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by Tam Chi Cheung. / Bibliography: leaves 92-96 / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986

Ce travail de thèse a pour objectif de fournir un panorama aussi complet que possible de la pauvreté et des inégalités la retraite, en France et en Europe de la fin du vingtième siècle à aujourd'hui, mais également d'identifier le rôle de certaines politiques publiques dans la lutte contre la pauvreté et les inégalités. Compte tenu des contraintes économique et démographique pesant sur les systèmes de retraites, étudier les sources d'inégalités et de pauvreté, mais aussi les mécanismes efficaces en matière de lutte contre les inégalités et la pauvreté à la retraite, est actuellement pertinent de manière à anticiper au mieux les risques futurs. Pour ce faire, nous identifions les populations retraitées pauvres, ainsi que les facteurs d'inégalité et d'inéquité tout en définissant les concepts centraux que sont les inégalités et l'équité intragénérationnelles, intergénérationnelles, mais également ce qu'est la pauvreté des retraités dans les pays développés aujourd'hui. Nous proposons dans un premier temps un modèle d'équilibre général pour évaluer les impacts de chocs de politique économique, ainsi que les conséquences d'un choc démographique. Puis des analyses empiriques des inégalités et de la pauvreté sont proposées de manière à mettre en évidence le lien entre les systèmes fiscaux, de protection sociale, de redistribution d'une part, et les inégalités à la retraite d'autre part.Nous arrivons à la conclusion que les systèmes de retraite et l'architecture de la redistribution, en France et en Europe, ont permis de réduire les inégalités et la pauvreté à la retraite. Le niveau de vie moyen des ménages retraités apparaît désormais équivalent à celui des ménages actifs. Les réformes des systèmes de retraite en cours devront donc tenir compte non seulement de l'environnement démographique et économique dégradé (ralentissement de la croissance économique, augmentation du taux de chômage et des aléas de carrières, etc.) mais également du caractère efficient de l'architecture redistributive telle qu'elle existe aujourd'hui. / We provide a large picture of the inequalities and the poverty among the French and the European pensioners, from the late twentieth century to today. The public pension systems support strong economic and demographic constraints, which could involve a higher risk of poverty and/or risk of inequality during the retirement. We focus on the role of the public policies in reducing these inequalities. To do this, we identify the poor populations and shed light on the inequality and poverty factors. Through the chapters, we define the inequality, the poverty of the retirees in developed countries, the inter- and intergenerational inequalities. We put into perspective the efficient mechanisms to reduce the inequalities and the poverty among the pensioners. In the first chapter, we propose a general equilibrium model to explore the impact of parametric reforms and the impact of a demographic shock on the inequality level. Then, we address the question of the social protection impact on the poverty and the inequality level among the European retirees at the end of the last century. To finish, the last chapter focus on the relationship between the architecture of the redistribution in France, including the socialbenefits and taxes, and the inequalities. We distinguish in this last chapter the inequality level among pensioners and among workers from the inequalities between pensioners and workers. We conclude that the pension systems and the redistribution architecture, in France and in Europe, permitted to reduce the inequalities and the poverty among pensioners. The retirees' and the workers' households have now the same living standard. Our findings suggest that the future pension reforms should take into consideration the bad economic and demographic environments, but also the efficiency of the actual redistributive architecture.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 1980. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Bibliography: leaves 247-267. / by Janet M. Corpus. / Ph.D.

This study examined the determinants of public pension fund performance through the lens of agency theory. The study sought to answer the following questions: (1) How much of the fluctuation in the performance of pension plans is due to political interference - either directly from decisions made by legislatures or through the governance structure of the pension boards, after controlling for asset allocation, plan size, and other external factors? (2) Do pension board expertise, education and training, and information disclosure requirements improve the performance of pension plans? (3) Do pension trustees strategically determine the actuarial rate of return (discount rate) in order to reduce contributions in times of fiscal stress for the pension sponsor? Using longitudinal data of pension fund performance over the period 2000 to 2009 and instrumental variables methods to address endogeneity issues, the study found partial support for the agency theory hypotheses. The results indicate that political interference through reduced contributions was the main factor explaining pension performance. There was no direct evidence about the negative impact of politically appointed trustees on pension performance. The impact of these findings for current policy and future research are discussed.

This study examined the determinants of public pension fund performance through the lens of agency theory. The study sought to answer the following questions: (1) How much of the fluctuation in the performance of pension plans is due to political interference - either directly from decisions made by legislatures or through the governance structure of the pension boards, after controlling for asset allocation, plan size, and other external factors? (2) Do pension board expertise, education and training, and information disclosure requirements improve the performance of pension plans? (3) Do pension trustees strategically determine the actuarial rate of return (discount rate) in order to reduce contributions in times of fiscal stress for the pension sponsor? Using longitudinal data of pension fund performance over the period 2000 to 2009 and instrumental variables methods to address endogeneity issues, the study found partial support for the agency theory hypotheses. The results indicate that political interference through reduced contributions was the main factor explaining pension performance. There was no direct evidence about the negative impact of politically appointed trustees on pension performance. The impact of these findings for current policy and future research are discussed.

Diss. Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2007.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 156-171).