Summaries in English, Afrikaans and Zulu / The significance for a bank to determine its risk appetite has become crucial over the years, based on past and recent risk events in the financial services sector. Regulatory pressure, a focus on corporate governance and risk management have been stimuli for many changes in the financial industry. An example is the need to establish an operational risk appetite framework. It is against this background that the study aimed to identify guiding principles for an operational risk appetite framework that can be used to determine the operational risk appetite of a bank. The study entailed a literature review and an empirical analysis of the principles for an operational risk appetite framework for the banking industry of South Africa. A survey was used to collate the data. Also, the researcher endeavoured to establish a gap between the principles and the current status of implementation of the confirmed principles. The descriptive and inferential results indicated that most of the identified principles were viewed as important and crucial for an operational risk appetite framework for a South African bank, although some were not yet fully implemented. The study also confirmed the principles for an effective operational risk appetite framework to comply with regulatory requirements and to ensure a sound risk management process to support the achievement of business objectives. / Dat 'n bank in staat is om sy risikoaptyt in die finansiëledienstesektor vas te stel, is betekenisvol en dit het oor jare heen vanweë vorige en onlangse risikogebeurtenisse van kritieke belang geword. Die druk van regulering, 'n fokus op korporatiewe bestuur en risikobestuur is stimuli vir talle veranderinge in die finansiële bedryf. 'n Voorbeeld hiervan is die noodsaaklikheid daarvan om 'n operasionele risikoaptytraamwerk op te stel. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die studie beoog om riglyne te identifiseer vir 'n operasionele risikoaptytraamwerk wat gebruik kan word om 'n bank se operasionele risikoaptyt te bepaal. Die studie omvat ’n literatuuroorsig en ’n empiriese ontleding van die beginsels van ’n operasionele risikoaptytraamwerk vir die bankbedryf in Suid-Afrika. ’n Opname is gebruik om die ingesamelde data te vergelyk, en die navorser het gepoog om ’n leemte tussen die beginsels en die huidige stand van implementering van die bevestigde beginsels uit te wys. In die beskrywende en inferensiële resultate word aangedui dat die meeste van die geïdentifiseerde beginsels beskou word as belangrik en kritiek vir ’n operasionele risikoaptytraamwerk vir ’n Suid-Afrikaanse bank, al word sommige beginsels nog nie ten volle geïmplementeer nie. Die studie bevestig die beginsels van ’n effektiewe operasionele risikoaptytraamwerk met die oog daarop om aan reguleringsvereistes te voldoen en ’n deurdagte risikobestuursproses te verseker en sodoende die verwesenliking van sakedoelwitte te ondersteun. / Ngokuhamba kweminyaka kuya kubaluleka kakhulu ukuba ibhanki iwujonge ngononophelo umngcipheko enokuwuthatha, ngenxa yokubona iziganeko zomngcipheko ezenzekileyo kwicandelo leenkonzo zoqoqosho. Uxinzelelo lolawulo, ugxininiso kulawulo lweenkampani kunye nolawulo lomngcipheko zizinto eziphembelele iinguqu ezininzi kurhwebo lokwenza imali. Umzekelo sisidingo sokuseka uphahla lokusebenza ngomngcipheko. Zezi zinto ezibangela ukuba esi sifundo sijolise ekufumaniseni iinqobo ezisisikhokelo sokuqwalasela umngcipheko onokuthathwa, nesinokusetyenziselwa ukulinganisela umngcipheko onokuthathwa yibhanki. Esi sifundo siphengulule uluncwadi olukhoyo ngalo mbandela kunye nohlalutyo olunobungqina lweenqobo ezinokusetyenziselwa ukulinganisela umngcipheko onokuthathwa licandelo leebhanki zoMzantsi Afrika. Kwenziwa uhlolo zimvo ekuqokeleleni iinkcukacha zolwazi. Umphandi wabuya wazama ukubonisa umahluko phakathi kweenqobo ezimiselweyo nemeko ekuyiyo ekusetyenzisweni kweenqobo ezivunyiweyo. Iziphumo ezichazayo nezicingelwayo zibonise ukuba uninzi lweenqobo zibonwa njengamanqaku abalulekileyo nangundoqo okwenza uphahla lokusebenza ngomngcipheko onokuthathwa yibhanki eMzantsi Afrika, nangona ezinye zingekasetyenziswa ngokupheleleyo. Esi sifundo siphinde sangqinisisa iinqobo zophahla olululo lokusebenza ngomngcipheko onokuthathwa ezimele ukuthobela imigaqo elawulayo nokuqinisekisa inkqubo yomgcipheko eqinileyo yokuxhasa ukufunyanwa kweenjongo zoshishino. / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management)

The financial crisis turmoil has exposed notable weakness in the risk management processes of the financial services industry. It has also led to a critical look at the scope of the various risk types as well as the classification of loss events. More importantly, the effects that incorrect risk classification might have on capital requirements are now also examined and taken into account. Boundary events between credit risk and operational risk continue to be a significant source of concern for regulators and the industry in general. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) requires that boundary events should be treated as credit risk for the purposes of calculating minimum regulatory capital under the Basel II Framework. Such losses will, therefore, not be subject to any operational risk capital charges. However, for the purposes of internal operational risk management, banks are required to identify all material operational risk losses. Boundary events should be flagged separately within a bank’s internal operational risk database. The Basel II Framework does not provide any further guidelines as to what constitutes boundary events and, therefore, consistent guiding principles that banks can follow for accurately classifying and subsequently flagging such events do not exist. The potential exists that actual boundary events might be classified as purely credit risk, and correctly be included in the credit risk capital charge, but not be flagged separately within the bank’s internal operational risk database. Alternatively, boundary events might be classified as operational risk and, therefore, be subject to the operational risk capital charge, instead of the credit risk capital charge. The former instance might give rise to an operational risk manager not being completely informed of the operational risks that the business is facing. The emphasis should always be on the management of risks and for this reason it is important that a financial institution indicates and flags all boundary events in their operational risk systems. To remedy this lack of guidance on the boundary event issue, guidelines are provided that banks can utilise within their risk classification processes. The approach utilised is to consider mechanisms and tools for classification, guidance from the Operational Risk Data Exchange (ORX) and the BCBS, as well as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). By compiling and submitting questionnaires to five South African banks, an investigation is conducted in order to obtain a view of the current mechanisms, tools and approaches that South African Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) banks currently utilise within their classification processes. The effectiveness of boundary event classification is assessed by analysing the percentage of losses classified as boundary. In addition, the degree of uniformity or disparity in the classification of typical boundary event scenarios is considered. This analysis is performed by providing respondents with a total of 16 typical boundary event risk descriptions, and requesting the respondents to classify each of the losses in the scenarios as credit risk, operational risk or boundary event type. / Thesis (M.Com. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

Basel II provides banks with four options that may be used to calculate regulatory capital for operational risk. Each of these options (except the most basic approach) requires an underlying risk measurement and management system, with increasing complexity and more refined capital calculations under the more advanced approaches. Approaches available are BIA, TSA, ASA and AMA. The most advanced and complex option under Basel II is the AMA. This approach allows a bank to calculate its regulatory and economic capital requirements (using internal models) based on internal risk variables and profiles, rather than exposure proxies like gross income. This is the only risk–sensitive approach allowed by and described in Basel II. Accompanying internal models, complex and sophisticated measurement instruments, risk management processes and frameworks, as well as a robust governance structure need to be implemented. This study focuses on the practical design and implementation of an AMA capital model. This includes a beginning–to–end solution for capital modelling and covers all elements of data analysis, capital calculation and capital allocation. The proposed capital model is completely risk–based, leading to risk–sensitive capital calculations and allocations for all business lines in a bank. The model was constructed to comply fully with all Basel II requirements and standards. The proposed model was subsequently applied to one South African bank’s operational risk data, i.e. risk scenario and internal loss data of the bank were used as inputs into the proposed capital model. Regulatory capital requirements were calculated for all business lines in the bank and for the bank as a whole on a group level. Total capital requirements were also allocated to all business lines in the bank. For regulatory capital purposes, this equated to the stand–alone capital requirement of each business line. Calculations excluded the modelling and incorporation of insurance, expected loss offsets and correlation. These capital mitigation techniques were, however, proposed as part of the comprehensive capital model. AMA based capital calculations for the bank’s business lines resulted in significant capital movements compared to TSA capital requirements for the same calculation periods. The retail banking business line was allocated less capital compared to corresponding TSA estimates. This is mainly attributable to lower levels of tail risk exposure given high income levels (which are the bases for TSA capital calculations). AMA–based