published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

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The dissertation deals with four issues affecting Employer Sponsored Pension Plans: (a) the rationale for their existence and growth, (b) the impact of taxation on funding decisions, (c) the development of an investment model for such funds, and (d) the evaluation of the historical investment performance of 83 Canadian pension funds. The proposed investment model integrates the fund's assets with the firm's assets. It is operationalized for four Canadian firms, using a universe of 192 common stocks and eleven bond portfolios. The results indicate that the optimal pension fund is firm-specific, in terms of both asset mix and security selection. The evaluation of investment performance emphasizes the equity portfolios of the 83 Canadian funds. The results show non-superior performance by these funds; the conclusions are robust across holding periods, benchmarks, performance measures and time periods. The study has major implications for the funding and investment policies of the pension funds and their investment performance.

Issues of pension viability are at the forefront of gerontological debate. The uncertainty of long-term effects of the societal aging process on public pensions and the constant public policy struggle to maintain income levels among pensioners are critical points of discussion. As existing pension policies are examined and amended, policymakers increasingly rely on experts of pension research and income inequality for policy frameworks. Gosta Esping-Andersen's (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism has provided the seminal typology for nearly two decades. His typology consists of three regimes: liberal, conservative, and social-democratic. The purpose of this research was to examine and compare the outcomes of historical pension policy in a social-democratic nation (Finland) with pension-receiving cohorts in a comparison nation of each regime: liberal (the United States), conservative (Germany), and social-democratic (Sweden). Specific aims were: to investigate the continuing viability of Esping-Andersen's typology at a national (macro) level; to explore a new analytical approach by disaggregating the population and conducting micro analyses; and to examine the value of using more sensitive inequality indices (Atkinson and Theil) in lieu of the commonly used Gini Index. Finland provides a case study focus of the comparative analysis. Analysis of Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data confirms that Esping-Andersen's typology remains viable at the macro level for the liberal United States. However, conservative Germany and social-democratic Sweden and Finland may be shifting their respective classifications with possible convergence of the conservative and social-democratic regimes info a European regime.

This paper utilizes a sample of 6,185 locally-issued, general obligation municipal bonds to examine the relationship between a city’s cumulative pension contributions and its cost of borrowing. Following the Great Recession unfunded public pension liabilities have soared to record highs, which, in theory, represent additional credit risks and may hinder local governments’ ability to service their outstanding debt. After controlling for bond characteristics, bond ratings, and issuer characteristics, the empirical analysis finds a statistically significant correlation between pension costs and borrowing costs, defined as the spread between the effective offering yield on municipal debt and the yield on a maturity-matched treasury on the municipal bond’s date of issuance. The results suggest that a 1% increase in cumulative city pension costs as a percent of city revenue is associated with an increase in yield spreads ranging from 1.2 to 3.5 basis points. These findings indicate that municipal bond investors do in fact consider pension expenses when pricing municipal bonds and suggest that addressing unfunded pension liabilities by mandating higher annual contributions will lead to higher borrowing costs for local governments.

Typescript. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1975. / Bibliography: leaves [225]-235. / xvii, 235 leaves ill

