No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 319-325).

Thesis (M.A.)--Humboldt State University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-65). Also available via the Internet from the Humboldt eScholar web site.

Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Thesis (M.A.)--Brigham Young University. Dept. of Communications, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

The concept of an apologetic president has only recently emerged in the United States. All presidents have made mistakes, but only recently have Americans come to expect apologies from them. The development of an increasingly critical media has necessitated that future presidents hone the art of apologizing. This thesis extrapolates lessons in this skill from the apologies of Presidents Nixon and Clinton. Watergate and Lewinsky-gate were cover-up scandals that rocked the nation in the 1970s and '90s. Although the presidential misconduct in both cases were similar, the way each president opted to navigate his controversy differed dramatically. Both presidents initially tried out the tactic of denying all accusations but branched off after taking that step. A comparison of their approaches offers insight into the possible ways of seeking forgiveness from a scorned public. The nuances of delivering a successful apology are dictated by circumstantial, structural factors as well as the personality of the president, which explains why no two apologies are the same. Although the art of apologizing will continue to evolve over time, future presidents stand to learn a great deal from studying Nixon and Clinton. This thesis finds that even though Americans get a certain degree of satisfaction from exposing presidential wrongdoing and making life more than uncomfortable for a wayward executive, the legacies of Nixon and Clinton are proof that a smattering of mistakes cannot completely overshadow a tradition of accomplishments. No matter how vindictive Americans may appear to be in the thick of a scandal, in the long run, the United States is a forgiving nation.

When the Judiciary Committee initiated its impeachment inquiry of Richard Nixon for his complicity in Watergate, it was the first time that the House of Representatives had commenced such a proceeding against a president since Andrew Johnson in 1868. Johnson’s impeachment and subsequent Senate acquittal was widely regarded as an example of Congress run amok, its partisanship so blatant and its failure so grand that many Americans assumed that presidential impeachment had become obsolete. But impeachment, by its nature, is political, and each Congress defines the bounds of high crimes and misdemeanors in light of the current political climate. For the House in October 1973, Nixon’s Watergate scandal threatened to breach those limits. From the outset, Judiciary Chairman Peter Rodino recognized that if his Committee were to recommend impeaching President Nixon without bipartisan support, the American public would interpret it as another Johnson-like fiasco, and a threat to the constitutional system of government. To thwart suspicion that the Democratic majority would impeach Nixon exclusively for its own political gain, Rodino preached fairness to the President, even as Nixon refused to comply with the Committee’s investigation. Despite Rodino’s assurances, however, his procedural proposals—designed in consultation with the Committee’s Special Counsel, John Doar—did not always seem fair enough to many Republicans. At the same time, many Democrats believed that Rodino and Doar had already accorded Nixon too many rights, which encroached upon the House’s constitutionally guaranteed “sole power of impeachment.” Ultimately, Rodino conceded that he could not marshal a bipartisan majority without making compromises with members who expected more fairness than he and Doar had initially offered. Despite pressure from their congressional leadership, constituents, and the White House, seven southern Democrats and moderate Republicans formed a “Fragile Coalition” to vote their conscience in favor of three articles of impeachment. In doing so, they convinced a fearful and cynical American public that impeachment could be just, and in the case of Richard Nixon, necessary. / text

Richard Nixon undoubtedly casts a long shadow on the American political conscience. Nowhere is this clearer than in the political behavior of American voters born 1950-1954. These baby-boomers were the youngest voters eligible to vote in 1972, and experienced the greatest scandal in postwar American politics at an important age. The question this thesis asks is: what happens when the most populous cohort in American history experiences one of the most contentious periods in postwar politics during the most important years of psychological development? This study finds three significant effects. First, this cohort shows lower levels of civic engagement throughout life. Second, this cohort is more likely to vote Democrat. Third, this cohort is more ideologically polarized. Not only are these trends clear, they are also distinct from adjacent cohorts.

Texte remanié de: Th. univ.--Droit public--Paris 1, 1997. / Bibliogr. p. 353-374. Index.

Deep Throat is one of the most famous anonymous newspaper sources in American journalism. He is known for helping Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein uncover the Watergate scandal that led to President Richard Nixon's impeachment and resignation in 1974. Deep Throat's identity was a source of curiosity until he was revealed in 2005 as the former number two figure at the FBI, William Mark Felt. This thesis will show that, despite Felt's notoriety, Deep Throat was not an indispensable part of Woodward and Bernstein's Watergate coverage, speaking with Woodward 16 times about Watergate during the reporters' coverage. Deep Throat was important to the Watergate story because he kept it alive. Deep Throat inspired numerous publications, which all served to create his mythic status. Many attempted to guess his true identity, although Woodward and Bernstein refused to confirm most guesses. An enduring Deep Throat legacy is that his nickname has become synonymous with deep background - a source that cannot be quoted or named. There was no clear consensus as to how people felt about Felt's role as Deep Throat. There were many negative and positive reactions when he revealed himself. His family sided with him; Nixon associates were unhappy with him. However, more than 30 years after the Watergate scandal, Deep Throat was still big news. No matter what people thought about him, they paid attention and they knew the story.