capital for the investment banking business line was higher than corresponding TSA estimates, due to high levels of extreme risk exposure relative to income generated. Employing capital modelling results in operational risk management and performance measurement was discussed and proposals made. This included the use of capital requirements (modelling results) in day–to–day operational risk management and in strategic decision making processes and strategic risk management. Proposals were also made on how to use modelling results and capital allocations in performance measurement. It was proposed that operational risk capital costs should be included in risk–adjusted performance measures, which can in turn be linked to remuneration principles and processes. Ultimately this would incentivise sound operational risk management practices and also satisfy the Basel II use test requirements with regards to model outputs, i.e. model outputs are actively used in risk management and performance measurement. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

The financial crisis turmoil has exposed notable weakness in the risk management processes of the financial services industry. It has also led to a critical look at the scope of the various risk types as well as the classification of loss events. More importantly, the effects that incorrect risk classification might have on capital requirements are now also examined and taken into account. Boundary events between credit risk and operational risk continue to be a significant source of concern for regulators and the industry in general. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) requires that boundary events should be treated as credit risk for the purposes of calculating minimum regulatory capital under the Basel II Framework. Such losses will, therefore, not be subject to any operational risk capital charges. However, for the purposes of internal operational risk management, banks are required to identify all material operational risk losses. Boundary events should be flagged separately within a bank’s internal operational risk database. The Basel II Framework does not provide any further guidelines as to what constitutes boundary events and, therefore, consistent guiding principles that banks can follow for accurately classifying and subsequently flagging such events do not exist. The potential exists that actual boundary events might be classified as purely credit risk, and correctly be included in the credit risk capital charge, but not be flagged separately within the bank’s internal operational risk database. Alternatively, boundary events might be classified as operational risk and, therefore, be subject to the operational risk capital charge, instead of the credit risk capital charge. The former instance might give rise to an operational risk manager not being completely informed of the operational risks that the business is facing. The emphasis should always be on the management of risks and for this reason it is important that a financial institution indicates and flags all boundary events in their operational risk systems. To remedy this lack of guidance on the boundary event issue, guidelines are provided that banks can utilise within their risk classification processes. The approach utilised is to consider mechanisms and tools for classification, guidance from the Operational Risk Data Exchange (ORX) and the BCBS, as well as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). By compiling and submitting questionnaires to five South African banks, an investigation is conducted in order to obtain a view of the current mechanisms, tools and approaches that South African Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) banks currently utilise within their classification processes. The effectiveness of boundary event classification is assessed by analysing the percentage of losses classified as boundary. In addition, the degree of uniformity or disparity in the classification of typical boundary event scenarios is considered. This analysis is performed by providing respondents with a total of 16 typical boundary event risk descriptions, and requesting the respondents to classify each of the losses in the scenarios as credit risk, operational risk or boundary event type. / Thesis (M.Com. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

Basel II provides banks with four options that may be used to calculate regulatory capital for operational risk. Each of these options (except the most basic approach) requires an underlying risk measurement and management system, with increasing complexity and more refined capital calculations under the more advanced approaches. Approaches available are BIA, TSA, ASA and AMA. The most advanced and complex option under Basel II is the AMA. This approach allows a bank to calculate its regulatory and economic capital requirements (using internal models) based on internal risk variables and profiles, rather than exposure proxies like gross income. This is the only risk–sensitive approach allowed by and described in Basel II. Accompanying internal models, complex and sophisticated