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Measurement is an indispensable part of physical science as well as of commerce, industry, and daily life. Measuring activities appear unproblematic when performed with familiar instruments such as thermometers and clocks, but a closer examination reveals a host of epistemological questions, including: 1. How is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? 2. What do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? 3. When is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Currently, these questions are almost completely ignored by philosophers of science, who view them as methodological concerns to be settled by scientists. This dissertation shows that these questions are not only philosophically worthy, but that their exploration has the potential to challenge fundamental assumptions in philosophy of science, including the distinction between measurement and prediction. The thesis outlines a model-based epistemology of physical measurement and uses it to address the questions above. To measure, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Idealizations are necessary preconditions for the possibility of justifying such inferences. Similarly, claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated against the background of an idealized representation of the measurement process. Chapters 1-3 develop this framework and use it to analyze the inferential structure of standardization procedures performed by contemporary standardization bureaus. Standardizing time, for example, is a matter of constructing idealized models of multiple atomic clocks in a way that allows consistent estimates of duration to be inferred from clock indications. Chapter 4 shows that calibration is a special sort of modeling activity, i.e. the activity of constructing and testing models of measurement processes. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, the accuracy of measurement outcomes is properly evaluated by comparing model predictions to each other, rather than by comparing observations.

Measurement is an indispensable part of physical science as well as of commerce, industry, and daily life. Measuring activities appear unproblematic when performed with familiar instruments such as thermometers and clocks, but a closer examination reveals a host of epistemological questions, including: 1. How is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? 2. What do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? 3. When is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Currently, these questions are almost completely ignored by philosophers of science, who view them as methodological concerns to be settled by scientists. This dissertation shows that these questions are not only philosophically worthy, but that their exploration has the potential to challenge fundamental assumptions in philosophy of science, including the distinction between measurement and prediction. The thesis outlines a model-based epistemology of physical measurement and uses it to address the questions above. To measure, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Idealizations are necessary preconditions for the possibility of justifying such inferences. Similarly, claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated against the background of an idealized representation of the measurement process. Chapters 1-3 develop this framework and use it to analyze the inferential structure of standardization procedures performed by contemporary standardization bureaus. Standardizing time, for example, is a matter of constructing idealized models of multiple atomic clocks in a way that allows consistent estimates of duration to be inferred from clock indications. Chapter 4 shows that calibration is a special sort of modeling activity, i.e. the activity of constructing and testing models of measurement processes. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, the accuracy of measurement outcomes is properly evaluated by comparing model predictions to each other, rather than by comparing observations.

This thesis describes an analysis of science textbooks, eight years after the implementation of the Years 1-10 Queensland Science Syllabus, which suggested a move towards constructivist teaching in Queensland schools (QSSC 1999). The textbooks have been analysed for evidence of constructivism, and this has led to recommendations for writing better textbooks. This thesis has been written in five chapters. In Chapter 1, a review of literature develops a conceptual framework, which is the basis of this research. Chapter 2 describes the process used to develop its methodology, and Chapter 3 presents the results of this analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the findings of this research and its implications for textbook content and design. In the literature review the themes of constructivism and the nature of science and the use of textbooks by teachers are explored. It suggests that textbooks continue to be central to developing curriculum, that they are used as a reference and as an independent learning tool, rather than as a guide to enacting curriculum. It also shows constructivist teaching closely aligns with authentic science, that it moves school science closer to that practised by scientists, and that it can engender improvements in teaching practice and in student interest. The data from this research has been collected using an analytical grid developed from three successive trials, after the literature review showed no previously developed analytical grid was suitable. In this final version of the grid, Likert scales are used to observe four dimensions of constructivism in textbook activities: coherence (use knowledge and concepts in a range of contexts), student-centredness of inquiries, language used and analysis questions to practice making new knowledge claims. The unit of analysis was ecology chapters of four middle school science textbooks. The research questions asked in this study are as follows: • Is a constructivist approach discernable in the textbooks reviewed in terms of the four dimensions of constructivism identified in the literature review? • What elements of constructivism are readily identifiable, and therefore are easily included in textbooks? • What elements of constructivism are not discernable? The results of this research have been synthesised and show no textbook could be considered constructivist, although one textbook had inquiries that could be considered exemplary. Two of the textbooks had no claim to be constructivist because they lacked inquiries, and this is where students experience the methods of scientists and practise making knowledge claims.   Other conclusions of this research include the following: •All textbooks reviewed were deficient in at least one dimension of constructivism, and those with one inquiry cannot be constructivist; •Activities and contexts made textbooks more coherent; •Technical terms were reduced compared to what has been traditionally covered by textbooks, however technical terms are also essential to scientific literacy and need to be used appropriately; •Most methods of inquiries are prescribed, so they do not allow students to solve problems in their own relevant contexts; even in those textbooks with more inquiries; •There was little evidence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning in inquiries rather data collection and simple analysis were usually suggested. Guidelines for writing better textbooks have become apparent from this research. Coherent textbooks are inherently constructivist because they apply concepts across contexts, and have more inquiries. Inquiries with a rigorous, authentic hypothetico-deductive approach arise naturally when the methods, concepts and language of science are applied in contexts that students are likely to find relevant and interesting, and where real-life problems need to be solved. Adopting these recommendations could lead to textbooks being more centrally positioned in enacting curriculum than now, because they are more likely to be constructivist (and represent the best thinking in the field).

