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The dissertation begins by discussing recent critical treatments of Nietzsche in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jürgen Habermas, then gives a brief discussion of the broader scholarly reception of Nietzsche’s political thought. The body of the dissertation proceeds through the text of the Second Essay of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, trying to explicate his account of the origin of political society. The dissertation attempts in the first place to show that the historical narrative Nietzsche offers in the Second Essay is coherent, then to illuminate the details of his account of the rise of political society, and thus of civilized morality (what Nietzsche calls “the bad conscience”), and finally to detail the different stages in the development of the bad conscience. The dissertation lays particular emphasis on determining the relation between what Nietzsche calls ressentiment and the bad conscience. The dissertation also attempts to shed light on Nietzsche’s view of the relation between nature and political society and morality, as he expresses it both in his analysis of the bad conscience and in the somewhat more thematic discussion of this question at the beginning of the Essay.

In this dissertation, I attempt to clarify the concept of odious debts and its relationship with global justice theory. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by an illegitimate government in their name but were used for private purposes. I approach the problem of odious debts from two different perspectives. First, I explore the possible connections between odious debts and the contemporary debate on global justice. I argue that current debates on global justice have focused on the extremely important question of whether the international order is harmful or coercive, but have sometimes reached wrong conclusions about this issue. While some scholars have argued that the international order is not coercive at all, others have argued that it is, but did not find a persuasive way of making the point. Odious debts become relevant in this context, because they show a different way in which the global order could be said to be coercive. Second, I develop an account of odious debts from a moral point of view. I argue that a big portion of the debts of the poorest countries are not binding and therefore countries are morally entitled to repudiate them. An implication of this is that lenders have no moral right to demand repayment of odious debts. The reason why some debts are not binding is that citizens should only be held liable for debts incurred in their name when the money that is the basis of that debt is used for legitimate public purposes, not private ones. Whenever ruler acts in accordance to private purposes, states are no longer collectively responsible for the acts incurred in their name. This follows from a proper understanding of social contract theories but also, I argue, from a utilitarian perspective.

The dissertation begins by discussing recent critical treatments of Nietzsche in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jürgen Habermas, then gives a brief discussion of the broader scholarly reception of Nietzsche’s political thought. The body of the dissertation proceeds through the text of the Second Essay of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, trying to explicate his account of the origin of political society. The dissertation attempts in the first place to show that the historical narrative Nietzsche offers in the Second Essay is coherent, then to illuminate the details of his account of the rise of political society, and thus of civilized morality (what Nietzsche calls “the bad conscience”), and finally to detail the different stages in the development of the bad conscience. The dissertation lays particular emphasis on determining the relation between what Nietzsche calls ressentiment and the bad conscience. The dissertation also attempts to shed light on Nietzsche’s view of the relation between nature and political society and morality, as he expresses it both in his analysis of the bad conscience and in the somewhat more thematic discussion of this question at the beginning of the Essay.

In this dissertation, I attempt to clarify the concept of odious debts and its relationship with global justice theory. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by an illegitimate government in their name but were used for private purposes. I approach the problem of odious debts from two different perspectives. First, I explore the possible connections between odious debts and the contemporary debate on global justice. I argue that current debates on global justice have focused on the extremely important question of whether the international order is harmful or coercive, but have sometimes reached wrong conclusions about this issue. While some scholars have argued that the international order is not coercive at all, others have argued that it is, but did not find a persuasive way of making the point. Odious debts become relevant in this context, because they show a different way in which the global order could be said to be coercive. Second, I develop an account of odious debts from a moral point of view. I argue that a big portion of the debts of the poorest countries are not binding and therefore countries are morally entitled to repudiate them. An implication of this is that lenders have no moral right to demand repayment of odious debts. The reason why some debts are not binding is that citizens should only be held liable for debts incurred in their name when the money that is the basis of that debt is used for legitimate public purposes, not private ones. Whenever ruler acts in accordance to private purposes, states are no longer collectively responsible for the acts incurred in their name. This follows from a proper understanding of social contract theories but also, I argue, from a utilitarian perspective.

