A computational tool to assess the most likely path a state proliferator would take in making a nuclear weapon was created in a Bayesian network. The purpose of this work was to create a tool to facilitate analysts and policymakers in learning about state proliferation. In carrying out this work, a previous Bayesian network based on nuclear weapon proliferation was expanded to include dual-use export controlled technologies. The constant nodes in the network quantifying technical capability, international networking, and available infrastructure were developed to be based on pertinent characteristics that were appropriately weighted. To verify the network, nine historical cases of state proliferation were tested over time, and the enrichment and weapon pathways were graphed. The network sufficiently modeled the cases, so it was concluded that, while one can never truly being able to sufficiently validate a network of this type, sufficient verification was achieved. The tool was used to gain knowledge and insight concerning technology transfers with four countries in hypothetical cases. This exercise proved that the network can in fact be used to learn about state proliferation under different policies and conditions.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2000. / Thesis advisor, David S. Yost. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis advisor: Robert Ross / In recent years, economic and political cooperation between China and Iran has deepened to levels never before reached. This thesis discusses the potentially far reaching implications the development in relations between China and Iran poses for controlling nuclear proliferation, international energy security, and the role the US plays in Middle Eastern and East Asian power politics. Monitoring the Chinese-Iranian relationship is thus important to the US, as its own influence across the globe could potentially be reduced as a result of cooperation between these two nations. With China newly confident following the global financial crisis of 2008, it appears that despite US pressure to stop, China is continuing to deepen its cooperation with Iran in pursuit of its own national interests. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science.

This diploma thesis deals with the issue of nuclear proliferation, specifically the motives of Iran's nuclear program. Given the unprecedented destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the international community has been trying to influence the course of Iran's nuclear policy for three decades. Unfortunately, their success has been limited. The aim of this work is to identify proliferation motives of Iran and to outline some of the steps that could be taken to minimize them. A basic theoretical framework was chosen, the conceptualization of Scott Sagan who categorizes the motives into three main groups - domestic, security and normative. However, because these models lack a clear identification of variables, the framework has been supplemented by specific indicators taken from the Stephen Meyer's concept. The work is instrumental case study, whose conclusion confirms the assumption that the realistic approach to the proliferation of nuclear weapons does not explain the overall structure of the motivation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thesis advisor: Donald Hafner / This thesis is aimed at determining an efficient American foreign policy for resolving the current North Korean nuclear crisis. It examines the current nuclear proliferation debate; the specifics of the North Korean case; the past successes and failures of American foreign policy towards North Korea; several key policy issues; and, finally, lays out a plan for American foreign policy to follow. This thesis is intended to develop a peaceful and permanent resolution to the crisis. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2004. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2000. / "December 2000." Thesis advisor(s): James J. Wirtz. AD-A386 702. Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-93).

The topic of the diploma thesis is a comparison of the American activities during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama towards Iran, in regard to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. It observes the diplomatic actions in relation to Iran and other actors, who play an important role in this issue, and also some other methods, used by the world's leading superpower to prevent Iran from the development of nuclear weapons. The mentioned topic is situated into the broader context of continuity and change in the US security and foreign policy. The objective of the diploma thesis is to assess what where the differences in the US actions under Obama's administration, compared with the actions during the presidency of his predecessor, as well as how the Obama's administration followed them, and to assess how effective these actions were.

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This thesis utilizes social influence theory and computational tools to examine the disparate impact of positive and negative ties in nuclear weapons proliferation. The thesis is broadly in two sections: a simulation section, which focuses on government stakeholders, and a large-scale data analysis section, which focuses on the public and domestic actor stakeholders. In the simulation section, it demonstrates that the nonproliferation norm is an emergent behavior from political alliance and hostility networks, and that alliances play a role in current day nuclear proliferation. This model is robust and contains second-order effects of extended hostility and alliance relations. In the large-scale data analysis section, the thesis demonstrates the role that context plays in sentiment evaluation and highlights how Twitter collection can provide useful input to policy processes. It first highlights the results of an on-campus study where users demonstrated that context plays a role in sentiment assessment. Then, in an analysis of a Twitter dataset of over 7.5 million messages, it assesses the role of ‘noise’ and biases in online data collection. In a deep dive analyzing the Iranian nuclear agreement, we demonstrate that the middle east is not facing a nuclear arms race, and show that there is a structural hole in online discussion surrounding nuclear proliferation. By combining both approaches, policy analysts have a complete and generalizable set of computational tools to assess and analyze disparate stakeholder roles in nuclear proliferation.

Why do wars happen, and what do societies fight over? Why are international relations sometimes fearful and aggressive and other times harmonious? I show that these questions can be fruitfully explored by importing some basic economic theory into the existing bargaining theory of war. A separate essay analyzes the interactions between the United States and countries that may be pursuing nuclear weapons. "Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War" posits a new explanation for war: sometimes peace is more costly (in the sense of leaving both sides worse off in expectation) than war. This means that some wars improve overall welfare relative to peace. I develop models for three common sources of costly peace tailored to particular wars and analyze them to expose the common underlying logic for war. The costs of: arming explain the Iraq War; imposition explain the civil conflicts within Iraq after the earlier Gulf War; and predation explain the American War of Independence. "The Modern Economic Peace" develops a theory of the origins of international disputes, in which the economic conflict of interests between two states is determined by the benefits and costs of transferring wealth from one state's economy to the other's. Whether such a transfer happens depends on the military situation between the two states and also the characteristics of their economies and governments. Nations with sensitive, integrated ("modern") economies of comparable size and representative governments have little to fight over. This might explain not only the puzzling comity of the West, but also long-run global patterns in organized violence, economic liberalization, and democratization. "A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention" is co-authored with Muhammet Bas. We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states, where one can invest in developing nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress over time, and use it to analyze the occurrence of proliferation and war, the viability of non-proliferation agreements, and the role of intelligence-gathering and estimates. The model explains some of the complex phenomena that occur in these interactions, such as mistaken wars, cyclical crises, and the failure of non-proliferation deals. / Government