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This thesis is an examination and evaluation of the development of Russell's theory of perception and its relation to the external world from 1905 to 1919. During this period Russell attempted a reductionist analysis of empirical knowledge, the foundations of which are sense-data with which we have direct acquaintance in perception. In the course of its development, Russell's theory of perception underwent considerable changes and modifications. I show that these changes and modifications do not seriously alter his main epistemological position which I identify as realism. The explicit treatment of Russell's realist theory of perception during the stipulated period had two clearly distinguishable subsidiary stages. The first stage, replacing his pre-"On Denoting" absolute realism, was between 1905 and 1912. Immediately after the publication of The Problems of Philosophy in 1912 there was a transitional period of scepticism which ultimately gave rise to the theory of logical construction. This period was between 1912 and 1919. These two stages represent what I take to be the periods of significant change and modification within Russell's realism. However, only during the first stage can Russell properly be called a committed representative realist. The first chapter introduces the issues to be addressed in this thesis. Chapters two and three cover the foundational aspects of Russell's theory of perception. In chapter two Russell's theory of acquaintance is thoroughly examined. The items discussed are the nature, objects and principle of acquaintance. I show that it is with regard to the objects of acquaintance that Russell's theory of acquaintance underwent considerable changes and revisions. I also present a detailed discussion of the principle of acquaintance and its role in Russell's epistemology, and suggest that it performs two important functions, one epistemological and the other semantical. Both of them are seen to run hand in hand. Chapter three is devoted to the doctrine of sense-data which, according to Russell, is the foundation of empirical knowledge during the stipulated period. Some obvious difficulties in interpreting sense-data are seen to disappear on closer inspection. I defend Russell from a certain arrount of misunderstanding regarding the sensibilia theory. I also trace and present the justification for a major modification of his notion of the judgment of perception from Principia Mathematica volume I to The Problems of Philosophy and from The Problems of Philosophy to subsequent works. It is suggested that such a modification is required for the internal consistency of Russell's theory of perception. Chapters four and five are devoted to the relation of perception to our knowledge of the external world. In chapter four the Problems of Philosophy view of the existence and nature of physical objects is investigated. I explain why Russell was right to hold that the naive realist's view is contradictory. I also show that after rejecting naive realism Russell explicitly coornitted himself to representative realism by holding a causal theory of perception. It is also shown that the episterrological dimension of the theory of descriptions allows him to overcome restrictions arising from the principle of acquaintance. The last part of this chapter explains the transition between Russell's preconstructionist and constructionist approaches to the relation of perception to physical objects. I show conclusively that Russell became a constructionist as early as 1912. In chapter five the construction of physical objects is discussed. The emphasis is placed on Russell's episte11Dlo:;ical motivation for such construction. I defend much of what Russell says about sensibilia and argue that the inclusion of unsensed sensibilia in construction violates neither the spirit of logical construction nor Occam's razor. I also defend Russell from the charge of phenomenalism. I argue that his constructionism does not comnit him to phenomenalism and that he always remained a realist. Chapter six examines the construction of space and time. I concede that Russell's attempt to construct a six-dimensional space is a failure but suggest that he does not need a six-dimensional space to give an account to the problem of perception. Regarding the construction of time, I show that Russell is for the most part correct in his construction of instants out of experienced events. In chapter seven I evaluate Russell's theory of perception. I show that Russell is neither completely consistent nor successful in his construction of physical objects. At the same time, I show that there is a consistency of purpose and direction which motivated Russell to introduce logical constructions. The purpose was to secure empirical knowledge from possible sceptical attack and to strike a compromise between his realism and his empiricism. The direction is towards the goal of establishing a bridge between perception and physics. I suggest that the constructionist view is a better approach towards, and a viable solution to, the problem of perception. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

