The oil shocks of the 1970s, initiated by the first Arab oil embargo in 1973, stunned the industrialized world. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) controlled a resource that was vital to the national well-being and national security of America and its allies. In the United States, gas lines formed as Americans waited for increasingly costly and scarce fuel. Europeans realized that the energy shortages, which they originally believed to be short-term, might permanently change their lives. This dissertation places the historical debate about the effectiveness of domestic and foreign energy policy within the framework of the global transformations taking place at the end of the twentieth century. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the advent of petrodollars on world currency markets, the emergence of the Soviet Union as an oil exporter, the rise of OPEC as a regulator of oil prices and the consequent decline in the power of the seven major multinational oil companies, and the growth of a global environmental movement, all contributed to the shifting interplay of forces confronting the United States and its allies in the late twentieth century and shaped the debate over national and international energy policy. America's efforts to work with its allies to develop a cohesive national and international energy policy fell victim to the struggle between political autonomy and interdependence in an era of globalization. The allied response to the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan highlighted these conflicts within the alliance.

The concept of an apologetic president has only recently emerged in the United States. All presidents have made mistakes, but only recently have Americans come to expect apologies from them. The development of an increasingly critical media has necessitated that future presidents hone the art of apologizing. This thesis extrapolates lessons in this skill from the apologies of Presidents Nixon and Clinton. Watergate and Lewinsky-gate were cover-up scandals that rocked the nation in the 1970s and '90s. Although the presidential misconduct in both cases were similar, the way each president opted to navigate his controversy differed dramatically. Both presidents initially tried out the tactic of denying all accusations but branched off after taking that step. A comparison of their approaches offers insight into the possible ways of seeking forgiveness from a scorned public. The nuances of delivering a successful apology are dictated by circumstantial, structural factors as well as the personality of the president, which explains why no two apologies are the same. Although the art of apologizing will continue to evolve over time, future presidents stand to learn a great deal from studying Nixon and Clinton. This thesis finds that even though Americans get a certain degree of satisfaction from exposing presidential wrongdoing and making life more than uncomfortable for a wayward executive, the legacies of Nixon and Clinton are proof that a smattering of mistakes cannot completely overshadow a tradition of accomplishments. No matter how vindictive Americans may appear to be in the thick of a scandal, in the long run, the United States is a forgiving nation.

The study of terrorism has gained attention and prominence post-September 11, 2001. Much of the literature on terrorism is teleological, and many authors focus their research on America’s involvement with terrorism in the Middle East beginning with the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. Accordingly, the literature fails to highlight the rise of terrorism in the Middle East and the importance of the Middle East to American foreign policy during the Nixon Administration. This study looks at how the American media and the American government conceptualized terrorism during the Nixon Administration, from 1969 to 1974. An analysis of American print media sources demonstrates that terrorism was associated with the Middle East more than other regions in the later years of Nixon’s presidency. American government documents reveal that the government linked terrorism with the Middle East after a fundamental shift in the perception of terrorism took place after the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972. In order to understand the contemporary manifestation of terrorism in American life, it is imperative to understand the history of how America conceptualized terrorism.

The study of terrorism has gained attention and prominence post-September 11, 2001. Much of the literature on terrorism is teleological, and many authors focus their research on America’s involvement with terrorism in the Middle East beginning with the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. Accordingly, the literature fails to highlight the rise of terrorism in the Middle East and the importance of the Middle East to American foreign policy during the Nixon Administration. This study looks at how the American media and the American government conceptualized terrorism during the Nixon Administration, from 1969 to 1974. An analysis of American print media sources demonstrates that terrorism was associated with the Middle East more than other regions in the later years of Nixon’s presidency. American government documents reveal that the government linked terrorism with the Middle East after a fundamental shift in the perception of terrorism took place after the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972. In order to understand the contemporary manifestation of terrorism in American life, it is imperative to understand the history of how America conceptualized terrorism.

Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of History, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF document. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 55 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-55).

When the Judiciary Committee initiated its impeachment inquiry of Richard Nixon for his complicity in Watergate, it was the first time that the House of Representatives had commenced such a proceeding against a president since Andrew Johnson in 1868. Johnson’s impeachment and subsequent Senate acquittal was widely regarded as an example of Congress run amok, its partisanship so blatant and its failure so grand that many Americans assumed that presidential impeachment had become obsolete. But impeachment, by its nature, is political, and each Congress defines the bounds of high crimes and misdemeanors in light of the current political climate. For the House in October 1973, Nixon’s Watergate scandal threatened to breach those limits. From the outset, Judiciary Chairman Peter Rodino recognized that if his Committee were to recommend impeaching President Nixon without bipartisan support, the American public would interpret it as another Johnson-like fiasco, and a threat to the constitutional system of government. To thwart suspicion that the Democratic majority would impeach Nixon exclusively for its own political gain, Rodino preached fairness to the President, even as Nixon refused to comply with the Committee’s investigation. Despite Rodino’s assurances, however, his procedural proposals—designed in consultation with the Committee’s Special Counsel, John Doar—did not always seem fair enough to many Republicans. At the same time, many Democrats believed that Rodino and Doar had already accorded Nixon too many rights, which encroached upon the House’s constitutionally guaranteed “sole power of impeachment.” Ultimately, Rodino conceded that he could not marshal a bipartisan majority without making compromises with members who expected more fairness than he and Doar had initially offered. Despite pressure from their congressional leadership, constituents, and the White House, seven southern Democrats and moderate Republicans formed a “Fragile Coalition” to vote their conscience in favor of three articles of impeachment. In doing so, they convinced a fearful and cynical American public that impeachment could be just, and in the case of Richard Nixon, necessary. / text

Richard Nixon undoubtedly casts a long shadow on the American political conscience. Nowhere is this clearer than in the political behavior of American voters born 1950-1954. These baby-boomers were the youngest voters eligible to vote in 1972, and experienced the greatest scandal in postwar American politics at an important age. The question this thesis asks is: what happens when the most populous cohort in American history experiences one of the most contentious periods in postwar politics during the most important years of psychological development? This study finds three significant effects. First, this cohort shows lower levels of civic engagement throughout life. Second, this cohort is more likely to vote Democrat. Third, this cohort is more ideologically polarized. Not only are these trends clear, they are also distinct from adjacent cohorts.

Thesis (M.A.), History--University of Central Oklahoma, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 142-152).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Bowling Green State University, 2008. / Document formatted into pages; contains v, 277 p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (D.A.)--Illinois State University, 1982. / Title from title page screen, viewed April 7, 2005. Dissertation Committee: Joseph Grabill (chair), Mark Plummer, Charles Gray, Earl Reitan, Hibbert R. Roberts. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-121) and abstract. Also available in print.