measurement instruments, risk management processes and frameworks, as well as a robust governance structure need to be implemented. This study focuses on the practical design and implementation of an AMA capital model. This includes a beginning–to–end solution for capital modelling and covers all elements of data analysis, capital calculation and capital allocation. The proposed capital model is completely risk–based, leading to risk–sensitive capital calculations and allocations for all business lines in a bank. The model was constructed to comply fully with all Basel II requirements and standards. The proposed model was subsequently applied to one South African bank’s operational risk data, i.e. risk scenario and internal loss data of the bank were used as inputs into the proposed capital model. Regulatory capital requirements were calculated for all business lines in the bank and for the bank as a whole on a group level. Total capital requirements were also allocated to all business lines in the bank. For regulatory capital purposes, this equated to the stand–alone capital requirement of each business line. Calculations excluded the modelling and incorporation of insurance, expected loss offsets and correlation. These capital mitigation techniques were, however, proposed as part of the comprehensive capital model. AMA based capital calculations for the bank’s business lines resulted in significant capital movements compared to TSA capital requirements for the same calculation periods. The retail banking business line was allocated less capital compared to corresponding TSA estimates. This is mainly attributable to lower levels of tail risk exposure given high income levels (which are the bases for TSA capital calculations). AMA–based capital for the investment banking business line was higher than corresponding TSA estimates, due to high levels of extreme risk exposure relative to income generated. Employing capital modelling results in operational risk management and performance measurement was discussed and proposals made. This included the use of capital requirements (modelling results) in day–to–day operational risk management and in strategic decision making processes and strategic risk management. Proposals were also made on how to use modelling results and capital allocations in performance measurement. It was proposed that operational risk capital costs should be included in risk–adjusted performance measures, which can in turn be linked to remuneration principles and processes. Ultimately this would incentivise sound operational risk management practices and also satisfy the Basel II use test requirements with regards to model outputs, i.e. model outputs are actively used in risk management and performance measurement. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

Background: Platinum refinery workers are exposed to various elements during the refining process, with soluble platinum salts posing a potential health risk. Platinum salts are extremely potent sensitisers that can result in the clinical syndrome of platinum salt sensitivity (PSS) that leads to skin and respiratory hypersensitivity in refinery workers. Several published research articles document refinery workers’ exposure levels to soluble platinum salts during production. However, the exposure levels to soluble platinum salts during non–routine stock take activities are unknown although cases of sensitisation have been diagnosed following these nonoperational periods. Stock take for the platinum refinery under study commenced on 18 January 2010 and ended 22 February 2010. Increased emphasis was placed on flushing plant equipment rather than dismantling it. The aim was to dismantle 10% of what previously was dismantled to reduce the risk of exposing employees to soluble platinum salts, to reduce the chance of damaging plant equipment and for cost and time saving purposes. Aim: The objectives of this study are to: (i) quantify work area and personal exposure levels; (ii) identify work areas and work practices with exposure levels exceeding the occupational exposure limit (OEL) (>2 ug/m3); (iii) determine whether exposure levels differ significantly between: a) personal sampling groups (engineering versus production), b) area sampling groups (open versus closed–face sampling), c) work areas, d) total area and total personal sampling groups and to (iv) evaluate the efficiency of the current control measures utilised. Design and Method: A total of 58 platinum samples were collected, consisting of 38 personal and 20 area samples. Personal sampling consisted of Institute of Occupational Medicine (IOM) samplers housing reusable 25 mm filter cassettes with mixed cellulose ester (MCE) membrane filters for the collection of inhalable airborne particles. Because both the cassette and the filter were pre and post–weighed as a single unit, all particles collected (even those against the walls of the cassette) were included in the analysis. Sampling was conducted in accordance with the stock take schedule and scope and included a roster for the systematic dismantling and cleaning of the refinery, following the process