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Thèse -- Université Lille, 1931. / Bibliographie pp. 13-16.

Texte remanié de: Thése de doctorat--Faculté des sciences politiques et sociales--Université libre de Bruxelles, 1999. / Bibliogr. p. 529-539. Index.

Dissertation--Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät--Universität Freiburg Schweiz, 2004. / Bibliogr. p. XIX-XXIX.

Moral outrage is an emotional, cognitive, and behavioral response to moral violations, resulting in a desire to punish the transgressor. Previous research has examined moral outrage toward transgressive behaviors, but no studies have examined the potential for moral outrage to be roused by another’s beliefs alone. Do people experience moral outrage at one another’s thoughts? If so, how do they punish someone who has roused their outrage but has “done nothing wrong”? In Study 1 (n = 209), I examined moral outrage reactions at people’s unacceptable beliefs on three topics (pedophilia, sexual assault, fraud) by comparing moral outrage elicited by people holding an indefensible belief (e.g., “sexual assault is no big deal”) but doing absolutely nothing to express or further that belief, versus people acting on these beliefs to various degrees (e.g., talking about it on social media, or assaulting someone themselves). Results indicated that people can become morally outraged at outrageous beliefs alone, and to a similar degree as at actual outrageous behaviors. In Study 2 (n = 327), I investigated whether the pattern would generalize from extreme beliefs most people would find outrageous to ideologically divided issues. Specifically, I examined the consequences of experiencing moral outrage when the target’s beliefs violated participants’ own moral convictions about abortion rights. Study 2 also investigated how participants punished the transgressor in a workplace setting, which is consequential and relevant to the fraught current political climate. Participants read a hypothetical male co-worker’s controversial and outrageous Facebook post, rated their feelings of moral outrage at the co-worker, and finally indicated how likely they would be to punish the co-worker directly (e.g., confrontation), indirectly (e.g., exclusion), or by avoiding him. Transgressive beliefs not only elicited more moral outrage when compared to control conditions, but transgressive beliefs elicited moral outrage to a similar degree as transgressive behaviors. Further, moral outrage at both beliefs and actions encouraged people to be more punitive toward the transgressor in direct ways (as seen in previous research), but also in indirect ways (such as social exclusion) or just by avoiding the transgressor. Finally, across both studies, I also found that participants’ intellectual humility (i.e., the degree to which a person recognizes that their beliefs and attitudes might be incorrect) predicted the intensity of their moral outrage: the intellectually humble reported overall lower levels of moral outrage than the intellectually arrogant. Implications for these findings for workplace discrimination and the study of moral outrage are discussed.

Moral outrage is an emotional, cognitive, and behavioral response to moral violations, resulting in a desire to punish the transgressor. Previous literature on moral outrage was limited in its examination of cognitive components and in the consideration of potential sources of moral outrage beyond transgressive behaviors. Through two studies, I addressed (a) cognitions and judgements integral to moral outrage, and (b) how different sources of moral outrage impacted overall moral outrage, as well as its cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components. In Study 1, I examined a literature-derived list of 42 cognitions and judgements about the transgressor in response to a morally outrageous news story. Using EFA and SEM models, I narrowed down and supported four subscales of potential cognitions related to moral outrage: judgements that the transgressor was Villainous, Intentional, Uncaring, and Harmful. Each subscale was internally consistent, though only Villainous and Intentional subscales were found to be uniquely and consistently predictive of moral outrage. In Study 2, I manipulated the moral outrage source in several scenarios presented as fictional news article about a YouTube star and his involvement with a disturbing viral video, following a 4 (moral outrage source: action, belief, affiliation, control) X 3 (topic: physical assault, zoophilia, stealing tips) design. Results showed a complex relationship between the moral outrage source and the strength of moral outrage, as well as each of its components. Interaction effects of source x topic also impacted multiple variables, where the pattern between each source condition differed depending on which vignette topic the participant had read. Broadly speaking, there were mixed results as to whether moral outrage toward a transgressive belief was equally strong as that toward a transgressive action (as seen in my previous research), or somewhat weaker. There was also novel support for the presence of a moderate level of moral outrage toward a person for their affiliation to a transgressive entity, even if the person had no personal transgressive actions or beliefs. The patterns of emotions, cognitions, and behavioral reactions varied slightly from overall moral outrage in unique ways that encourage future study. This research has implications for political polarization, cancel culture, and recognizing the cognitive component of moral outrage, a construct thus far defined primarily through its emotional components.