El propósito del presente trabajo ha sido investigar si los niños reaccionan de modo diferencial ante objetos físicos y sociales en función de dimensiones del temperamento y estudiar la evolución de estas reacciones a lo largo del primer año de vida. Participaron 51 niños, nacidos a término, sin complicaciones pre ni postnatales y con peso y talla normal al nacer. La expresión de las características temperamentales ante objetos físicos y sociales fue evaluada en el laboratorio trimestralmente desde los tres hasta los doce meses de edad, a partir de una selección de la batería de situaciones denominada “Tareas evolutivas y escalas de puntuación para la evaluación del temperamento infantil en el laboratorio”. Los resultados indicaron que los niños parecen reaccionar de modo diferente ante los objetos sociales y los objetos físicos en las dimensiones temperamentales. Respecto a la evolución de esta sensibilidad diferencial, los niños mostraron mayor estabilidad cuando estaban interactuando con objetos físicos que cuando lo hacían con objetos sociales. / The aim of this research was to investigate whether infants react differentially to social and physical objects as a function of temperament dimensions and to study the evolution of these reactions during the first year of life. 51 infants took part in this study. All infants were healthy, full-term and without any pre and post-natal complications. Newborns had a normal weight and normal length at birth. The expression of infants’ temperamental traits when faced to social and physical objects was assessed in the laboratory quarterly from 3 to 12 months, using a selection of the Matheny and Wilson Developmental Tasks and Rating Scales for the Laboratory Assessment of Infant Temperament. The results indicated that the infants seem to react differentially when facing to social and physical objects. With respect to course of this differential responsiveness, the infants showed a higher stability when interacting with physical objects than that with social objects.

Physical objects with digital properties are being used more and more by the public. One such term for these artefacts include "the Internet of Things''. Most of these objects are often impossible to further modify or customise, and thus serve just the single purpose intended by their creators. This thesis explores the possibility of customising physical objects in order to provide an affordable and flexible way of interacting with them. A prototype, involving a mobile phone application (Android) and wireless sensor technology (NFC tags), was developed for the medical domain of speech and language therapy. The system, developed in close association with two therapists, allows the customisation of current speech and language exercise and associated material. It is designed to also assist with logging the patient interactions during the conduction of such exercises. The proposed solution has been tested and validated by medical experts, and its user interface evaluated by non-patient users.

Cette thèse se situe à mi-chemin entre la phénoménologie et la physique de particules expérimentale. Dans la première partie, nous décrivons un calcul de section efficace à order supérieur en développement perturbatif, ainsi que son implementation dans un générateur d'événements Monte Carlo. Nous présentons les corrections au premier order en chromodynamique quantique pour la production de boson de Higgs chargé en association avec un quark top au LHC, en utilisant le formalisme de soustraction de Catani et Seymour. Notre code indépendant nous a permis de valider les résultats donnés par MC@NLO, et nous avons réalisé des études concernant diverses contributions aux erreurs systématiques dues à la simulation d'événements. L'implémention du processus a été réalisée pour le générateur POWHEG. En raison de la quantité de données insuffisante disponible fin 2010 (le détecteur ATLAS a accumulé 35 pb-1 de données de collisions proton-proton), le processus de production de Higgs chargé n'a pas pu être étudié et nous nous sommes tournés vers la caractérisation de bruits de fonds. Dans ce contexte, il s'avère que la production de boson W en association avec un quark top est importante à connaître. Dans la seconde partie de cette thèse, nous mettons en place une analyse spécifique au canal Wt semileptonique, en incluant les effets statistiques et systématiques, pour lesquels nous nous concentrons plus particulièrement sur l'effet dû aux différentes paramétrisations du contenu des protons. Le processus Wt étant inobservable au Tévatron, nous pouvons pour la première fois donner une limite à la setion efficace de production. / This thesis is intended as a bridge between the two highly specialised domains of phenomenology and experimental particle physics. The first part describes in detail a higher order cross section calculation and implementation into a Monte Carlo event generator. We present the calculation of the next-to-leading order (NLO) quantum chromodynamic corrections for charged Higgs boson production in association with a top quark at the LHC, using the Catani-Seymour dipole subtraction method. Building an independent NLO code enabled us to cross-check the implemented version of MC@NLO, and a few studies have been made which focus on different contributions to the theoretical uncertainty attached to the NLO calculation. The actual implementation was performed for another NLO event generator, POWHEG. Considering the small production cross section of charged Higgs production associated with a top quark, an analysis of this channel using the 35 pb-1 of data collected with the ATLAS detector in 2010 from the proton-proton collisions of the LHC, makes no sense, and we switch to a very similar SM channel, namely Wt production. In the second part, we set-up a dedicated analysis for semileptonic Wt and focus on the evaluation of the PDF systematic uncertainty, following the PDF4LHC recommendation. The electroweak single top production cross section at the Tevatron is so low that it hasn't been observed until today, so we are able to set the world's first limit on its production cross section and include the most important systematic uncertainties in our analysis.