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No description available.

L’effet de potentialisation motrice, initialement décrit par Tucker et Ellis (1998), correspond au bénéfice entrainé par l’action potentielle évoquée par la perception d’objets manipulables en lien avec le dispositif de réponse. Cet effet a été observé dans de nombreux contextes expérimentaux. Toutefois, il semble que cet effet ne s’observe pas lorsque la tâche des participants ne porte pas directement sur une caractéristique requise pour le contrôle de l’action (Tipper, Paul & Hayes, 2006) ou qui n’entraîne pas suffisamment d’attention sur l’objet (Ellis, Tucker, Symes & Vainio, 2007 ; Symes, Ellis & Tucker, 2005). Le cas particulier de l’identification de la couleur est un exemple dans lequel cet effet n’est généralement pas constaté (Symes et al. 2005 ; Tipper et al. 2006). En s’appuyant sur des travaux qui proposent une alternative aux théories dissociatives classiques du système visuel (Creem & Proffitt, 2001 ; Frey, 2007 ; Young, 2006 ; Derbyshire, Ellis & Tucker, 2006) et qui se basent essentiellement sur des processus de résonance motrice et de simulation comme condition nécessaire à l’identification et à la reconnaissance (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003 ; Bar, 2007 ; Berthoz & Petit, 2003), cette thèse a pour objet de spécifier les conditions d’observation du phénomène de potentialisation motrice en tâche d’identification chromatique. Pour ce faire, nous avons adapté le paradigme SRC modifié de Tucker et Ellis (1998) et le protocole d’amorçage développé par Phillips et Ward (2002) à l’étude de l’identification des couleurs d’objets manipulables. Les résultats que nous avons obtenus montrent une interaction entre l’identification de la couleur et les simulations motrices associées à la perception d’objets manipulables. Ces résultats sont discutés en faveur des modèles qui cherchent à réconcilier les approches écologiques et représentationnelles de la perception ainsi que de ceux qui insistent sur la nature profondément proactive et simulationniste du système perceptif. / Potentiation of action effect, originally described by Tucker and Ellis (1998), corresponds to the advantage led by action evoked by the perception of graspable objects related to the response device. These effects have been reported for many experimental conditions. However, this effect is not observed when the task is not directly about a characteristic required for action control (Tipper, Paul & Hayes, 2006) or when it does not allowed for enough attention on the object (Ellis, Tucker, Symes & Vainio, 2007; Symes, Ellis & Tucker, 2005). Color perception and identification is a particular case where these effects are generally not observed (Symes et al. 2005; Tipper et al. 2006). Relying on recent works that propose an alternative to theories of classic dissociation of the visual system (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Frey, 2007; Young, 2006; Derbyshire, Ellis & Tucker, 2006) and that are essentially based on motor resonance and simulation processes as a condition to identification and recognition (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003; Bar, 2007; Berthoz & Petit, 2003), this thesis aims to specify the conditions of observation of a potentiation of action phenomenon in a chromatic identification task. To that end, we have adapted the SRC paradigm (stimulus response compatibility) modified by Tucker and Ellis (1998) and the priming paradigm developed by Phillips and Ward (2002) to study color identification of graspable objects. Results we obtain shows an interaction between the identification of color and the motor simulations associated with the perception of graspable objects. We discuss our results in the light of models which tend to reconcile ecological and representational approaches of perception as well as those which insist on the deeply proactive and simulationist nature of the perceptual system.

