Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 9, 2008). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 368-404).

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Peter R. Lavoy, James A. Russell. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, November, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

The objective of this thesis is to determine why Canada, a state that pioneered nuclear technology, and that faced, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet threat to its national security, consistently rejected any opportunity to convert its latent nuclear capability into an indigenous nuclear weapons program. The answer to this research question must address a number of explicit contradictions in Canadian foreign policy. While Canada has, on the one hand, rejected the bomb, it has, on the other hand, pursued defence and industrial policies based upon intimate involvement with nuclear weapons. Moreover, Canada espouses, on the one hand, a clearly realpolitik view of international relations, while, on the other hand, committing to forging for itself a role as an international peace broker. It becomes, therefore, unclear which theory of international relations could adequately explain this dualism in Canadian policy formulation. This thesis argues that power and self-interest are not separable from Canada's decision to reject the bomb, and that by modifying certain precepts of realist theory, we may substantiate the hypotheses that two disincentives to proliferation are at the root of Canada's policies: first, Canada's political and geographical proximity to the United States and thus a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella; and second, prestige, where Canada interpreted both the rejection of its nuclear option and its internationalist policies as a sign of independence vis-a-vis the United States.

This study investigates how the PRC, during the three decades since its establishment, has responded to international politics involving arms control and disarmament (ACD) issues, and explores the essence of China's approach to concepts of arms control and disarmament. The central finding is that, despite its seeming relaxation of hostility towards international ACD activities, and the more active and flexible part it has played in them at the UN since the mid-1970s, China remains unconvinced of the value of these activities. This does not make it dangerous, irrational or immature. Chapters Two to Five provide a comprehensive account of the history of Chinese ACD policy between 1949 and 1978. Each chapter represents a distinctive period of Chinese arms control policy. Although more interested in the banning of the use, rather than the possession, of atomic weapons, the PRC behaved at first as an uncritical disciple of Soviet ACD positions (Chapter Two). During the second period (Chapter Three), China became increasingly uneasy about international ACD efforts and began to deviate from the Soviet stance. Moscow's denial of concrete assistance to China's nuclear weapons development, and the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, eventually led the PRC into a period (Chapter Four) of open hostility towards nearly all international ACD initiatives. Then, in 1964, China's first nuclear test likewise radically changed its outlook on ACD matters. The final period (Chapter Five) examines its record at the UN in this regard, showing how the PRC was persuaded to commit itself to the Tlatelolco Treaty and to the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament. In conclusion, however, there is no evidence to suggest that the PRC has been committed to the concept of a disarmament process through arms control which both the US and the USSR, in their very different ways, have accepted. China has participated in international ACD negotiations while not really believing in their objectives, based as these are on a permanency of two superpowers. It is to be hoped that China's increasing involvement in the UN disarmament negotiation machinery will feed back into PRC policy-making and lead to a more positive and more willing participation in these ACD negotiations.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2004. / Submitted to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 571-601). Access restricted to members of the Tufts University community. Also available via the World Wide Web;

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Virginia, 2006. / Title from v.1 t.p. (viewed Apr. 20, 2009). "UMI number: 3218417." Includes bibliographical references (p. 582-609). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter Lavoy, Jeff Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-92). Also available in print.