flow. A target population of maximum five fitters and five operators per area were identified, responsible for dismantling and cleaning plant equipment respectively. The sampling strategy was based on the identification and sampling of employees presumed to have the highest exposure risk. The Occupational Exposure Sampling Strategy Manual (OESSM) refers to this as the “maximum risk employees” (Liedel et al., 1977). The selection of the maximum risk employees was done with reasonable certainty since the employees sampled were working closest to the source of exposure. Sampling was conducted for the total duration of the task consisting of single sample measurements. Area sampling was conducted by means of BUCKAir high volume samplers fitted with preweighed 47 mm MCE filter cassettes to show the spread of the contaminant in the work area. The high volume samplers were calibrated to operate at a sampling volume of 20 L/min. The sampling heads were positioned 1.5 m from the ground surface and as near as possible to the work location or failing this as near as is possible to major sources of exposure. Samples were collected and analysed according to the method for the determination of hazardous substances 46/2 (MDHS 46/2). This is an advanced sampling and analysis standard which enables detection of low levels of soluble platinum (0.01 ug/m3). Results: Thirty eight personal platinum samples were collected, consisting of a sampled engineering (n=15) and production (n=23) subgroup. Out of the thirty eight personal samples taken in total, 21% of the samples’ concentrations exceeded the OEL of 2 ug/m3 and ranged between 0.004–20.479 ug/m3. Twenty area platinum samples were collected, consisting of open (n=10) and closed face (n=10) sampling. Out of the twenty area samples taken in total, 10% of the samples’ concentrations exceeded the OEL of 2 ug/m3 and ranged between 0.0004–5.752 ug/m3. The mean personal exposure levels for the production subgroup (2.739 ug/m3) were significantly higher compared to the engineering subgroup’s mean personal exposure levels (0.393 ug/m3). This significant difference (p=0.033) was expected since the production subgroup was more exposed and involved in the digging out of residues and the cleaning of plant equipment compared to the engineering subgroup with limited exposure and involved in the opening of plant equipment. Although the mean exposure levels for open face sampling (0.725 ug/m3) were higher compared to the mean exposure levels for closed face sampling (0.441 ug/m3) no significant difference (p=0.579) were noted. The mean area exposure levels (0.583 ug/m3) were significantly lower (p=0.004) compared to the mean personal exposure levels (1.813 ug/m3) for similar areas and tasks performed and, therefore, not an effective indicator of personal exposure levels. Higher personal exposure levels were expected since the workers were closer to the source of exposure and since the platinum salts could have diluted in the workplace’s air resulting in lower area exposure levels. Conclusion: The research study addressed the problem statement, met the objectives set out in Chapter 1, hypotheses were accepted and rejected and future studies were recommended. It was hypothesised that: a) refinery workers are exposed to airborne soluble platinum during non–operational periods; b) exposure levels do not differ significantly between the personal sampling groups (engineering vs production); c) exposure levels do not differ significantly between the area sampling groups (open versus closed–face sampling); d) exposure levels do not differ significantly between work areas; e) exposure levels differ significantly between total personal and total area sampling groups. The results confirmed that refinery workers are exposed to airborne soluble platinum during non–operational periods and hypothesis a was accepted. The personal exposure levels of the engineering versus production sampling groups differed statistically (p=0.033) and hypothesis b was rejected. The exposure levels of the open and closed face sampling groups did not differ significantly (p=0.579) and hypothesis c was accepted. In addition no statistical difference (p>0.05) was indicated between the work areas and hypothesis d was accepted. Total personal versus total area exposure levels (p=0.004) differed statistically and hypothesis e was accepted. / Thesis (M.Sc. (Occupational Hygiene))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Background: Platinum refinery workers are exposed to various elements during the refining process, with soluble platinum salts posing a potential health risk. Platinum salts are extremely potent sensitisers that can result in the clinical syndrome of platinum salt sensitivity (PSS) that leads to skin and respiratory hypersensitivity in refinery workers. Several published research articles document refinery workers’ exposure levels to soluble platinum salts during production. However, the exposure levels to soluble platinum salts during non–routine stock take activities are unknown although cases of sensitisation have been diagnosed following these nonoperational periods. Stock take for