The meeting of the eyes is a potent form of communication. The eyes are able to convey many subtle nuances of feeling by their complex capacity for expression. Their stimulus configuration has made them highly noticeable; they serve as an innate releaser for the responses of animals and infants. The fact that they are critical in the maternal - infant relationship later gives them special meaning to the adult person. This is conveyed in the many references to the eyes found in literature, language, art, and mythology. Psychologists have begun to recognize, both in research and practice, the importance of eye contact in interpersonal interaction. Eyes intensify expressions of warmth and empathy, as well as hostility and aggression (Ellsworth & Carlsmith, 1968). Recognizing this, psycho- therapists have begun to emphasize the intimacy value of eye contact. Group therapists and sensitivity trainers often ask strangers to engage in eye contact as a way of transcending interpersonal barriers in a group. Many of the relationships between eye contact and variables such as sex, age, race, and culture have been investigated. It is assumed in most of these studies that eye contact leads to intimacy. The present study will attempt to document this assumption. For this purpose, it was hypothesized that 3 minutes of silent eye contact between a female subject and a confederate would facilitate inti- macy more so than the two selected silent control conditions which were also of 3 -minute duration. One of these involved looking at another part of the body, the hand, and the other was an interaction in which no instructions were given other than to maintain silence. For this study, intimacy was postulated to be composed of the Rogerian attitudes which facilitate therapeutic change - empathy, positive regard, and congruence. In addition to the main effect of condition, a secondary prediction involved a main effect of personality. That is, the way a subject responded to the confederate was partly related to the subject's style of relating to people, regardless of experimental condition. A three-way interaction effect was predicted for the dependent variable of state anxiety such that high AFFE would lead to an increase in anxiety going from high interpersonal contact- -the eye contact condition- -to low interpersonal contact- -the hand and non-directed conditions. The reverse was predicted for low AFFE. In addition, the magnitude of the interaction would differ for high vs. low anxious subjects on the trait anxiety. That is, the amount of anxiety experienced by high and low AFFE subjects in both the high and low contact conditions was hypothesized to be less. As predicted, in all cases women who made eye contact expressed more intimacy than the those with no eye contact. By their own report, they felt more empathy, positive feeling, and willingness to tell intimate details about their lives to the women they had visually contacted than did the women in the other situations. Furthermore, the hypothesis was partially confirmed that subjects who usually express affection to other people (high AFFE) feel greater empathy than do low AFFE subjects. Only in the case of empathy was the difference between high and low AFFE significant; however, the trend was in the predicted direction for self-disclosure and positive feeling variables. The final hypothesis was not supported. That is, trait anxiety did not interact significantly with condition and personality for state anxiety. Problems in the measurement of this variable may have accounted for the nonsignificant results. Implications for further research are discussed. / This thesis was digitized as part of a project begun in 2014 to increase the number of Duke psychology theses available online. The digitization project was spearheaded by Ciara Healy.

Recent evidence indicates that mental imagery comprises independent object and spatial subsystems. The experiments reported here are behavioral studies of these subsystems. Experiments 1 and 2 used the selective interference paradigm to determine whether these subsystems could be behaviorally dissociated. In Experiment 1, subjects listened to descriptions of spatially arrayed objects as they performed an object or spatial interfering task. Recall of the descriptions was expected to demonstrate selective interference of item names or spatial relations as a function of interfering task, however this result was not found. In Experiment 2, subjects indicated whether sentences read in either a spatial or a non-spatial format were true or false. Sentences required either object, spatial, or no imagery. The spatial presentation differentially slowed verification time for high imagery sentences compared to abstract sentences. The prediction that the spatial format would selectively slow verification time for spatial versus object imagery sentences did not obtain for all subjects, however subjects of lower spatial ability showed this pattern of results. Experiments 3-5 isolated one contribution of spatial imagery to memory: Its ability to preserve the sequential order of events. Pictures were presented either in the same location or in different locations. When items in the spatial condition appeared in consecutive locations (Experiment 3), there was no effect on amount recalled, but subjects made fewer sequencing errors. No benefits of the spatial presentation were found with nonconsecutive locations (Experiment 4), presumably because subjects could not remember the order of locations in which the stimuli appeared. When retrieval cues informed subjects of the sequence of locations in which the stimuli had appeared (Experiment 5), subjects were able to use the nonconsecutive locations to aid in sequencing. These studies are interpreted in terms of the anatomical underpinnings of the spatial and object systems. It is argued that connections between these systems make it difficult to separate them through selective interference. Nevertheless, Experiments 3-5 indicate that spatial imagery functions to maintain temporal order information. The two systems therefore appear to serve different and complementary roles in memory. / This thesis was digitized as part of a project begun in 2014 to increase the number of Duke psychology theses available online. The digitization project was spearheaded by Ciara Healy.

