The principle of the offensive in naval warfare has long been studied by scholars of military science. Studies suggest that in order for the principles of war to be practically useful for professionals, they need to be described concretely. The principle of the offensive as described in the Swedish Doctrine for Naval Tactics however, is not. This thesis aims to identify different success factors for naval offensive operations by using a qualitative analysis of Castex’s, Hughes’, and Vego’s naval theories, which when combined may form the principles for a successful offensive. A qualitative case study has been utilised, with literature from the successful Israeli naval offensive in the Yom Kippur-war, and the failed Argentinian naval offensive in the Falklands war; in order to identify which factors are practicable in a modern context. All factors, intelligence, manoeuvre, concentration of force, numerical superiority, qualitative superiority, adaptation to capabilities differences, and command and control, were identified in the Israeli offensive. In the Argentinian offensive, only the manoeuvre factor was identified, due to a lack of sufficient intelligence and command and control. The conclusions are that all factors were useful for a successive offensive action, however, more research is necessary for further generalization.