<p>Theories that engender fundamental transformations in our world view seldom come perfect from the outset for two reasons. First, the empirical discoveries and theoretical framework necessary for their full explanatory efficacy are often not yet in place. Secondly, as a consequence of the first, some of the auxiliary theories and assumptions they rely upon are often antiquated and erroneous. For these reasons, anomalies are frequent in scientific theories. In this thesis, I discuss some of the major scientific anomalies, including particularly, the paradox of altruism. I suggest that the paradox of altruism arises because one of the most fundamental Mendelian genetic principles is misapplied. I show that today’s explanatory models err in supposing altruism and selfishness to be genetic allelomorphs. The supposition is inconsistent with the field data on altruism, and entails a logical inconsistency in accounting for the evolution of altruism. Largely, the models that purport to resolve the paradox hinge on the conditional expression of the altruistic gene, a move which I argue contradicts the theoretical assumption that engenders the paradox in the first place. I demonstrate from the empirical data that altruism and selfishness are rather plastic phenotypic expressions of a single genotype. And by supplanting the standard neo-Darwinian assumptions with the principle of phenotypic plasticity, I provide a parsimonious account of the evolution and maintenance of altruism which entails no paradox.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is <i>scientific</i> explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific <i>explanation</i>?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other. / Master of Arts / While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to ‘what is scientific explanation?’, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to ‘what is scientific explanation?’. In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.

2024 / This dissertation investigates the scientific practices involved in biodiversity conservation at the intersection of the philosophy of measurement, the philosophy of data, and the literature on values in science. With a focus on the epistemology, methods,and ontology of measuring biodiversity within the context of conservation science, it aims to develop a socially relevant and socially engaged philosophy of science. Chapter 1 challenges ”Biodiversity Skepticism,” which dismisses the usefulness of the concept of biodiversity due to the proliferation of heterogeneous, non covariant measurements. Instead, drawing from Norman M. Bradburn, Nancy L. Cartwright, and Jonathan Fuller’s model of the measurement process, I argue for understanding the pluralistic nature of conceptualizing complex measurands. In Chapter 2, I address the need for a proper justification of the claim that we are in a biodiversity crisis by analyzing the conceptual and data incommensurability between contemporary biodiversity and paleodiversity. Building on Carlos Santana’s ideas, I propose solutions for obtaining robust inferences about the status of environmental crises. Chapter 3 challenges the slogan implicitly endorsed in evidence-based conservation that ”the bigger the data, the bigger the evidence,” highlighting the complexity of turning data into evidence through an examination of the IUCN’s redlisting process. I contend that evidence relies on a complex infrastructure made of data communities and evidential standards, and undermine the facile equating of data with evidence. In Chapter 4, I counter the contention that performance metrics in conservation are value-neutral, using the philosophical framework of ”critical metrology.” This section exposes the fallacy of measurements’ inherent value neutrality and addresses the contribution of conservation science to ”scientific colonialism.” I also propose potential solutions for fostering an ethical and epistemically stronger conservation agenda. Chapter 5 concludes by going back to the measurement theory used to account for biodiversity measurement, and shows how this context reveals the ways in which Bradburn, Cartwright, and Fuller’s theory of measurement needs to be amended. It also sketches an adequacy-for-purpose view to evaluate measurements and elaborates on some implications of this view in relation to measurement validation and the irremediable value-ladeness of measurements. This dissertation offers novel philosophical insights into the theoretical and practical complexities of measuring biodiversity that is valuable to biodiversity scientists, offering a space for building actionable knowledge at the intersection of philosophy and conservation science. / 2027-02-07T00:00:00Z

This dissertation considers the “strategic naturalism” of Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory in the philosophy of science, and it should be applied to epistemology. Strategic naturalism stipulates that all elements of inquiry are historically and culturally situated, and thereby subject to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. Allegiance to naturalism is de rigueur, yet there is no clear agreement on the term’s meaning. Harding’s standpoint theory reads the lack of definition as indicative of its generative possibilities for epistemic progress. The driving question is why Harding’s approach has not been considered a viable candidate for determining progress in epistemology. Beyond the fact that epistemic labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a social activity, Harding’s approach recognizes that it is situated in and reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. Harding’s strategic naturalism would invigorate epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and respect for epistemic difference and drive epistemic progress that not only acknowledges pluralistic ways of knowing but also gives a more accurate account of the knowing subject. Chapter one is a discussion of non-naturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized Epistemology (QNE), framed by Harding’s historical account of the related projects of modern epistemology and science. This chapter highlights two important issues. The first issue is that epistemology is more complex than the story Quine offers. The second, and decisive issue is that the shared history of modern epistemology and science demonstrates the influence of social and cultural values on that history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in epistemology, science, and philosophy of science. Chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for critical feminist responses to both the received epistemological theory and QNE discussed in chapter one. The justifications for the feminist critiques and the problematic issues that motivate these critiques provide the backdrop for the initial, positive response to QNE, as well as their disenchantment with Quine’s influential proposal. Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science assess QNE as not naturalized enough to address their concerns. Chapter three considers several feminist standpoint theories to show that they are more naturalistic and better at providing a multi-faceted theory that is based on actual scientific practice, and re-introduces social values and interests as having a positive influence on epistemology and philosophies of science. This chapter shows that given the closely shared histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE would be a viable resource for a more naturalistic epistemology. The final chapter argues that the project of naturalizing epistemology could incorporate FSE insights and the positive role FSE’s controversiality would play in naturalizing epistemology and philosophies of science. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness and what that entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and reflective eye. The implications on both our epistemic theories and our accounts of what kinds of knowing subject we are would foster epistemic progress.

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As the discipline of economics professionalized during the interwar period, two schools of thought emerged: institutionalism and neoclassical economics. By 1954, after the publication of Arrow and Debreu’s landmark article on general equilibrium theory, consensus formed around neoclassical economics. This outcome was significantly influenced by trends in the philosophy of science, notably the transformation from the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle to an ‘Americanized’ version of logical empiricism that was dominant through the 1950s. This version of logical empiricism provided a powerful ally to neoclassical economics by affirming its philosophical and methodological commitments as examples of “good science”. This dissertation explores this process of consensus formation by considering whether consensus would be judged normatively appropriate from the perspective of three distinct approaches to the philosophy of science; Carl Hempel’s logical empiricism, Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory change and Helen Longino’s critical contextual empiricism. The conclusion is that there is no ‘consensus on consensus’. Longino’s approach reveals the ways in which alignments between mid-century philosophy of science and neoclassical economics mask the normative commitments implicit in both disciplines. Moreover, Longino’s alternative set of theoretical virtues reveal how questioning the standards of “good science” yields very different conclusions about both the scientific credentials and viability of institutional economics. My conclusion is that a pluralistic approach to the philosophy of science is essential to fully understanding the case study of mid-century economics. / Philosophy