the platinum refinery under study commenced on 18 January 2010 and ended 22 February 2010. Increased emphasis was placed on flushing plant equipment rather than dismantling it. The aim was to dismantle 10% of what previously was dismantled to reduce the risk of exposing employees to soluble platinum salts, to reduce the chance of damaging plant equipment and for cost and time saving purposes. Aim: The objectives of this study are to: (i) quantify work area and personal exposure levels; (ii) identify work areas and work practices with exposure levels exceeding the occupational exposure limit (OEL) (>2 ug/m3); (iii) determine whether exposure levels differ significantly between: a) personal sampling groups (engineering versus production), b) area sampling groups (open versus closed–face sampling), c) work areas, d) total area and total personal sampling groups and to (iv) evaluate the efficiency of the current control measures utilised. Design and Method: A total of 58 platinum samples were collected, consisting of 38 personal and 20 area samples. Personal sampling consisted of Institute of Occupational Medicine (IOM) samplers housing reusable 25 mm filter cassettes with mixed cellulose ester (MCE) membrane filters for the collection of inhalable airborne particles. Because both the cassette and the filter were pre and post–weighed as a single unit, all particles collected (even those against the walls of the cassette) were included in the analysis. Sampling was conducted in accordance with the stock take schedule and scope and included a roster for the systematic dismantling and cleaning of the refinery, following the process flow. A target population of maximum five fitters and five operators per area were identified, responsible for dismantling and cleaning plant equipment respectively. The sampling strategy was based on the identification and sampling of employees presumed to have the highest exposure risk. The Occupational Exposure Sampling Strategy Manual (OESSM) refers to this as the “maximum risk employees” (Liedel et al., 1977). The selection of the maximum risk employees was done with reasonable certainty since the employees sampled were working closest to the source of exposure. Sampling was conducted for the total duration of the task consisting of single sample measurements. Area sampling was conducted by means of BUCKAir high volume samplers fitted with preweighed 47 mm MCE filter cassettes to show the spread of the contaminant in the work area. The high volume samplers were calibrated to operate at a sampling volume of 20 L/min. The sampling heads were positioned 1.5 m from the ground surface and as near as possible to the work location or failing this as near as is possible to major sources of exposure. Samples were collected and analysed according to the method for the determination of hazardous substances 46/2 (MDHS 46/2). This is an advanced sampling and analysis standard which enables detection of low levels of soluble platinum (0.01 ug/m3). Results: Thirty eight personal platinum samples were collected, consisting of a sampled engineering (n=15) and production (n=23) subgroup. Out of the thirty eight personal samples taken in total, 21% of the samples’ concentrations exceeded the OEL of 2 ug/m3 and ranged between 0.004–20.479 ug/m3. Twenty area platinum samples were collected, consisting of open (n=10) and closed face (n=10) sampling. Out of the twenty area samples taken in total, 10% of the samples’ concentrations exceeded the OEL of 2 ug/m3 and ranged between 0.0004–5.752 ug/m3. The mean personal exposure levels for the production subgroup (2.739 ug/m3) were significantly higher compared to the engineering subgroup’s mean personal exposure levels (0.393 ug/m3). This significant difference (p=0.033) was expected since the production subgroup was more exposed and involved in the digging out of residues and the cleaning of plant equipment compared to the engineering subgroup with limited exposure and involved in the opening of plant equipment. Although the mean exposure levels for open face sampling (0.725 ug/m3) were higher compared to the mean exposure levels for closed face sampling (0.441 ug/m3) no significant difference (p=0.579) were noted. The mean area exposure levels (0.583 ug/m3) were significantly lower (p=0.004) compared to the mean personal exposure levels (1.813 ug/m3) for similar areas and tasks performed and, therefore, not an effective indicator of personal exposure levels. Higher personal exposure levels were expected since the workers were closer to the source of exposure and since the platinum salts could have diluted in the workplace’s air resulting in lower area exposure levels. Conclusion: The research study addressed the problem statement, met the objectives set out in Chapter 1, hypotheses were accepted and rejected and future studies were recommended. It was hypothesised that: a) refinery workers are exposed to airborne soluble platinum during non–operational periods; b) exposure levels do not differ significantly between the personal sampling groups (engineering vs production); c) exposure levels do not differ significantly between the area sampling groups (open versus closed–face sampling); d) exposure levels do not differ significantly between work areas; e) exposure levels differ significantly between total personal and total area sampling groups. The results confirmed that refinery workers are exposed to airborne soluble platinum during non–operational periods and hypothesis a was accepted. The personal exposure levels of the engineering versus production sampling groups differed statistically (p=0.033) and hypothesis b was rejected. The exposure levels of the open and closed face sampling groups did not differ significantly (p=0.579) and hypothesis c was accepted. In addition no statistical difference (p>0.05) was indicated between the work areas and hypothesis d was accepted. Total personal versus total area exposure levels (p=0.004) differed statistically and hypothesis e was accepted. / Thesis (M.Sc. (Occupational Hygiene))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has defined operational risk, legal risk and compliance risk. However, the definitions might not be adequate for countries with a hybrid legal system, such as South Africa. This study aims to provide a practical solution to the problems faced by countries with a hybrid legal system wishing to comply with the Basel Committee’s standards. It is argued that compliance, compliance risk and regulatory risk should all be viewed as constituent components of legal risk, and in turn necessarily also of operational risk in a hybrid legal system. Legal risk is a wide concept which includes all aspects of a legal system, while compliance risk is a narrower concept which only includes the codified aspects of a legal system. Legal risk therefore includes compliance risk. However, the opposite is not true as compliance risk does not include legal risk, and the two concepts are decidedly shown not to be synonymous in a mixed legal system. / Thesis (PhD (Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has defined operational risk, legal risk and compliance risk. However, the definitions might not be adequate for countries with a hybrid legal system, such as South Africa. This study aims to provide a practical solution to the problems faced by countries with a hybrid legal system wishing to comply with the Basel Committee’s standards. It is argued that compliance, compliance risk and regulatory risk should all be viewed as constituent components of legal risk, and in turn necessarily also of operational risk in a hybrid legal system. Legal risk is a wide concept which includes all aspects of a legal system, while compliance risk is a narrower concept which only includes the codified aspects of a legal system. Legal risk therefore includes compliance risk. However, the opposite is not true as compliance risk does not include legal risk, and the two concepts are decidedly shown not to be synonymous in a mixed legal system. / Thesis (PhD (Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

In Januarie 1914 het ‘n algehele industriële staking in die Unie van Suid-Afrika (SA) uitgebreek en die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) sou vir die eerste keer operasioneel aangewend word om die staking te onderdruk. Die Staande mag van die UVM was nog nie gereed om die staking op hul eie te onderdruk nie en gevolglik is die kommando’s van die Burgermagreserwes opgekommandeer vir diens. Probleme is dus destyds met die samestelling en organisasie van die UVM, as gevolg van die intergrasie van die verskillende militêre kulture, ondervind. Die Unieregering het op baie van die gewone burgers wat in die Anglo-Boereoorlog (ABO) in kommando’s geveg het, se ondersteuning en deelname om die staking te onderdruk, staatgemaak. Die tradisionele kommandostelsel van die voormalige Boererepublieke sou dus vlugtig tydens die 1914-staking herleef. Die Afrikaner het as gevolg van verskeie redes op kommando gegaan om die staking te help onderdruk. Die groeiende gees van nasionalisme onder die Afrikaner kon ook tydens die staking waargeneem word en sou tesame met die suksesvolle aanwending van die kommando’s tydens Januarie 1914 bydra tot die Rebellie later die jaar. Die politieke, ekonomiese en sosio-maatskaplike omstandighede van destyds het tot die nywerheidstaking van Januarie 1914 bygedra. Die rol wat die vakbonde en mynbedryf in die tydperk voor die Eerste Wêreldoorlog gespeel het, het ook bygedra tot die staking. Die ervaringe en omstandighede van die kommandolede tydens ontplooiing in Januarie 1914 is ‘n belangrike aspek van die sosiale militêre geskiedskrywing in SA. Onderwerpe soos, mobilisasie, voorrade, vervoer, dissipline, asook demobilisasie en kompensasie werp dus lig op die ervaringe en omstandighede van gewone burgers op kommandodiens tydens die staking. Die aanwending van die kommando’s tydens die 1914-staking het uiteenlopende reaksies van die verskillende groepe in die gemeenskap tot gevolg gehad. Die betrokkenheid van ander rolspelers, soos swart mense en vrouens, tydens die staking was gering, dog belangrik vir die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis. Copyright / Dissertation (MHCS)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted