No description available.

With the increased use of teleworkers, it is important to understand how teleworker attitudes are related to the willingness to accept and follow guidelines that maintain data security in the telework environment. The objective of the study was to evaluate the application of the Theory of Planned Behavior and the idea of subjective norms as a means of explaining teleworker compliance in using information technology (IT) security guidelines in a telework environment. A sample of 150 respondents who considered themselves formal and informal teleworkers and were eligible for membership in The Telework Exchange completed an original Teleworker Security Survey. Descriptive and linear regression analyses were used to determine relationships existing between willingness to follow organizational teleworker data information security guidelines and practices. The findings of the analyses demonstrated that Personal Attitude, Social Pressure, and Sense of Control represented a weak to moderate model for explaining teleworker willingness to follow an organization’s security guidelines. This study is significant to organizations with teleworkers by identifying insight on attitudes of teleworkers regarding data security, sense of control and sense of responsibility teleworkers have regarding the confidentiality and integrity of data, and the intent of teleworkers to follow security protocols in a telework environment.

published_or_final_version / Architecture / Master / Master of Architecture

No description available.

For more than a decade, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been attempting to transform their centrally planned economies into market economies. In some of these countries a considerably large unofficial economy has become a serious obstacle to economic growth and public finances. Studies by Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson et al. (1998), and Johnson et al. (2000) show that transition countries with large unofficial economies tend to have excessive regulations, high levels of taxation and high incidence of corruption. As well, bureaucratic corruption in tax and customs administration appears to be an important element in defining the underground economy in some transition countries. </p> <p>Given the potential impact of the unofficial economy on public finances and the provision of public goods, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine how corruption affects the unofficial economy in transition countries, with a particular focus on the unofficial economy that results from tax non-compliance. More specifically the study examines tax cheating as it relates to corruption in tax administration, to the business culture in the economy and to the tax-regulation policy-making process. The thesis looks at the feedback effects of decisions of different agents in the economy, and the implications of these decisions for the provision of public goods. </p> <p>The research is conducted along two lines. First, the thesis examines the nature and the extent of corruption in Albania, focusing particularly on the informal sector and corruption in customs and tax administrations. The thesis also examines the implications of the informal economy on the tax revenues available for the provision of public goods. Then the thesis examines the pattern of government spending in public education and transport infrastructure in Albania to reveal the priorities that these sectors are being given during the transition period. Second, the thesis develops a number of theoretical models to examine some of the issues raised in the analysis of Albania. The theoretical models provide a framework to examine the incentives for different agents in the economy to engage in tax cheating and corruption. More specifically, this section of the thesis examines: the feedback effects between the decision of tax inspectors to engage in corruption and firms' cheating activities; the firms' tax compliance as tax cheating and corruption are more accepted practices when they become increasingly widespread; how government affects the degree of cheating and corruption through auditing; and how corruption affects policy-makers' decisions to allocate the revenue obtained from tax collection between public education and infrastructure. </p> <p>Results from the theoretical models show that widespread bureaucratic corruption among tax inspectors can perpetuate an unofficial economy that in turn sustains these and other corrupt practices. In such situations, intense auditing and penalties serve as cheating deterrents only if cheating and engaging in corruption is very costly for both firms and tax inspectors. When cheating becomes cheaper as the size of the unofficial economy grows, a multiplier effect in the economy gives rise to Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. In an economy with a widespread tolerance for corrupt tax enforcers, tax non-compliance and a low enforcement of penalties, the Pareto inferior (large unofficial economy and an under-provision of public goods) stable equilibrium can prevail. Changes that will move an economy from an inferior equilibrium to a superior equilibrium have a strong political dimension and are complex.</p> <p>Modeling the ways in which policy-makers affect the unofficial economy indicates that, due to the high cost of auditing, the government must allow for some cheating and corruption in order to maximize the revenues available for the provision of public goods. Only if a government views illicit activities as a "public bad", and is willing to eliminate these activities at any cost, will it choose to perform very intense auditing. The government's decision to allocate revenues between education and infrastructure depends on the returns generated by these public goods in the economy and on the private benefits from corruption. A government will allocate funds to education only if education generates relatively higher returns, and if the government favours at the margin the provision of public goods relative to private benefits from corruption. If at the margin the government favours the private benefits from corruption and cheating, then all revenues are allocated to infrastructure even though education generates higher relative returns in the economy. When infrastructure generates higher social returns in the economy, the government commits revenues to infrastructure either to provide the most beneficial public good, or to facilitate opportunities for corruption benefits. Overall the thesis shows that illicit activities (cheating, and political and bureaucratic corruption) can sustain each other regardless which actors in the economy (firms, enforcers, and politicians) undertake them.