INTRODUCTION The Problem Cognitive controls are important for the understanding of perceptual, motivational, and other personality processes is a set of variables which have been variously termed cognitive controls(55, 70, 105), cognitive system-principles (43, 102), cognitive attitudes (39, 55, 100), cognitive styles (28, 59), perceptual attitudes (53, 56, 61), Anschauungen (53), coping modes (60), and regulatory structures or delay mechanisms (55), Cognitive controls are stable patterns or styles of response characteristic of an individual in a wide variety of situations but differing considerably from one individual to another. They have been described as preferred ways of solving tasks requiring adaptation, and they serve as regulating structures which ‘Modulate, facilitate, inhibit, counteract or otherwise qualify the discharge of need-tension in behavior” (55). Cognitive controls have been defined as “sets or dispositions of the organism--a sort of prevailing structure- -which determine the pattern or style of an individual's response to situations” (70). Whereas needs, drives, and other motivational forces serve to energize or “push” behavior, these control aspects of personality act to channelize, direct, and regulate behavior. These control processes have been emphasized and have had extensive experimental investigation by G. S. Klein (15, 16, 28, 37, 39, 43, 44, 53-37, 59, 61, 100, 102, 103, 105), K. S. Lazarus (69, 70, 71), H. A, Witkin (125, 126), and their respective associates and students, particularly In the field of perception. A number of control dimensions have been isolated and found to account for a significant amount of the individual differences in perceptual and motivational studies. Among these dimensions are “tolerance vs. resistance to the unstable” and “physiognomic vs, literal” (53, 54, 60, 61), “categorizing behavior” (28), “focusing** (lOO), “interference proneness** (55, 70), "verbalness” (70), and the one used in the present experiment, “leveling vs. sharpening** (37, 39, 43, 53, 54, 56, 57, 60, 90, 102, 103). Leveling and Sharpening. Leveling and Sharpening cognitive controls were operationally defined by Klein and his co-workers in terms of a dimension of perceptual accuracy. The defining task (The Schematizing Test) requires the subject to judge the size of squares presented visually, the sizes increasing gradually as the task continues. In their early studies the Klein group analyzed the subjects' responses to this task for stable patterns, and identified at least two major modes or styles of response: progressive underestimation leading to inaccurate judgment, and appropriate shifting resulting in consistently high accuracy of judgment. The individuals at the lower end of the accuracy distribution were called Levelers, and those at the upper end were called Sharpeners (53). Subsequent experimentation led to a more precise characterization of these cognitive controls, Klein found that Levelers had greater difficulty in separating figure from ground in three situations, including the Gottschaldt figures test (53). Holzrean (39), working with Klein (43) demonstrated that assimilation effects in visual, auditory, and kinesthetic time-error were greater for Levelers than for Sharpeners, Using a Gestalt neurophysiological model to explain their findings, Holzman and Klein suggested that differences between Levelers and Sharpeners may be due to characteristic differences in the brain field: Levelers have weaker boundaries between traces in the brain field, and there is a tendency for greater exchange of energy between traces. Noting Koffka's (62) explanation of retroactive inhibition as being due to the interference with each other of similar traces, Holzman predicted that if trace boundaries are weaker in Levelers, this group should show greater retroactive inhibition than Sharpeners (39). Sharpeners should more easily maintain the discrete differences between stimuli, resulting in more accurate discrimination and less interference. The purpose of the present experiment was to demonstrate the generality of Leveling and Sharpening in a new situation, and to assess the influence of these controls on the expression of some type of motivational or drive behavior. Since a great deal of work had been done recently with manifest anxiety. Interpreted as drive (108, 116), this variable was selected for study in conjunction with the Leveling-Sharpening cognitive controls. / This thesis was digitized as part of a project begun in 2014 to increase the number of Duke psychology theses available online. The digitization project was spearheaded by Ciara Healy.

Theories of pitch perception, and the related literature, are reviewed, with special reference to the residue pitch of tonal complexes. A distinction is drawn between spectral-pattern theories, which propose that pitch is derived from independent internal estimates of component frequency, and periodicity theories, which propose that the pitch of tonal complexes may be derived from a residual periodicity resulting from an incomplete auditory frequency analysis. The Spectral-pattern models described by Goldstein (1973) and Wightman (1973b) are discussed in detail; computer simulation procedures, allowing the prediction of a probability density function for the estimated fundamental frequency of a tonal complex, are described for each. Contrasting predictions concerning the relation between component frequency discrimination and fundamental frequency discrimination for harmonic complexes are developed for the spectral-pattern and periodicity theories. Component frequency and fundamental frequency discrimination by human observers was measured, under a variety of conditions, for a complex containing the 4th and 5th harmonics of 200 Hz. For a comparison of the pitches of two such complexes of slightly different frequency, the relative fundamental frequency difference limen was no larger, and generally smaller, than the smaller relative component frequency difference limen. Discrimination performance was interpreted in terms of a modified version of Goldstein's (1973) spectral-pattern theory, in which an internal noise limits discrimination between signals with non-coincident components. Further experiments investigated the identification of fundamental frequency by human observers as a function of the variability of internal estimates of component frequency as estimated from the discrimination experiments. The results of these experiments were consistent with the predictions of the spectral-pattern theories. Component and fundamental frequency discrimination was also considered with respect to temporal and spatial theories of frequency discrimination. The results of the discrimination studies were consistent with a modified Energy Detection model, where discrimination is ultimately limited by an internal noise.

This study is designed to determine if people have a particular stimulus or perceptual preference which is congruent with their personality. Seventy-six male and female college students completed three personality tests, consisting of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the Revised Art Scale of the Welsh Figure Preference Test, and the Gough Adjective Check List. A preference for simplicity or complexity in designs for four different personality dimensions was examined. The personality dimension of introversion and extroversion was looked at in particular.