This thesis argues that the debate over the relationship between Theory and political practice has reached a dead-end in IR. Most scholars taking part in this debate based their claims on meta-theoretical assumptions, which explains the inability to settle the debate. This logic not only discouraged empirical enquiries, but also undermined reflexivity. Instead, this thesis calls for the translation of these meta-theoretical assumptions into a methodology and into methods to produce empirical knowledge by which to explore the relationships between Theory and political practice on specific issues. To this end, the thesis investigates relationships between American IR academic discourse and senior officials discourse and their effects on US foreign policy towards Iran between 1998 and 2014. The thesis provides a typology to map and to assess the gaps in the debate over the relationship between Theory and political practice in IR. This typology is composed of four ideal-types: Theory to political practice, Theory vs. political practice, Theory as political practice and practice to political practice. The thesis also translates meta-theoretical assumptions drawn from Wittgenstein and Foucault into a methodology to generate empirical knowledge on specific relationships between Theory and political practice. This methodology enables to trace an evolving system of thoughts expressed in the Theory and political practice of the Iranian nuclear crisis and to expose what this system does to US society and foreign policy. Three elements compose this system: the certainty of democratic teleology, the certainty of uncertainty and the certainty of smart power. The thesis claims that IR knowledge production on Iran mostly acted as symbolic knowledge morphing uncertainties about Iran into certainties for US governmental power. Only then could senior officials produce a judgement against Iran and implement disciplinary measures in the form of sanctions, covert actions, and military threats.

Nuclear weapons remains in the security discourse of the United States for over 70 years. The threat of nuclear weapons changed its content several times since then. Our study examines how the nuclear threat was socially constructed and how different actors securitized the threat and to which purpose. Our Diploma thesis uses methodological framework of discourse analysis. We examine the political and social nuclear discourse in the U.S. along two levels of analysis: governmental level and nuclear disarmament level. The diploma thesis researches multiple governmental and societal sources in order to determine how different types of nuclear threat emerged within the discourse.

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The intent for this thesis is to explain and inform the process of the Iranian Nuclear Program throughout the last decades. The stand of the Islamic Republic of Iran has brought very delicate issues and confrontations to the international community. This thesis discusses the history of key countries that play an important part into developing the Iranian nuclear program. These countries being the United States, Israel, Russia and other countries part of the UN Security Council. This thesis also attempts to analyze and focuses on the domestic policies the government of Iran and its people have interacted with the nuclear deal. The nuclear deal between the UN Security Council members and the Islamic Republic of Iran have shown an array of acceptance and rejection within, specially, the United States, Arab countries in the region and Israel. The implementations of the solution to future confrontation are probably the main ideal to a healthy international community who can adapt to new measures and policies to a safer world. Using classical realist theory, based on Hans J. Morgenthau realist theory, the Iranian nuclear program could be explained with a different perspective. There are other international relations theories that could help explaining Iran’s government behavior and how it interacts with the international community. Iran’s move in the past years has shown progress towards the international community and has lowered the potential military action against Iran. Some countries like Israel continue on the dissatisfaction against the nuclear deal signed by Iran and the UN Security Council member countries. This thesis will show the behavior the country of Iran has had towards other countries based on their domestic policy.

The overarching goal of this study is to conduct an investigation of regional perspectives on the impact of Israel's nuclear monopoly on nuclear decisions in the Middle East. This Dissertation addresses the question as to why regional actors have taken divergent nuclear paths relative to Israel's nuclear posture. The point of departure for this inquiry is whether the 'introduction' of Israel's nuclear weapons has ever played a pivotal role in the nuclear decisions and escalation dynamics in the Middle East. In so doing, this study addresses why Israel has maintained a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Within this context, the nuclear decisions are analyzed while employing three specific Independent Variables, namely: conventional balance; alliance reliance; and the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons. The analysis of the Egypt and Iran cases demonstrated layers of common and divergent responses, namely in relation to their perception of conventional, nonconventional, and nuclear deterrence. The dissertation addressed how both countries perceived and reacted to the underlying principles that underpinned Israel's nuclear posture. The main findings of this dissertation serve the logic of comparison between Egypt and Iran. These findings are addressed in terms of: a) the essence of reaction whether it applies to the nuclear posture or nuclear capabilities; b) the mere existence of a nuclear decision; c) the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons in terms of deterrence, compellence, and coercion; d) the difference between the official, semi-official and unofficial rhetoric; e) the significance of the legal reaction. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation addressed two comparative reactions to Israel's nuclear posture, namely Egypt's and Iran's divergent nuclear paths. In so doing, it addressed the nuclear decisions of Egypt and Iran from 1955 to 2021. This dissertation made an effort in investigating how a tacit ally, namely the Shah, perceived Israel's nuclear posture. As analyzed, the literature tends to overlook the story of Iran's reaction under the Shah. Therefore, more research is necessary to decipher the puzzle of why allies feel alarmed or concerned by a nuclear ambition of a close regional partner. An important issue that this dissertation addressed while investigating reactions to Israel's nuclear posture was the delicate issue of decoupling Israel's posture from other established nuclear powers or nuclear aspirants. Within this context, it is central that this study underscores the impacts of the Indian, and Pakistani bombs and the impact of Iraq's nuclear ambition and to make a strong and substantiated case as to why Iran's reaction addressed Israel's posture and not Iraq or India. The same analysis applies to Egypt which witnessed the emergence of another nuclear aspirant in the 1980s, namely Iraq. In the final analysis, the main findings of this dissertation support the argument that comparative regional reactions to Israel's nuclear posture help investigate and test the main assumptions that underpinned opacity. Within this context, future researchers might further analyze the trichotomy of conventional; nonconventional, and nuclear deterrence because regional actors might employ the case of monopoly for explicit or tacit bargaining that fulfills the overarching interest of guaranteeing a robust conventional force. The underlying foundation of this research is to address how regional actors perceive and react to asymmetries in power, resolve, and stake.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons. / Major, United States Air Force

由於蘇聯解體所導致的核擴散，這個世界比起過去更加危險。新的安全威脅源自於俄羅斯核物質、武器與科學家的擴散。另一方面，俄羅斯軍事力量的下降導致俄羅斯提高了核武器在未來戰爭中的作用。俄羅斯國家安全構想與軍事學說的轉變可能升高核戰爭的可能性。在本文中，筆者將探討由俄羅斯所引起的核擴散風險。 / Because of the nuclear proliferation caused by the collapse of USSR, the world is more insecurity than before. The new security threat comes from the spread of Russian nuclear materials, weapons and scientists. On the other hand, the decline of Russian military leads Russia to pay much attention on the use of nuclear weapon in the future warfare. The change of the Russian national security concept and military doctrine may raise the possibility of nuclear war. In the paper, author will study the risk of nuclear proliferation caused by Russia.

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