Thesis advisor: Alicia H. Munnell / Retirement plans for state employees have over $2 trillion in assets, a significant portion of the U.S. retirement market. In the last 10 years, seven states have transitioned their employee retirement plans from traditional annuity-providing defined benefit pensions to individual account-style defined contribution plans. While private-sector employers save money in transitioning to a defined contribution plan, states actually lose money when switching. Why state governments choose to sponsor retirement plans that cost both the state and its employees money is the central question of this study. Several financial and demographic variables are considered; the only variable that cannot be ruled out is political ideology. The probit panel regression finds that states with Republican-controlled governments are far more likely to switch to a defined contribution plan than states with mixed or Democrat-controlled governments. This conclusion illuminates the central importance of unions in the political process of public plan decision-making and reveals the importance of potential economics losses that result from sponsoring defined contribution plans. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2006. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Thesis advisor: Kenji Hayao / This paper discusses the forces driving variation in the success of state pension system retrenchment. Two case studies are presented: the United Kingdom’s largely successful effort in 1986, and Germany’s less than stellar effort in 2001. After examining the general impact of institutional effects, ideology, path dependency, and demographic pressures on retrenchment, the importance of these factors in each country is discussed. These two countries are particularly enlightening due to their prototypical natures and opposing democratic traditions. One objective of this paper is to explain an unexpected outcome: the successful retrenchment produced in a low-pressure environment in the U.K., and ineffective reform in Germany in a high-pressure environment. This discussion frames the factors that determine successful retrenchment as such: whether a government has the ‘will,’ or motive, to retrench, whether it has the capability to do so, and whether it has the awareness and acumen to implement low-visibility strategies. I find that low-visibilities are extremely important to success in this area, and due to the nature of pension policy, the implications of this conclusion may be applicable to other policy-making challenges. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: Shannon Seitz / Issues pertaining to low income workers are of the upmost interest to policy makers. In the mid 1990s, the issue of welfare recipients and work was at the forefront of public policy, as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 was passed. One of the many goals of the policy was to "end the dependence of needy families on government benefits" by encouraging work and ultimately higher wages. The first paper of my dissertation explores the processes by which work leads to wage growth for welfare recipients. I find that welfare recipients have similar returns to tenure and experience as non-recipients and that tenure has higher returns than experience for these women. Because of this, policies that discourage leaving work, like a work requirement, are more effective encouraging wage growth than policies discouraging welfare use, like a time-limit. A decade later, the low savings rates of low income workers has led policy makers within the Obama administration to consider making Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) available to all workers. The second paper of this dissertation examines how likely low individual workers are to participate in these plans. We find that low-income workers not currently offered voluntary retirement savings plans are less likely to participate than those currently offered those plans. The paper indicates policy makers should be wary of basing estimates of participation in the offered IRAs on current participation, as this may overestimate the participation rate by up to 25 percent. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

This research examines the different social costs that have a bearing on the form and content of regulatory intervention underpinning the Auto-Enrolment (AE) pensions’ regime and whether these are recognised within current UK legislation. AE requires employers to assess the workforce and, subject to qualifying criteria, enrol them into a pension and make contributions to the pension. Workers are also required to contribute to the pension although they can choose to leave the scheme, Since its introduction in 2012, more than 4.7 million workers in the UK have now been enrolled into a pension which they did not choose highlighting the impact of the regulatory intervention. The starting point for my research is to consider the history of pension legislation in the UK and the circumstances leading up to the introduction of AE. The next step is to consider whether this legislative intervention is paternalistic and, if so, whether justified. I then consider whether the implementing legislation functions as it was intended or whether there are any unintended consequences. Parliamentary debate at the inception of AE illustrates an intention to ensure that individuals save more for themselves for their own good. Behavioural economics was widely referred to as authority on the hypothesis that individuals do not make rational financial decisions for themselves, justifying legislative intervention to ensure that private pension saving is the default position for all workers in the UK. Paternalistic legislation can be difficult to justify where individual choice is overridden entirely and so the legislation allows for individuals to opt out – soft paternalism or nudge. There is an assumption that low opt-out rates indicate that individuals now agree that the pension saving is in their best interests, justifying the intervention. However, there has been a marked dearth of research into AE savers' actual perceptions of how the schemes work for them. My research has come to close this gap and also allows drawing up some normative conclusions regarding the proper framework for offering and regulating AE in the UK. In particular, participants were asked to discuss their own choices and actions within their workplace pension and understanding of pensions’ information. Employers and professional advisers were also interviewed to build a complete picture of the practical implementation of AE. In considering these findings my work considers whether there are negative or unintended consequences of the policy change and how these are dealt with.

Diss. Göteborg : Univ., 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Kentucky, 2002. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 142 p. : ill. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 128-139).

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Shu S. Liao, John E. Mutty. Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-132). Also available online.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Richard Doyle, Ira Lewis. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-82). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-103).

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration