Deterrence as a military strategy aims to discourage an aggressor from initiating unwanted courses of actions by convincing the aggressor that cost exceeds the profit. In cyberspace, where the costs are lower, deterrence is disputed because of the natural interconnectedness and constant actions. The aim of this study is to investigate how the US understands cyber deterrence. This study is motivated by the current ambiguity regarding whether deterrence works in cyberspace or not. Using both theories of conventional and cyber deterrence together with theories of offense and defense, the study focuses on the US since they remain at the center of development regarding cyber deterrence. Through a discourse analysis using Bacchis What´s the problem represented to be approach, the investigation of US policy from 2018 shows that the US has adopted theories of cyber deterrence in their policy. However, the presumptions of the problem presentation have rather descended from theories of conventional deterrence. The solutions implemented indicate that the US has an advantage in cyber offense capabilities, but the study also shows that they are moving towards more defense-oriented capabilities in the future. In the stress of taking action, the US end up interfusing premises and actions which may affect the principle of intervention and thus the security of the American population.

The thesis: "The Causes of Iraqi War: Why the US Administration decided to invade Iraq in 2003" focuses on explanation why the administration of the USA made that step. The specification of the roots of war is based on five causes and seventeen subcauses according to the essay of Stephen Van Evera and other scholars, and the paper trough the methodology of text's analyzes investigates behavior, decision-making process and motivations of the US administration (the level of units) and some steps of the US president G. W. Bush (individual level) in the process leading to the war in Iraq. Concerning the causes of war, the paper introduces different concepts of the offense-defense balance and analyzes whether the balance was disrupted. Secondly, it examines the role of cumulative resources in Iraq like oil, territory and state structures and it shows how they influenced the decision. Third, it searches for the linkage among an emergence of a new threat and responses to it which mouthed to the acceptance of the concept of the first move advantage. Fourth, the thesis accounts for the roots of misperception, where they originate and how they operated in perception of the US administration of the Iraqi threat. Finally, the investigation of the last root of conflict explains why and how windows of...