La tesis tiene como objeto el estudio del aseguramiento (reaseguramiento) de un Plan de Pensiones que asume el riesgo derivado de las desviaciones de mortalidad en un colectivo de partícipes (personas físicas en cuyo interés se crea el Plan) y beneficiarios (personas físicas con derecho a la percepción de prestaciones del Plan).Las modalidades de reaseguro que hemos planteado han sido las siguientes:a) Reaseguro del Percentil, contrato de reaseguro por el cual el reasegurador se obliga a cubrir la pérdida que puede tener plan como consecuencia en las desviaciones en la mortalidad de los partícipes del colectivo. En esta modalidad hemos supuesto que el Plan de Pensiones parte con un nivel de solvencia prefijado.b) Reaseguro de diferencia de siniestralidad, contrato por el cual el reasegurador se encarga de cubrir en cada período las provisiones matemáticas y márgenes de solvencia que pudieran establecerse, y el riesgo de fallecimiento.Dentro de esta modalidad hemos planteado dos tipos de reaseguro:- Tipo A: el reasegurador interviene siempre y cuando con las primas recargadas cobradas no tenga suficiente para poder hacer frente a las contingencias indicadas.- Tipo B: se diferencia del anterior en que en aquellos períodos donde el Plan requiera de financiación externa para cubrir la provisión y el margen de solvencia correspondiente, éste cede al reasegurador aquella parte de sus fondos que exceden de la provisión matemática y margen de solvencia correspondiente. De esta forma el plan, consigue tener garantizados exactamente en cada período la provisión matemática y el margen de solvencia a un coste menor al que tendría con el reaseguro Tipo A.Para cada modalidad de reaseguro hemos contemplado la posibilidad de ceder al reaseguro el posible beneficio del plan en el momento de extinción del colectivo (sólo posible en colectivos cerrados). Lo cual ha permitido reducir el coste de la operación sin menoscabo en los objetivos del reaseguro.La consideración del recargo de seguridad del plan como variable independiente que puede manejar el plan, nos ha permitido encontrar combinaciones óptimas recargo-reaseguro, en el sentido que hacen mínimo el coste total de la operación, dadas el resto de variables que interviene en el modelo.El modelo aplicado en la tesis para calcular la prima de reaseguro se caracteriza por ser:a) Actuarial: En la medida que utiliza como instrumento la matemática actuarial.b) Estocástico: ya que trabajamos con toda la aleatoriedad de las variables aleatorias que intervienen en el modelo.c) General: puesto que el mismo nos permite obtener las primas de reaseguro para las dos modalidades anteriormente descritas.d) Discreto: puesto que trabajamos con variables aleatorias discretas.Las hipótesis del modelo son:- Las prestaciones se relacionan únicamente con la vida y fallecimiento del partícipe.- El único riesgo es el derivado de las fluctuaciones aleatorias de la mortalidad respecto de su valor esperado. - El tipo de interés está determinado y es determinista.- El Plan de Pensiones no persigue ánimo de lucro.- El Plan de Pensiones una vez reasegurado no asume ningún riesgo.- El Plan de Pensiones carece de reservas iniciales y sólo se financia de las aportaciones de los partícipes. El modelo ha sido aplicado al caso tanto de colectivos cerrados como abiertos, utilizando como instrumento para poder determinar la evolución del colectivo el método de simulación de Monte Carlo.El cálculo de la prima de reaseguro de cada elemento del colectivo aparece como un problema de reparto del coste del reaseguro entre los partícipes que forma el colectivo. Este reparto, que puede realizarse de distintas formas, ha dado lugar a criterios en la determinación de la prima de reaseguro.La conclusión a la que llegamos es que no podemos establecer una prima de reaseguro general y válida en cada modalidad planteada y para cualquier Plan de Pensiones, ya que ésta depende del tipo de prestaciones y contraprestaciones del colectivo, de las bases técnicas utilizadas y de la composición del colectivo.Por tanto, cada Plan de Pensiones requerirá de un análisis particular para determinar la prima de reaseguro. / The objective of this thesis is the insuring (or reinsuring) of a Pension Plan that assumes the risk derived from the deviations of mortality in a collective of participants.The proposed types of reinsurance are the following:a) Reinsurance of Percentile: in which the reinsurance covers the loss of the plan as a consequence of deviations in the mortality of the participants of the collective. In this type, we have supposed that the Pensions Plan starts from a given level of solvency.b) Reinsurance of the difference in a misfortune: in which the reinsurance assumes responsability for covering, in each period the mathematical provisions and margins of solvency that could be establisited and the risk of death.In particular, we have supposed that:b-l) The margin of solvency in each period is a given as a result of the reserves necessary to the mathematical provisions of each period so that the level of insolvency of the plan is maintained in a predetermined.b-2) The margin of solvency in each period is a given as result of a percentage of the mathematical provisions.The fact that the Plans aren't intended for profit has allowed us to consider a new possibility of a contract of reinsurance based in the payment to the reinsurance of the expected profit that the plan can have at the moment of the extinction of the collective.We will propose the problem and the calculation of the premium of reinsurance for the stated types in closed collectives as well as in open collectives.The conclusion we will reach is that we cannot establish a general and valid premium of reinsurance in each proposed type and for any pension plan in as much as this depends on the type of payments and counter-payments of the collective, the technical bases used and the composition of the collective. Therefore each pension plan will require a special analysis to determine the premium of the reinsurance.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 146-150).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Melbourne, 1984. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 184-197).