- About
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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
provided by the
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
Search results
Showing 11 to 20 of 376 (0.07 seconds)| 11 |
The relationship between salary and recruitment in state legislaturesClynch, Edward John January 1968 (has links)
There is no abstract available for this thesis.
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| 12 |
Stochastic modelling and control of pension plansHuang, Hong-Chih January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
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Les moments infinitésimaux et le problème du risque dans les caisses de pensions autonomesOdier, Marcel. January 1945 (has links)
Thesis--Université de Zurich. / Curriculum vitae. "Littérature": p. [53]-54.
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Das Zusammentreffen von Renten im Sozialwesen /Götz, Josef. January 1930 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen.
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Les moments infinitésimaux et le problème du risque dans les caisses de pensions autonomesOdier, Marcel. January 1945 (has links)
Thesis--Université de Zurich. / Curriculum vitae. "Littérature": p. [53]-54.
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History of military pension legislation in the United StatesGlasson, William Henry, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Vita. Published also as Studies in history, economics and public law, v. 12, no. 3. Bibliography: p. 134-135.
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Alterssicherung in Taiwan (Republik China) : Grundprobleme sozialer Sicherung in einem jungen Industriestaat /Kuo, Ming-Cheng. January 1990 (has links)
Texte remanié de: Diss.--Juristische Fakultät--Universität München, 1989-1990. / Bibliogr. p. 291-319. Index.
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| 18 |
ESSAYS ON MANAGERIAL OPPORTUNISM, PENSION DE-RISKING, AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT POLICIESUnknown Date (has links)
In the first essay, I examine how managerial opportunism affects corporate investment efficiency and, ultimately, firm performance. Prior research establishes corporate investment efficiency as a function of the firm’s information environment and internal governance. To measure managerial opportunism, I use an ex-ante firm level measure of managerial opportunism based on insider trading patterns and test its effects on investment efficiency and performance. Extant research associates opportunistic insider trading with opaque information environments about the firm and weak firm governance, making it an apropos proxy for opportunistic managerial behavior.
Despite the clear establishment of opportunistic insider trading as an agency problem in the literature, it remains unanswered how the managerial insider trading decision’s economic irrationality might reflect a broader agency problem that affects firm investment policy and performance. I introduce competing hypotheses that managerial opportunism may positively associate with overinvestment through “empire building” and excessive risk taking at shareholders’ expense. On the contrary, manv agerial opportunism may lead to underinvestment through rent seeking behavior. My results show that managerial opportunism decreases firm investment efficiency and negatively affects accounting and stock performance. Further tests show that both the quality of the information environment and internal governance moderate the effects of managerial opportunism, providing a unique perspective on how insider trading policy and regulation can affect corporate investment policy. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (PhD)--Florida Atlantic University, 2021. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection
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Government pensions; an analysis of the benefit structure in the Canadian system.Watson, Beverly Y. January 1968 (has links)
No description available.
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The practice and operation of industrial pensions.Slocum, Clarence Alfred January 1953 (has links)
No description available.
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