NY, Columbia Univ., Diss.--New York. / Literaturverz. S. 401 - 429.

No description available.

Boston University. University Professors Program Senior theses. / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-02

This thesis focuses on the events surrounding the South Asia Crisis of 1971, beginning in when the Pakistani government launched its military crack-down in East Pakistan in the spring and extending to the conclusion of the Indo-Pak War by the year's end. It examines how President Nixon's administration and the US State Department viewed the events in South Asia, what they saw as being the appropriate response, and the differences in what they thought the US should do in response to what was happening on the other side of the globe. The analysis will reveal that the President and his primary foreign policy advisor, Dr. Kissinger, deliberately misled and misinformed the US State Department and its Ambassadors abroad in Pakistan and India in an effort to keep secret from them and the American public, the President's desire to support Pakistan and to blame India as the source of the conflict. The resulting confusion and misunderstanding by the diplomatic community raised tensions in the region, lengthened the conflict, and weakened America's credibility in the sub-continent. / text

When the first Nixon Administration took office, all the main conditions that make foreign policy innovation likely were present in an acute form: a combination of external and domestic crises coupled with widespread political self-doubt and unrest. There were essentially two alternatives for the new Administration: First, to implement a 'holding operation' that would preserve the key features of the conservative-realist definition of the US national interest, but would also include tactical adjustments to a changed environment that demanded - at least temporarily -a more differentiated policy of global containment. The second option open to the Nixon-Kissinger team was to set in motion a process of redefinition of the prevailing notions of national interest and security, and of the objectives of US foreign policy, questioning the basic (conservative-realist) ideological presuppositions that had guided this policy until the Vietnam debacle, and also the role played by the 'liberal' ideological discourse as a legitimating device disconnected from US actions - particularly in the Third World. The central thesis of the study is that substantial ideological innovation - not merely a change in tactics - was feasible and also necessary at the time in order to avoid a repetition of costly mistakes, to relate the US to emerging forces in world politics, and to restore an equilibrium between the ethical values that give cohesion to a free society and its actions abroad. Kissinger brought to office a conceptual framework that allowed him to impose significant coherence upon US foreign policy, but which also made it extremely difficult for him and Nixon to introduce the ideological innovations called for by the Vietnam experience. In this study four themes intertwine: (1) a consideration of the nature and functions of ideology in politics; (2) a characterization of US foreign policy ideology; (3) a discussion of the problem of innovation in the field of foreign policy; (4) an analysis of Kissinger's political thought and the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy strategy. The conclusion is reached that under Nixon and Kissinger the conservative-realist aspect of US foreign policy ideology reached a higher point of political maturity and sophistication, without in any fundamental sense deviating from the assumptions about US aims and security interests that took America into Vietnam.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1961. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-84).

No description available.

University of Macau / Faculty of Arts and Humanities. / Department of English

No description available.

This thesis explores the notion of personality as it impacts presidential behavior. Relying on the arguably fragmented field of personality and policymaking, the paper offers a case study of President Richard Nixon's experience with the Family Assistance Plan, a landmark piece of welfare reform. In contending that character is most evident in situations that are less structured or that permit individual expression, I argue that President Nixon's personality greatly impacted his rhetorical style and was also evident through his reluctance to conduct bargaining with members of Congress. To add rigor to the analyses, I borrow heavily from the work of Erwin Hargrove (1998) who, in putting forth a model of political leadership that draws upon elements of moral commitment, character, integrity and cultural discernment, holds that effective democratic leadership combines strong personal aptitude with a coherent assessment of what action history will permit. Furthermore, this thesis contends that President Nixon failed to discern the grains of history that had characterized past welfare reform; the proposed major overhaul of welfare, commenced in the aftermath of the War on Poverty, was attacked from both the left and right, and thus failed to make it intact through the 91st Congress. / Master of Arts