come up with its own strategy. Russia is a threat to the West. The modern-day environment makes international threats unique. The US is changing its strategy to focus more on China, while Brexit—the United Kingdom's decision to leave the EU—removes the UK military from the EU. Finally, France was offended from the AUKUS controversy, which involved a canceled submarine contract with Australia. They are seriously thinking about unifying the EU military and making it more independent on strategy. There are still challenges to European defense. A pacifist culture is a problem in Europe, especially in Germany. A basic opposition to the EU continues to slow down integration. Europeans still rely a lot on the US military. EU efforts to gain independence in strategy also worries NATO, as it is seen as doing the job that NATO should be doing. Finally, the EDC is a sign of how hard it will be to start the EDU. This look at the EDC shows results that are expected according to the theory. Each country figured out the level of power, compared to other countries, that each got from the EDC. France changed its mind because the original Pleven Plan was changed. If there is going to be a unification of European militaries and independence for strategy in the EU, it needs to change the peace-centered culture in Germany, so that the German military might be built up to convince Eastern European nations on the seriousness of a European Army to replace the US military in defending the continent.

This thesis provides a critical cultural analysis of the discursive myths of salvation and conspiracy, using as a case study the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the transition period in Romania, from 1989 to 2007. The study offers an answer to the questions: how do NATO myths change? Why and with what discursive implications for the Romanian audience? The thesis uses a combination of methodological tools from three different disciplines - history, mythology, and rhetoric - with the intent of showing how the Romanians' public attitudes toward NATO change in four different political contexts: during the integration period until Romania's admission into the alliance, during the Kosovo war, after 9/11 events and during the installation of NATO troops on Romanian territory. This study demonstrates that NATO myths are effective operational strategies that offer Romanians a sense of identity in the critical period of transition. The thesis also explains how NATO, as a carrier of Western values, helps the democratization of the Romanian public sphere and the reconstruction of a national identity based on democratic principles. / by Daniela Popescu. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 166-174).

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.

Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Gates, William. Second Reader: Doyle, Richard. "December 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 2, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): NATO, Defense Planning, Industrial Production, Economics, Burden Sharing, Defense Industries, Sharing, Costs, Military Forces (Foreign), Military Forces (United States), Military Equipment, Mathematical Models, Military Reserves, Industrial Capacity. Author(s) subject terms: Burden-sharing, NATO. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-80). Also available in print.

HF communication has been used for more than a century and to this day still fulfils an important function in communications networks. In order to interface with modern communications protocols, solutions have to be designed to facilitate data communication over HF (High Frequency). STANAG 5066 is one such solution which provides an application independent ARQ (Automatic Repeat Request) bearer service for client applications. A need exists within the STANAG 5066 specification for a DRC algorithm. The objective of such an algorithm is to select the optimum data rate and interleaver size, based upon current HF channel conditions, to maximise the data throughput over the HF link. In this dissertation previous implementations of DRC algorithms were studied and evaluated. In literature it was found that algorithm implementations used the FER and no channel information to make a data rate choice. This resulted in algorithms that tended to oscillate between data rate choices, and was very slow to react to changes in the HF channel. A new DRC algorithm was designed and simulated that uses the SNR (Signal-to-Noise Ratio) and the BER estimate to make a data rate choice. The DRC algorithm was implemented in a commercial STANAG 5066 system and tested using HF data modems and a simulated HF channel. The results of the implementation and testing show that the designed DRC algorithm gives a better performance, is quicker to adapt and is more robust than previous DRC algorithms. This is also the first DRC algorithm that has been designed to use channel information, such as the SNR and BER, to make a data rate choice. / Dissertation (MEng)--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering / unrestricted

Under what conditions and for what reasons do American leaders seek the endorsement of relevant international organizations (IOs) such as the UN or NATO for prospective military interventions? My central hypothesis is that U.S. government efforts to obtain IO approval for prospective interventions are frequently the result of significant bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials--with the top military brass and war veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront--who highlight its potential downsides and long-term costs, on the other. The military leaders--the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff in Washington--are generally skeptical of humanitarian and other "idealist" interventions that aim to change the domestic politics of foreign countries; they naturally tend to consider all the potential downsides of intervention, given their operational focus; and they usually worry more than activist civilian policy officials about public and congressional support for protracted engagements. Assuming that the military leaders are not merely stooges of the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to altogether resist a prospective intervention, when they believe that no vital American interests are at stake and fear an open-ended deployment of U.S. troops. Given the military's professional expertise and their standing in American society, they come close to holding a de facto veto over prospective interventions they clearly oppose. I hypothesize that confronted with such great initial reluctance or opposition on the part of the military brass, civilian advocates of intervention from other government agencies will seek inter alia to obtain an advance endorsement from relevant IOs, so as to lock in international support and thereby reassure the military and their bureaucratic allies that the long-term costs to the United States in terms of postwar peacekeeping and stabilization will be limited. That, in turn, can be expected to help forge a winning bureaucratic coalition in Washington and persuade the president to authorize military action. United States multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy resultant--the outcome of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining--and it may not actually reflect the initial preferences of any particular government agency or senior official.

Canada consistently balances competing inclinations for proximity and distance with the United States. Yet the extant literature on Canadian foreign policy has rarely focused on this particular behaviour trait or readily accepted that such an ambiguous stance is actually underpinned by a strategic logic, let alone the crux of a purported grand strategy. And the few that that are open to the notion of a Canadian grand strategy often overlook the domestic decision-making determinants of behaviour, are largely empirical-descriptive in content, or are chronologically limited to either the early Cold War or a few key foreign policy episodes. This dissertation rectifies these shortcomings by providing a theoretical-explanatory and empirically-informed account of Canada’s post-war grand strategy, in which its domestic origins, strategic policies, and cultural predispositions are all carefully explored. It does so by applying the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour, which combines strategic cultural factors that guide policy-makers on security matters with cybernetic policy processes, through which beliefs, inclinations, and policy choices are standardized and regularized as distinct doctrines across a range of foreign, defence, and security policies. It tests this model on two key cases of Canadian grand strategy in the post-war period: (1) Canada’s policy responses to American preferences on strategic (air and missile) defence over some six decades, and (2) its policy responses to US – and to a lesser extent British – strategic preferences on NATO defence strategy during the Cold War. The findings reveal that Canada’s strategic policies fluctuated between the two Standing Operational Doctrines in its policy repertoire: continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism. These two doctrines span the range of feasible policy options – the “goldilocks zone” – required to ensure that any trade-offs between security and sovereignty, as the central values being pursued in the cybernetic process, are minimized. It is for this reason that Canada’s strategic behaviour has a high degree of policy continuity, patterned consistency, and is best described as the goldilocks grand strategy.

Univ., Habil.-Schr.--Darmstadt. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 290 - 308) and index.

Zugl.: Frankfurt am Main, Univ., Diss. / Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universität Frankfurt am Main. Includes bibliographical references and index.