This thesis aims to show that Coleridge's thinking about science was inseparable from and influenced by his social and political concerns. During his lifetime, science was undergoing a major transition from mechanistic to dynamical modes of explanation. Coleridge's views on natural philosophy reflect this change. As a young man, in the mid-1790s, he embraced the mechanistic philosophy of Necessitarianism, especially in his psychology. In the early 1800s, however, he began to condemn the ideas to which he had previously been attracted. While there were technical, philosophical and religious reasons for this turnabout, there were also major political ones. For he repeatedly complained that the prevailing 'mechanical philosophy' of the period bolstered emerging liberal and Utilitarian philosophies based ultimately on self-interest. To combat the 'commercial' ideology of early nineteenth century Britain, he accordingly advocated an alternative, 'dynamic' view of nature, derived from German Idealism. I argue that Coleridge championed this 'dynamic philosophy' because it sustained his own conservative politics, grounded ultimately on the view that states possess an intrinsic unity, so are not the product of individualistic self-interest.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Groningen, 1985. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 260-302) and index.

No description available.

The philosophical and scientific teaching in the universities of 17th century Scotland has frequently been dismissed as Aristotelian and reactionary. However, there must surely have been some development during the century for the universities to have achieved as much as they did in the 18th century. It is the purpose of this study to investigate the contant of the courses in philosophy and science given at the Scottish Universities in the 17th century with a view to answering the following quesions: Was Aristotle really taught so exclusively throughout the century? Or, given that the universities did concentrate on Aristotle to a great extent, was this Aristotleianism so monolithic and unifrom as is sometimes made out? Did Scottish university teachers make any acknowledgement of the philosophical and scientific revolutions which were taking place in the 17th century? How were the universities affected by the political and religeous struggles of the century? Was the teaching the same at Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow and St. Andrews, or were some of the universities in advance of the others? The main sources for our knowledge of 17th century Scottish university teaching are student lecture notes or dictates and the graduate theses produced by the masters or regents for the students to defend at the annual laureation ceremony. the dictates and theses are supplemented by library lists, university and faculty minutes, and the reports of the numerous commissions appointed by church and state to visit the universities during the 17th century, together with papers relating to these commissions. Throughout the century the curriculum at all universities remained the same in outline, viz. 1st year: Greek; 2nd years: Logic/ metaphysics; 3rd year: Metaphysics/ Ethics; 4th year: physics. Until the 1660s the teaching in the 2nd, 3rd and fourth years consisted of commentaries on Aristotle, but the authorities cited by the regents show that they were acquainted with more 'modern' Aristotalians, e.g. Zabarella and the Coimbra commentators. Frequently the works of such authors were praised, and the library lists show that they were bought extensively. From the 1660s onwards Cartesianism entered the courses. At first the regents distrusted this new philosophy, and indeed as long as Descartes was taught in the Scottish Universities, many of the regents and visiting commissioners feared the atheistic implications of Cartesian mechanism. However, descartes was accorded warm praise in the theses and dictates for Edinburgh, St. Andrews and Aberdeen during the 1670s and 1680s. by the 1690s the enthusiasm for Descartes was beginning to decline, although some of the regents continued to teach Cartesianism into the 18th century. In Logic and Metaphysics the teaching of Locke was often adopted, and in Physics Newtonian ideas were expounded. The teaching was perhaps most conservative in Logic, where Aristotelian ideas continued to be taught by the scholastic method of debate until the beginning of the 18th century. Despite the praises of Descartes's method, and later Locke, the scheme for Logic teaching was probably based on scholastic textbooks such as those of Keckermann and Burgersdijk. In Metaphysics too scolasticism tended to predominate, but because of Scotland's religeous allegiance there are numerous quotations from and references to the works of Protestant theologians. Once commentaries on Aristotle ceased, metaphysics was divided into Metaphysics proper and Pneumatology, the two subjects frequently being separated and taught in different years of the course. the Scottis regents saw Ethics as a strictly practical science, aimed at teaching their students how to live as godly citizens. Accordingly in their Ethics teaching they tended to cite authorities less frequently than in their teaching of other subjects; instead they gave rules of conduct for their students. After the 1660s many of the regents based their teaching on Henry More, and Descartes's theory of the passions was widely accepted. Discussion of different types of justice and of natural law formed a great part of the Ethics dictates and theses, and Grotius, Cumberland and Puffendorf were all referred to. In Physics the experiments of many contempory or recent scientists were described. Robert Boyle and the Royal Society were universally praised by the regents. the work of English, French and Dutch scientists featured prominently in the lectures from the 1660s onwards, and were bought for the libraries. Cartesian physics and cosmology were taught in the last quarter of the 17th century, but by the beginning of the 18th century many of the regents had gone over to Newtonianism.the politicl and religeous upheavals in 17th century Scotland affected staff appointments in the universities. many of the regents lost their posts in 1638 and during the Civil Wars, at the Restoration, and at the revolutioanry Settlement in 1689. Unorthodoxy in their dictates and theses was frowned on, and sometimes led to dismissal. Various commissioners tried to regulate what was taught in the universities, and in the 1690s a project for a uniform course made considerable headway. however, despite this interference on part of state and church, the universities managed to preserve a fair degree of autonomy, and both their statements in answer to the commission's proposals in the 1690s and the actual content of their dictates and theses show a concern to uphold their academic integrity. The courses in the Scottish universities were sufficiently similar to enable one to talk of 17th century Scottish university education in general terms, but the universities did not always agree amongst themselves, as their comments on each other's contributions to the uniform course show. Edinburgh seems generally to have been the most advanced of the universities in its teaching, Glasgow the least. the conclusion of this survey is that university education in the 17th century was by no means as consistently uninspired as is sometimes proposed. It is true that neither the system of regenting nor the troubled stare of the country in the 17th century were conductive to a high educational standard. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of new ideas in the dictates and theses from 1600 to the 1660s, and after that date many of the regents showed themselves to be conversant with new devlopments in all fields of philosophy. By the beginning of the 18th century the way had been paved for the intellectual achievements of that century in the universities.