This thesis describes an analysis of science textbooks, eight years after the implementation of the Years 1-10 Queensland Science Syllabus, which suggested a move towards constructivist teaching in Queensland schools (QSSC 1999). The textbooks have been analysed for evidence of constructivism, and this has led to recommendations for writing better textbooks. This thesis has been written in five chapters. In Chapter 1, a review of literature develops a conceptual framework, which is the basis of this research. Chapter 2 describes the process used to develop its methodology, and Chapter 3 presents the results of this analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the findings of this research and its implications for textbook content and design. In the literature review the themes of constructivism and the nature of science and the use of textbooks by teachers are explored. It suggests that textbooks continue to be central to developing curriculum, that they are used as a reference and as an independent learning tool, rather than as a guide to enacting curriculum. It also shows constructivist teaching closely aligns with authentic science, that it moves school science closer to that practised by scientists, and that it can engender improvements in teaching practice and in student interest. The data from this research has been collected using an analytical grid developed from three successive trials, after the literature review showed no previously developed analytical grid was suitable. In this final version of the grid, Likert scales are used to observe four dimensions of constructivism in textbook activities: coherence (use knowledge and concepts in a range of contexts), student-centredness of inquiries, language used and analysis questions to practice making new knowledge claims. The unit of analysis was ecology chapters of four middle school science textbooks. The research questions asked in this study are as follows: • Is a constructivist approach discernable in the textbooks reviewed in terms of the four dimensions of constructivism identified in the literature review? • What elements of constructivism are readily identifiable, and therefore are easily included in textbooks? • What elements of constructivism are not discernable? The results of this research have been synthesised and show no textbook could be considered constructivist, although one textbook had inquiries that could be considered exemplary. Two of the textbooks had no claim to be constructivist because they lacked inquiries, and this is where students experience the methods of scientists and practise making knowledge claims.   Other conclusions of this research include the following: •All textbooks reviewed were deficient in at least one dimension of constructivism, and those with one inquiry cannot be constructivist; •Activities and contexts made textbooks more coherent; •Technical terms were reduced compared to what has been traditionally covered by textbooks, however technical terms are also essential to scientific literacy and need to be used appropriately; •Most methods of inquiries are prescribed, so they do not allow students to solve problems in their own relevant contexts; even in those textbooks with more inquiries; •There was little evidence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning in inquiries rather data collection and simple analysis were usually suggested. Guidelines for writing better textbooks have become apparent from this research. Coherent textbooks are inherently constructivist because they apply concepts across contexts, and have more inquiries. Inquiries with a rigorous, authentic hypothetico-deductive approach arise naturally when the methods, concepts and language of science are applied in contexts that students are likely to find relevant and interesting, and where real-life problems need to be solved. Adopting these recommendations could lead to textbooks being more centrally positioned in enacting curriculum than now, because they are more likely to be constructivist (and represent the best thinking in the field).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Texas, Dec., 2007. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2009. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 158-166). Issued in print and online. Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations.

In this thesis, I argue for rationalism, the claim that political legitimacy should be distributed such that justice is promoted best. In chapter 1, I define legitimacy as the permission to rule. I deny that political institutions generally enjoy authority, which is the moral power to directly impose duties on others. I then describe how legitimate political institutions without authority are possible in principle. In the second chapter, I outline a major problem for rationalism. If individuals have strong, moral rights, then it seems that political institutions cannot legitimately operate without their subjects' consent. I describe the key assumptions in this argument, and discuss a series of unconvincing proposals in the literature to escape it. In chapter 3, I argue that we can solve the problem if we look at theories of the moral justification of rights. There are two major such theories, the interest theory and the status theory. I outline the interest theory, and argue that it allows for non-consensual but legitimate political institutions. In chapter 4, I describe a Kantian claim about the nature of rights, according to which our rights are fully realised only if there are political institutions. If we accept this thought, then non-consensual political institutions can be legitimate on the status theory as well. In chapter 5, I outline what it means to promote-rather than respect-justice, and argue that the promotion of justice enjoys primacy over other values. At first sight, rationalism appears to have very radical implications, given that it asks us to base legitimacy on justice. In chapter 6, I argue that this impression is mistaken. We should often pursue justice indirectly, for example, through methods which focus on legal validity or democratic procedure rather than justice.

In Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the problems which confront a realist account of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the beginning of Chapter 2, I explain in what sense relativism constitutes a challenge to this account. Four interconnected questions are then posed which are said to underlie the realist position. The chapter finishes with an explanation of how some of them arise in an actual case study. Chapter 3 deals with a general argument of Quine's for the view that reference is inscrutable. In reply I maintain that the argument does not hold good, either with respect to interpreting our own language or when it comes to translating an alien language. With Chapter 4, I begin to answer the four questions. I explain how Tarski's theory of truth can be seen as a correspondence theory. It is argued, however, that Tarski's theory itself presupposes theories of reference and extension, and certain recent attempts to overcome this lacuna are criticized. In the next chapter I draw an analogy between natural kind predicates, which are of particular importance in science, and proper names, and offer cluster theories of reference for both. This answers the third most basic of the four questions. These theories are defended against criticisms made by Kripke and Putnam, Chapter 6 aims to answer the second most basic question by considering in detail how we can understand what earlier scientific theories were about. I develop some arguments of Davidson's as a counter to Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. I claim that although translation might in fact be indeterminate, Quine, through concentrating on behavioural evidence to the exclusion of other physical evidence, has failed to show that it is, and that in any case indeterminacy of sentence translation does not imply inscrutability of reference of terms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum up ray explication of the realist's account of the growth of science with respect to natural kind predicates. I then consider two cases of theory change of different sorts and suggest how my work might be extended.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:31:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-04-25Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:22:43Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 rufatto_ca_dr_bauru.pdf: 363707 bytes, checksum: b6fd24f55ae0b377afc00b5dec69a478 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O trabalho inicia-se com a apresentação das ideias sobre a verdade nas tradições racionalista e empirista, com a posterior avaliação dessas duas tradições por Popper. Em seguida, aborda-se o problema da indução de David Hume (fundamental no debate sobre a verdade), e a solução apresentada por Popper. A concepção de ciência de Popper é explicada, com especial atenção para o caráter provisório do conhecimento científico, sua racionalidade e potencial de progresso e a importância do critério de verossimilitude. A concepção de aprendizado de Popper é apresentada a partir de suas críticas da teoria do senso comum do conhecimento, da teoria dos três mundos, da importância que ele atribuía aos problemas e de suas idéias sobre a evolução do conhecimento, tendo o evolucionismo de Darwin como modelo. É feita uma retomada dos argumentos, trabalhos e autores que pesquisaram sobre a relevância da Filosofia da Ciência para o Ensino de Ciências, procurando-se identificar pontos importantes de influência. Ao final se procura estabelecer a relevância da contribuição de Popper para o Ensino de Ciências, identificando-se os pontos fortes de sua contribuição. / This work begins with a presentation of ideas concerning truth according to rationalist and empiric traditions, with a posterior evaluation of both traditions given by Popper. Following, it dels with the problem of David Hume's induction (fundamental in the discussion concerning truth) and the solution presented by Popper. Popper's conception of science is explained, giving special attention to the temporary characteristic of scientific knowledge, its rationality and its capability of progress and the value of the criterion verisimilitude. The concept of learning conceived by Popper is presented commencing with his critical insight of the theory of commom sense of knowledge, the theory of three worlds, of the importnace he used to attribute to problems and his ideas concerning evolution of knowledge, using Darwin's evolution theory as a model. A retaken of arguments is accomplished, works and authors who conducted research about the relevance of philosophy of science for the teaching of science, attempting to identify points of influence. Finally one attempts to establish the relevance of Popper's contribution to the teaching of sciences, thus identifying the strong points of this contribution.