Les événements pertinents de notre environnement sont intégrés au flux d'information complexe et multisensoriel qui nous parvient. La perception du temps est malléable et de nombreuses illusions suggèrent que le temps perçu est influencé par le contexte. Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous nous sommes intéressés à l’influence de différents aspects du contexte sur la perception du temps et du timing des actions chez l’humain. Dans la première partie de cette thèse, nous avons étudié le rôle du caractère explicite de l’apparition d’un événement sur la durée perçue de l’intervalle entre deux événements. Nous avons montré que l’influence du contexte temporel était plus forte dans la condition d’apparition implicite, pour laquelle le biais d’estimation des vers la moyenne des durées présentées est plus fort, et la sensibilité plus basse. Dans la deuxième partie de la thèse, nous avons étudié les effets du contexte temporel et spatial sur le temps perçu des événements. Les résultats de ces études suggèrent que le moment perçu de l’apparition d’un événement ne correspond pas toujours aux latences perceptives mesurées par des taches de temps de réaction, et que la saillance est un indice important pour percevoir le temps. Enfin, dans la troisième partie, nous avons examiné comment différentes sources d’incertitude influencent le timing perçu d’une action et son auto-évaluation. Les résultats suggèrent que ces deux aspects s’appuieraient au moins en partie sur des processus différents. / Relevant events in our environment are embedded in the complex, multisensory stream of information. Time perception is malleable, and numerous time illusions suggest that the perceived time of events is affected by context. The work presented in this thesis investigated how different aspects of human time perception and timing an action are affected by context. In the first part of the thesis, we investigated how the explicitness of the event onset affects perceived elapsed time between two points in time. The temporal context affected the estimates more in the implicit onset condition. The estimates were more biased towards the mean of the presented durations, and sensitivity of duration discrimination sensitivity was lower in the condition with no explicit onset of the duration to be timed. The effects of the temporal and spatial context on the perceived time of events were addressed in the second part. The findings suggest that the perceived time of events can be easily and compulsory biased by the temporal and spatial context. Findings from these studies support the hypothesis that the perceived time of events does not always correspond the the perceptual latencies measured in the reaction time tasks, and that the saliency is an important cue for the perceived time. Finally, in the third part, we investigated how different sources of uncertainty affect the timing and self-evaluation of an action. The findings suggest that timing an action and evaluating its outcome may, at least in part, rely on different computations.

Our ordinary concept of perception contains a seeming tension: we distinguish perception from thought on the grounds that it is a direct awareness of mind-independent objects through their effects on our senses; yet we also allow that what we see (hear, feel, etc) is determined by how we interpret or classify the data that comes through our senses. Theorists of perception disagree over which of these intuitions should prevail, with some maintaining that concepts are in play all the way down and others that perceptual awareness is wholly immediate and concrete. But we do not have to choose. This dissertation argues that the patterns of perception sustain a distinctive form of nonconceptual classification, in which property spaces organize sensory matter so as to preserve rather than discard its concreteness and detail. What then is classification without concepts? What sort of abstraction, generality, representation, or form does it entail? And what ramifications then for thinking about the roots of language and reason, and of our awareness of the external world?

The research investigates visitor and resident place perceptions of Mid Wales and evaluates the potential of such perceptions to shape economic development in the area. A review of literature indicated a need for an holistic approach to place. It was suggested that a starting point towards achieving this is to envisage place as three components - the real, the expected and the perceived. The real place is described using secondary statistical information and maps of the area. the expected place is described using topographical writing and guide books. The perceived place is examined through a combination of questionnaires and interviews with residents and visitors. These investigate perceptions of the landscape and economy of Mid Wales. The 'perceived places' of residents and visitors are described. A number of agencies based in Mid Wales were also interviewed to examine i) their perceptions of Mid Wales' ii) the way in which visitor and resident perceptions are incorporated into the policy development process, and, iii) their responses to some of the preliminary outcomes of the research. The research concluded that both residents and visitors have well defined, but different place perceptions of Mid Wales. Visitor perceptions are more affected by the expected place than the real, whilst resident perceptions are more affected by the real place than the expected. There are currently few mechanisms by which place perceptions are directly incorporated into the development process. However, the place perceptions of agencies were found to be close to those of the groups they represented; it is suggested that place perceptions are fundamental truths shared by groups, which are so strong as to actually subconsciously drive the policy development process. Policy implications are suggested, as are ideas for future research.