For over two thousand years, Plato’s superiority to Thucydides was taken as an article of faith in Western philosophy. Nietzsche was the first to challenge this verdict by asserting his view—on philosophical grounds—that Thucydides was the more penetrating analyst of the human condition. Other than Nietzsche’s consideration of the two thinkers, surprisingly little has been done to investigate the connections between the two greatest Greek prose writers. My purpose in this dissertation is to rekindle this debate in light of new evidence to see what—if anything—can be gained by examining the relationship between how Plato and Thucydides treat the problem of Athenian imperialism. More specifically, I believe and attempt to show that: (1) Plato silently but explicitly directs his readers to different parts of the History through the use of textual references and thematic patterns; (2) Plato uses these textual allusions to highlight the common ground between the two thinkers, and that Plato understands Thucydides to be an ally to his philosophic aims; (3) Plato and Thucydides agree that the underlying cause of Athenian imperialism can be attributed to a combination of greed (pleonexia) and the internalization of specific sophistic teachings that, whether intended by the sophists or not, support unbridled appetitiveness as the best way of life; and (4) Plato and Thucydides largely agree on the solution to the problem—that pleonexia must be extirpated from the ruling order. / text

Aristotle argues in Chapter 2 of Book I of the Politics that the polis exists by nature. I argue that this notion of a natural polis, what I call the Naturalness Thesis, is fundamentally important to Aristotle's political philosophy. The Naturalness Thesis is discussed in only one place by Aristotle, and it is found alongside two further claims—the claim that humans are the most political animal and the claim that the polis is naturally prior to the individual. Together these three ideas constitute Aristotle's political naturalism. I begin by examining the relationship between the Naturalness Thesis and the other two claims. I argue that the Naturalness Thesis is the central idea in Aristotle's political naturalism. I then proceed to defend the argument Aristotle gives in support of the Naturalness Thesis from David Keyt's critique of it. Keyt argues that Aristotle's argument is unsuccessful and that, furthermore, Aristotle himself has reason to believe the polis exists by art rather than nature. Because of this, Keyt believes that there is a blunder in Aristotle's political naturalism. I argue that it is Keyt, and not Aristotle, who blunders. Keyt makes the mistake of interpreting Aristotle's account of the rise of the polis out of the village and household as an account of three distinct social arrangements. As I see it, Aristotle is instead suggesting that village, household, and polis are three stages in the development (or growth) of one thing, namely the polis. That is, households and villages are essentially the same (they contain the same form) as the polis, though they are underdeveloped. Finally, I expound on the Naturalness Thesis by interpreting Aristotle's account of the rise of the natural polis from a number of perspectives. First, the account is sociobiological: Aristotle's polis is literally a naturally living thing. Second, the account is historical: it alludes to other accounts of prehistory and reveals Aristotle's ascription to the theory of a perpetual rise and fall of civilization. Third, the account is ethical: it seeks to break down the distinction between nomos (=law) and phusis (=nature) to ground politics in nature. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2008-09-15 19:10:03.993

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The severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and the high-profile nature of the public health response make it a natural context for exploring the current state of public health ethics. This paper explores this topic from two perspectives: justification and compliance. Libertarianism and utilitarianism are two frameworks that dominate the question of how public health interventions are justified. Consequently, this paper analyzes the events of the pandemic to determine how these frameworks fared in terms of offering reliable means of justifying the interventions needed to curb the spread of COVID-19. Consideration of these events suggests that a framework centered around actionable scientific health research may be able to offer a more reliable means of justifying interventions than traditional libertarian and utilitarian approaches. From the standpoint of compliance, I analyze data on the pandemic-related behaviors of Americans as well as their motivations. This analysis found that factors such as commitment to exercising freedom, distrust of public health institutions, and pursuit of higher priorities were the predominant motivations behind noncompliance. Furthermore, reflection on these realities indicates that they constitute a formidable obstacle to public health efforts. Given the swift action that public health crises such as pandemics demand, overcoming these obstacles in a timely manner such that free compliance is acquired is unlikely. As a result, it seems that the only option available to public health officials to effectively reduce the deadly consequences of another COVID-like pandemic is mandated enforcement of public health interventions.