For more than a decade, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been attempting to transform their centrally planned economies into market economies. In some of these countries a considerably large unofficial economy has become a serious obstacle to economic growth and public finances. Studies by Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson et al. (1998), and Johnson et al. (2000) show that transition countries with large unofficial economies tend to have excessive regulations, high levels of taxation and high incidence of corruption. As well, bureaucratic corruption in tax and customs administration appears to be an important element in defining the underground economy in some transition countries. </p> <p>Given the potential impact of the unofficial economy on public finances and the provision of public goods, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine how corruption affects the unofficial economy in transition countries, with a particular focus on the unofficial economy that results from tax non-compliance. More specifically the study examines tax cheating as it relates to corruption in tax administration, to the business culture in the economy and to the tax-regulation policy-making process. The thesis looks at the feedback effects of decisions of different agents in the economy, and the implications of these decisions for the provision of public goods. </p> <p>The research is conducted along two lines. First, the thesis examines the nature and the extent of corruption in Albania, focusing particularly on the informal sector and corruption in customs and tax administrations. The thesis also examines the implications of the informal economy on the tax revenues available for the provision of public goods. Then the thesis examines the pattern of government spending in public education and transport infrastructure in Albania to reveal the priorities that these sectors are being given during the transition period. Second, the thesis develops a number of theoretical models to examine some of the issues raised in the analysis of Albania. The theoretical models provide a framework to examine the incentives for different agents in the economy to engage in tax cheating and corruption. More specifically, this section of the thesis examines: the feedback effects between the decision of tax inspectors to engage in corruption and firms' cheating activities; the firms' tax compliance as tax cheating and corruption are more accepted practices when they become increasingly widespread; how government affects the degree of cheating and corruption through auditing; and how corruption affects policy-makers' decisions to allocate the revenue obtained from tax collection between public education and infrastructure. </p> <p>Results from the theoretical models show that widespread bureaucratic corruption among tax inspectors can perpetuate an unofficial economy that in turn sustains these and other corrupt practices. In such situations, intense auditing and penalties serve as cheating deterrents only if cheating and engaging in corruption is very costly for both firms and tax inspectors. When cheating becomes cheaper as the size of the unofficial economy grows, a multiplier effect in the economy gives rise to Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. In an economy with a widespread tolerance for corrupt tax enforcers, tax non-compliance and a low enforcement of penalties, the Pareto inferior (large unofficial economy and an under-provision of public goods) stable equilibrium can prevail. Changes that will move an economy from an inferior equilibrium to a superior equilibrium have a strong political dimension and are complex.</p> <p>Modeling the ways in which policy-makers affect the unofficial economy indicates that, due to the high cost of auditing, the government must allow for some cheating and corruption in order to maximize the revenues available for the provision of public goods. Only if a government views illicit activities as a "public bad", and is willing to eliminate these activities at any cost, will it choose to perform very intense auditing. The government's decision to allocate revenues between education and infrastructure depends on the returns generated by these public goods in the economy and on the private benefits from corruption. A government will allocate funds to education only if education generates relatively higher returns, and if the government favours at the margin the provision of public goods relative to private benefits from corruption. If at the margin the government favours the private benefits from corruption and cheating, then all revenues are allocated to infrastructure even though education generates higher relative returns in the economy. When infrastructure generates higher social returns in the economy, the government commits revenues to infrastructure either to provide the most beneficial public good, or to facilitate opportunities for corruption benefits. Overall the thesis shows that illicit activities (cheating, and political and bureaucratic corruption) can sustain each other regardless which actors in the economy (firms, enforcers, and politicians) undertake them.

Internationella undersökningar gjorda av OECD visar att studie- och yrkesvägledarna i Sverige använder sig av metoder snarare än teorier. Syftet med denna studie var att undersöka karriärutvecklingsteorin Planned Happenstance relevans för vägledningssamtalet, en teori som bejakar obeslutsamhet och de planerade tillfälligheternas betydelse, vilket enligt studiens utgångspunkt - Anders Hallqvists doktorsavhandling - överensstämmer med hur den rådande arbetsmarknaden ser ut. Detta diskuteras utifrån påståendet att då den nuvarande arbetsmarknadspolitiken bygger på en idé om att vi människor gör rationella val, är verkligheten en annan; det är till stor del kreativitet och tillfälligheter som styr vårt jobbsökande. Studien är kvalitativ och bygger på intervjuer av fyra studie- och yrkesvägledare. Resultatet visar att respondenterna använder sig av delar av Planned Happenstance, tillämpar ett holistiskt tillvägagångssätt i sina samtal samt att de anser att klienterna får en mer gynnsam karriärutveckling med hjälp av olika färdigheter. Studien visade att det finns frågetecken kring huruvida Planned Happenstance i sin helhet kan användas i en verksamhet som präglas av ett klientel som lever på försörjningsstöd. Detta eftersom Planned Happenstance innebär att individen ska lära sig använda de fem färdigheterna optimism, uthållighet, nyfikenhet, flexibilitet och risktagande för att få en gynnsam karriärutveckling.

The Dietary Supplements Health and Education Act (DSHEA) of 1994 made safety and efficacy testing of dietary supplements the responsibility of the consumer. Currently, there exists little data on safety and efficacy of supplements, and there is virtually no data regarding safety and efficacy of supplements in individuals under the age of 18 years. Sales indices suggest sports supplement consumption continues to increase among young athletes, and research indicates young athletes have become the key target for marketing. Additionally, pressures to achieve greater athletic performance or an ideal body image are strong motivators for young athletes. These factors create an environment in which adolescents are likely to consume dangerous sports supplements without being aware of risks associated with supplements. This study was conducted as an attempt to understand factors that motivate young athletes to consume sports supplements. The sample for this study consisted of 207 female collegiate athletes participating in basketball, soccer, cross country, volleyball, and swimming during the 2005-2006 NCAA season. A survey instrument containing four scales measured participants'€™ behavioral intention, attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control regarding the consumption of sports supplements. Behavioral intention, attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control are Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) components that, in theory, measure an individual's internal motivations for performance of a behavior. The dependent variable was defined as the intention to consume sports supplements (Behavioral Intention), and attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control were predictor variables. Findings from this study revealed a poor fit for the TPB measurement model. However, the components of the TPB were able to explain 61% of variance in behavioral intention. Additionally, subjective norms were the strongest predictor and perceived behavioral control the weakest. Furthermore, the average female collegiate athlete did not regularly consume sports supplements. Participants claiming to use sports supplements regularly indicated weight loss and gain, fat loss and looking better as primary motivations for consumption. Results indicated the TPB was able to explain a considerable amount of variance in intention to consume sports supplements with body image concerns being primary motivators.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Kathleen Stewart. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Recently, the Mississippi community college system has experienced significant budget cuts. Although fundraising has long historical significance, it has not been fully embraced by the community college system. With the transfer of wealth estimated to be $41-$136 trillion over the next 40 years, there has never been a better time for community colleges to tell their story. Studies reveal that planned giving is a key strategy for fundraising and that new innovative ideas must be developed to take advantage of private sources of funding. Planned giving in the form of forestland donations is an innovative avenue that can benefit the institution and the potential donor through charitable estate planning. Although there are examples of planned giving through donations of forestland, there is not any extensive research on this subject involving community colleges. The purpose of this study was to use the concept of the Bulldog Forest at Mississippi State University to determine if the idea of the community college foundation forest would be feasible and valuable to implement within the Mississippi community college system. Holmes Community College (HCC) alumni, who fall into the non- industrial private forest landowner category, were surveyed to determine their interest in donating their forestland to the institution through charitable estate planning options. Through the use of growth-and-yield models, hypothetical management regimes were employed on hypothetical forestland donations to produce long-term cash flow scenarios for a specific rate of return for a specific rotation. These scenarios determined the level of funding that could be generated through a planned giving program involving forestland. The findings revealed that HCC alumni do not have an immediate interest in donating their forestland to the HCC foundation. It is recommended that personal connection(s) be established with these alumni along with the facets of planned giving explained by a trained professional. The findings also revealed that the donation of forestland can be very profitable for a community college foundation. However, further research is needed to explore the other charitable estate planning options since it was assumed that all of the hypothetical forestland donations were outright gifts.