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Due to new technological affordances, such as the internet and social media, people are more exposed than ever to actions or statements that may be perceived as moral violations. Consequently, moral outrage has become a prevalent feature in the online sphere. While it is well-known how moral outrage arises and what kind of practices it motivates, little is still known in regards to how moral outrage is experienced by the individuals who are at the receiving end of such outrage. The purpose of this study was thus to explore how individuals understand their experiences of being subjected to moral outrage online. Drawing on a theoretical framework comprised by interactionist and symbolic interactionist concepts, the study analysed interviews conducted with twelve individuals who have been subjected to moral outrage online. The findings show that the individuals understand their experience as being characterized by a sense of being in the hands of others once their action or statement had been reframed into a moral violation. The moral outrage is furthermore understood as having wider social consequences that contributed to, solidified or, by contrast, mitigated the experience of becoming an outcast, while also predominantly being understood as having a negative impact on the individuals’ sense of self. Accordingly, by taking these individuals’ understanding of moral outrage online into account, rather than problematizing their actions or statements, the study opens up for a discussion in regards to how moral outrage expressed online may itself be problematic and worthy of critical reflection.

Regular online outrage about changed content in regional editions of video games has brought our attention to the concepts of censorship and localization. Game Rating Systems have their fair share of critics among those debating the details of localized content and prove to be in a peculiar position between developers and the end-user. The current state of the industry shows that alterations are made to regional versions of a game, especially with regards to sensitive topics such as violence, nudity, and sexualization. A survey to gauge end-users’ perception on these topics has been spread amongst residents of Japan and Western regions. Japanese respondents show to be more accepting of legislation surrounding video games whereas Western respondents tend to display a severe dislike for any sort of legislation, and often see not only censorship, but also localization in a negative context. Censorship, self-censorship, and localization are complicated and nuanced topics that turn out to be complexly intertwined with the practice of game production.