Orientador: Eneias Junior Forlin / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-12T06:27:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sardeiro_LeandrodeAraujo_M.pdf: 603403 bytes, checksum: 3d1c7910596bd5fd3fdf0b9074cb77b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Desenvolveu-se o problema do conhecimento humano na constituição das Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1619-1628) no que se refere à significação da Mathesis universalis. Pretendeu-se defender uma compreensão da Mathesis universalis enquanto ciência do conhecimento em geral - diversa, portanto, das Mathematicae - mostrando a sua aplicabilidade aos diversos ramos do conhecimento por via da análise das naturezas simples. Defendeu-se que a Mathesis universalis não se esgota em uma teoria geral da quantidade por ser delineada por naturezas simples que não expressam apenas quantidades, mas todos os objetos passíveis de conhecimento, inclusive metafísicos. A universalidade da Mathesis universalis estaria expressa pela sua aplicabilidade indefinida, porque potencialmente presente em toda e qualquer descrição e problematização das naturezas simples. Por essa razão, sustentou-se que as naturezas simples não designam apenas coisas - passíveis de tratamento quantitativo -, mas se referem igualmente a proposições, cujo escopo abrange, entre outras coisas, objetos comuns a diversos saberes. A Mathesis universalis seria uma metaciência, a ocupar-se de metaobjetos. Nesse sentido, recuperou-se a noção de ingenium no intuito de mostrar que, por estar ligada à problemática mais científica das Regulae, tal noção resignara-se a uma epistemologia, sem constituir uma metafísica, fato este que não impediria a posterior aplicação da Mathesis universalis àquele campo do saber. Toda essa discussão pressupôs como válida a apresentação material do manuscrito de Hannover, encontrado por Foucher de Careil na primeira metade do século XIX, que apresenta a discussão acerca da Mathesis universalis desenvolvida na regra IV na forma de apêndice, o que nos fez levantar o questionamento acerca da "significação" da Mathesis universalis. / Abstract: We have dealt with the problem of human knowledge in the constitution of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1619-1628), as it is concerned with the signification of the Mathesis universalis. We intended to defend a comprehension of the Mathesis universalis as science of knowledge in general - different, therefore, from the Mathematicae - by showing its applicability in the diverse fields of knowledge through the analysis of the simple natures. Thus, we claim that the Mathesis universalis is not fully apprehended when it is conceived of as a general theory of quantity, for it is determined by simple natures, which do not only express quantities, but all knowledgeable objects, including the metaphysical ones. The universality of the Mathesis universalis would then be expressed in its indefinite applicability, for it is potentially present in each and every description and problematization of the simple natures. That is why, for example, we claim that the simple natures do not only express things which are dealt with quantitatively, but equally refer to propositions, in whose scope we find, among others, objects that are common to a wide range of forms of knowledge. The Mathesis universalis would then be a metascience, one that should deal with metaobjects. Thus, we have brought forth the notion of ingenium so as to show that, since it was then connected to the Regulae's more scientifical problematics, it then resignated itself to an epistemology that did not go so far as to constitute a metaphysics; what, however, would not constitute impediment to a future application of the Mathesis universalis to that field of knowledge, to wit, metaphysics. All of this discussion presupposes as valid the material presentation of the Hannover manuscript of the Regulae, found by Foucher de Careil in the first half of the XIX century, which relegates the discussion related to the mathesis universalis developed in rule IV to an appendix - what made us raise this questioning concerning the "signification" of the Mathesis universalis. / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia