Russia’s nuclear signaling since the start of the war in Ukraine has been prevalent but far fromeasy to understand. Nuclear threats are often ambiguous and vague—prompting one to wonderjust how effective they are as a coercive tool in general and in the Ukraine war in particular.The destructive potential of nuclear weapons has been described as providing nuclear states witha coercive advantage towards non-nuclear states. Not only as a tool of deterrence but as a tool ofcompellence. However, there may be certain communicative and credibility issues in the way ofsuccessful nuclear coercion. We use data of Russian nuclear signaling in the first 18 months ofthe war in Ukraine and investigate whether these signals are recognized by the Ukrainiangovernment and whether their credibility is questioned. The investigation concludes that Russiannuclear threats are recognized and that the credibility of nuclear threats are sometimesquestioned albeit not consequently. This suggests that the responses to nuclear threats may bejust as ambiguous and vague as the actual threats themselves.