La présente thèse examine les rapports entre la liberté d'expression et l'administration de la justice. En droit, historiquement, ces rapports ont été posés comme étant ceux des journalistes et du public d'accéder aux audiences des tribunaux, celui de rendre compte de ce qui s'y passe et de critiquer les décisions judiciaires et la magistrature elle-même, et ceux, corrélatifs et opposés, des magistrats de tenir des audiences in camera, d'émettre des ordonnances de non-publication et, le cas échéant, de condamner pour outrage au tribunal. Plus récemment, la question de la protection des sources journalistiques est devenue un nouvel enjeu autour duquel se heurte la constellation du droit et celle de l'information. Notre thèse s'inspire d'une approche matérialiste des rapports du droit et de la société. La vision matérialiste, dont la pensée maxienne a pu représenter une composante - sans parler des avatars de cette pensée qu'ont constitué les diverses écoles marxistes -, pose la nécessité d'une confrontation synchronique et diachronique du monde du droit et de celui de l'information dans toutes les dimensions et surfaces de leur interaction - d'où l'utilisation du terme de paradigme pour désigner les deux constellations. Cette exigence fondamentale dicte, pour l'essentiel, la forme et les dimensions qu'a pris cette thèse. En effet, notre travail se divise en deux Parties. La Première Partie expose le cadre d'analyse et les données empiriques, alors que la Seconde partie est consacrée à l'examen des normes juridiques elles-mêmes. La Première Partie se consacre à l'étude des rapports de la société et du droit, et elle aborde succinctement l'examen historique et sociologique des protagonistes. La Seconde Partie analyse les normes juridiques internationales en matière de rapports entre la presse et de la magistrature, et livre notre analyse des normes juridiques canadiennes en la matière. Chaque Section de chacun des chapitres explore, d'un point de vue diachronique, un sujet d'étude spécifique, respectant généralement les quatre modes fondamentaux de production de la richesse sociale dans lesquels le droit et l'information se sont inscrits comme mode de normalisation spécifique. Le respect de ces règles architectoniques rigoureuses nous a semblé la meilleure façon de présenter un sujet vaste et complexe. Toutefois, compte tenu de l'ampleur qu'a pris notre travail, il nous a semblé que notre sommaire devait être utilisé à présenter cette stmcture afin de guider quelque peu notre lecteur. La Première Partie livre notre analyse théorique des rapports du droit et de la société et celui plus spécifiquement des rapports de la liberté d'expression et de l'administration de la justice. Les chapitres qui le composent abordent successivement la problématique d'ensemble, le point de vue et la démarche qui fut la notre (Chapitre I), exposent la théorie matérialiste des rapports du droit et de la société (Chapitre II), explorent d'un point de vue historique les moments et surfaces de leur confrontation en tentant de mettre en lumière les caractéristiques épistémologiques communes qui les unissent et qui font de l'appel au public le mode essentiel de leur action et de leur légitimation (Chapitre III). La Seconde Partie examine, comme nous l'avons précédemment indiqué, la norme internationale en matière de rapports entre la presse et la magistrature et le monde du droit. Nous avons choisi des modèles posant une très large perspective sur ces questions où présentant des parentés historiques avec le droit canadien en la matière. C'est ainsi que nous examinons le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et la jurisprudence du comité des droits de l'homme de l'ONU en matière de rapports entre la presse et de la magistrature; nous procéderons ensuite de la même manière pour la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme et la jurisprudence de la Cour de Strasbourg, pour les normes américaines et les normes françaises en la matière. Nous nous étendrons ensuite beaucoup plus longuement sur les normes canadiennes en la matière. C'est ainsi que nous examinerons le droit d'accéder aux audiences des tribunaux et de rendre compte de leur travail (Chapitre V) et celui de critiquer les juges et la magistrature, d'une part, et de celui des journalistes de protéger leurs sources d'information, d'autre part (Chapitre VI). Un dernier chapitre complète notre travail en résumant les conclusions, si provisoires soient-elles, auxquelles nous en arrivons. Signalons, en terminant, que cette thèse n'est que le premier volet d'une approche plus globale qui sera complétée par des études sociologiques et économiques touchant au même sujet. Bonne lecture à tous et à toutes ... / The present thesis examines the relations between the freedom of expression and the administration of justice. Historically, these relations have been set down as being those of the journalists and the public to be admitted to court hearings, those of the media to report and criticize the judicial decisions and the judiciary itself, and those, correlative and opposing, of the judges to order the proceeding to be held in camera, to issue non-publication orders and, if need be, to sentence for contempt of court. More recently, the protection of the journalistic sources has become a new stake about which the constellation of law and that of information collide. Our thesis is inspired by a materialistic approach to the relations between the law and the society. The materialistic vision, of which the marxian thought may have represented an element - not to mention the varied metamorphoses of that thought constitued by diverse marxist schools - sets down the necessity of a synchronic and diachronic confrontation between the world of law that of information in ail the dimensions and surfaces of their interaction - hence the use of the term paradigm to designate those two constellations. Essentially, this fundamental requirement imposes the form and the dimensions taken by this thesis. This work is divided in two Parts. The First Part expounds the analysis framework and the empirical data, whereas the Second Part in dedicated to the examination of the legal norms themselves. The First Part is dedicated to the relations between law and society. The Second Part analyses the international legal norms regarding the relations between the media and the judiciary, while our analysis of the canadian legal nonns in this matter will be found in the Second Part. Each Section of each Chapter explores, from a diachronic standpoint, a specific subject of study, generally respecting the four fundamental modes of production of the social wealth in which law and information are inscribed as a specific mode of normalization. Rigorous observance of those architectronic rules has seemed to us the best way to lay out such a wide ranging and complex subject. However considering the extent of our work, it seemed to us that our abstract should be used to expound this structure in order to guide the reader somewhat. The First Part sets out our theoretical analysis of the relations between law and society, more specifically, the relations between the freedom of expression and the administration of justice. Its Chapters successively tackle the over all issue, our standpoint and our procedure (Chapter I), expound the materialistic theory of the relations between law and society (Chapter II), explore the moments and surfaces of their confrontation and emphasize the common epistemological characteristics that unite them and that make the appeal to the public the essential mode of their action and their legitimation. The Second Part is considering, as we have already pointed out, the legal norms concerning the relations between the media, the judiciary and the world of law. We have chosen models laying a very wide perspective on these questions or presenting historical links with the Canadian law in this matter. In this way we examine the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court and the American and French nonns (Chapter IV). The Second Part is dedicated to the canadian legal norms. We examine the rights to be admitted to court hearings and that of media to report and criticize the judicial decisions, the judges and the judiciary, on the one hand (Chapter V), and, on the other hand, the right of the journalists to protect their joumalist sources (Chapter VI). A last chapter completes our work, summing up our conclusions, however provisional they may be. Finally, we would like to point out that this thesis is but the first phase of a more comprehensive approach that will be completed by sociological and economical studies on the same subject. Bonne lecture to you all ! / "Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"