Background and Aims This research dissertation attempts to elicit care staff perceptions of clients with profound learning disabilities and the processes involved in these perceptions. There is little research in the area of staff perspectives in this field. Clinical psychologists working in this field often have extensive contact with staff regarding clients, and conflict regarding perception of clients can arise. It is suggested that for psychologists to gain some insight into how staff perceive clients and the processes involved would help to facilitate understanding of, and co-operation, with care staff. Design and Participants A qualitative design was employed as the study was seen as exploratory and was investigating the personal experiences and perspectives of participants. Participants were nine direct care staff who worked in a variety of service settings. Measures Each respondent completed a written free response description of a client of their choice. This was followed by a semi-structured interview that aimed to explore the processes involved in staff perceptions of clients. Results Written descriptions shared some factors in common with free response description within the general population. However, novel categories included communication issues, behavioural difficulties and the disability itself The interviews suggested that there were complex processes operating that made it difficult for respondents to acknowledge the disability and still feel positive about the clients and the work. There was also a marked change over time described by respondents in their perceptions of clients. Implications It is suggested care staff need a forum for acknowledging and exploring difficult feelings. Clinical psychologists are well placed to facilitate this but must also be aware of their own problems regarding acknowledging and coping with profound disability. Awareness of the issues might also help psychologists to work more sensitively and productively with staff.

Li Yuk Lam. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-97). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1 : --- Introduction --- p.6 / Brief Summary in Change Blindness Studies --- p.6 / Visual Processing and Change Blindness --- p.9 / Attention and Change Blindness --- p.9 / Different Types of Memory and Change Blindness --- p.16 / General Overview of the Paper --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter 2 : --- Experiment 1 --- p.23 / Experiment 1A --- p.25 / Method --- p.27 / Participants --- p.27 / Materials & Apparatus --- p.27 / Design & Procedure --- p.28 / Result --- p.31 / Discussion --- p.33 / Experiment IB --- p.34 / Method --- p.36 / Participants --- p.36 / Materials and Apparatus --- p.36 / Design and Procedure --- p.37 / Result --- p.39 / Discussion --- p.43 / Comparing Experiment 1A and IB --- p.45 / Discussion --- p.49 / Chapter Chapter 3 : --- Experiment 2 --- p.51 / Method --- p.53 / Participants --- p.53 / Materials & Apparatus --- p.53 / Design & Procedure --- p.53 / Result --- p.54 / Discussion --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- Experiment 3 --- p.57 / Method --- p.61 / Participants --- p.61 / Materials & Apparatus --- p.61 / Design & Procedure --- p.62 / Result --- p.63 / Discussion --- p.68 / Chapter Chapter 5 : --- Experiment 4 --- p.69 / Method --- p.72 / Participants --- p.72 / Materials & Apparatus --- p.72 / Design & Procedure --- p.72 / Result --- p.73 / Discussion --- p.78 / Chapter Chapter 6 : --- General Discussion --- p.78 / Attention and Change Blindness --- p.79 / Stability of Different Kinds of Visual Information --- p.84 / Chapter Chapter 7 : --- Conclusion --- p.88

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The project examines the relationship between perception and action, and is divided into two parts. The first establishes a detailed philosophical critique of recent sensorimotor or enactive approaches to perception, targeting in particular the work of Alva Noë. In the second part I defend what may be called an 'action-space' account, according to which conscious experience is constituted by an agent's representing his surroundings in such a way as to enable a certain suite of actions. The enactive approach, I argue, misconstrues the relationship between perception and action and fails in its aim to provide an explanation of consciousness. It faces difficulties, too, when it comes to illusion, hallucination and non-visual perception. The action-space model, by contrast, drawing upon work by Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett and Philip Pettit, has the resources to provide a reductive, functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness; an account that locates consciousness where we want it - in the service of fluid world-engagement by embodied, active perceivers. Thus the perception/action interface is taken to be less direct than on the sensorimotor interpretation, but is nonetheless deep and important. The approach I endorse, furthermore, is consistent with and informed by empirical results from the cognitive sciences, including work on embodied, situated cognition and dual-streams analyses of visual processing.

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Thesis (M.S.V.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1979. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-98). / by Thomas Austin Sansone. / M.S.V.S.

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