This paper considers empirically whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993-2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf, the Shapley-Shubik, and other power indices, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates point to significant differences in member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences of empirical (versus theoretical) power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. Interestingly, this result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variant differs from the theoretical one both under individual and bloc voting. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This paper investigates whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993- 2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates indicate significant differences between member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences between empirical and theoretical power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. This result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variants differ from the theoretical one, both under individual and bloc voting. (authors' abstract)

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of EU member states' power, the EU's capability to act (efficiency), and the proportionality of the voting system in the Council of Ministers from the treaties of Rome in 1958 till the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and beyond, using a wide range of alternative power indices. Moreover, it considers explicitly the relevance of additional legal provisions (such as the 'Luxembourg Compromise', the 'Demographic Clause', and the 'Ioannina Compromise') and the implications of novel, more recently introduced voting rules such as reverse qualified majority voting. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Jumping ability in volleyball players is crucial to a team's success. There are both muscular and neural components in jumping. Coaches often test jumping ability and body composition prior to the start of the competitive season, but many fail to monitor these important variables during the course of the season. Jumping ability can decrease over the course of the season as the focus moves from strength training in the weight room to skill development on the court. It is imperative that players maintain their jumping ability and body composition over the course of the season. Seasonal changes in elite-male volleyball players were determined by testing the players body composition, spike jump, block jump and lower body power index at three distinct time points: prior to the first game, during their bye-week, and at the end of their regular season. It was found that these players were able to maintain their vertical jump and lower body power index. Also, those who were deemed players (those who played throughout the course of the season) had lower body fat percentages and higher jump scores. These results will aid coaches in understanding the changes that occur over the course of the season in elite-male collegiate volleyball players.

This dissertation investigates the pricing and the market reaction to the announcement of private placements. A sample of 181 private placement announcements during January 2002 and March 2007 in Taiwan was obtained. This dissertation consists of two essays on the private placements. The first essay identifies the conditions determining insiders will pay more (or less) in private placement. We explore the argument of private placement pricing sold to insiders by considering the changes in the control power of the largest shareholders in private placement, using the Banzhaf power index to better reflect the largest shareholder¡¦s relative power of influence. Our results indicate that, if the existing insiders maintain their leading control status, in cases where insiders are the main investors, private placements are issued at deep discounts that benefit themselves; however, in cases where outsiders/new insiders are the main investors, outsiders and new insiders will pay relatively more when existing insiders dominate. Contrarily, if existing insiders fail to retain their leading position and become less powerful after private placement, outsiders and new insiders buy at lower prices. In more than 65% of the sample, the largest shareholders lost their leading control status, and the issuer¡¦s ownership structure becomes more concentrated following private placements. In the second essay, we examine whether the announcement of private placement and public offering share the same announcement effects. In particular, we investigate whether the market reactions to private placement announcements vary with different placement motivations and investor types. In addition, we focus on the dark side of private placement by studying how the stock price reaction to private offerings when insiders intentionally lower the offer price to self-dealing, or when within-group private placements are motivated by the controlling shareholders¡¦ tunneling. The results indicate that private placements generally result in a positive wealth effects, however, public offerings associated with negative announcement effects. The market reacts more favorably to private placements in which a strategic alliance or merger are involved, or to private placements where investors actively participate in the management or even procures the controlling rights of the company. It suggests that the motivation and investor type of private placement convey important information to market investors regarding the issuing firm¡¦s performance. Moreover, we have evidence to support the dark side of private placements. For issuing firms with stronger tendency towards self-dealings by insiders or tunneling in transactions between firms within a business group, they are more likely to have poor performance after private placement. However, we have no evidences to support the firm quality hypothesis.

nÃo hà / Esta pesquisa fez uma aplicaÃÃo do Valor de Shapley e do Ãndice de Poder de Shapley-Shubik no contexto da Teoria dos Jogos Cooperativos, com enfoque na repartiÃÃo da renda gerada nas bilheterias dos jogos do Campeonato Cearense de Futebol de 2010. Os dados foram coletados da pÃgina na internet da FederaÃÃo Cearense de Futebol-FCF, do blog Contexto Esportivo e do portal da transparÃncia do Tribunal de Contas do MunicÃpio-TCM. Aplicou-se o Valor de Shapley e o Ãndice de Poder de Shapley-Shubik para classificar os clubes de acordo com os ganhos de renda lÃquida obtidos nesta alocaÃÃo. Os resultados mostraram que a alocaÃÃo do Valor de Shapley à mais equitativa, de modo que clubes como QuixadÃ, Limoeiro e Boa Viagem, que obtiveram arrecadaÃÃo negativa pelo sistema de rateio atual da renda lÃquida, passaram a auferir renda lÃquida positiva com a alocaÃÃo do Valor de Shapley, de modo que pode-se dizer que estes clubes sÃo subsidiados com a repartiÃÃo de renda via valor de Shapley. Verificou-se que os clubes de maiores rendas lÃquidas obtiveram maiores valores para o Ãndice de Poder Shapley-Shubik, com exceÃÃo apenas do Fortaleza Esporte Clube. / This research is an application of the Shapley Value and the Power Index Shapley-Shubik as studied in the context of the Cooperative Game Theory. Specifically, this paper studied the distribution of net income generated at the box office of the FederaÃÃo Cearense de Futebol-FCF during the 2010 football championship. The data were collected from the website of FCF, as well as from the Contexto Esportivo blog, and from the ransparency portal of the Tribunal de Contas do MunicÃpio-TCM. The Shapley value and the power index Shapley-Shubik were applied to rank the football clubs participants according to the net income gains achieved in this allocation. The results revealed that the Shapley value application is more equal because the minor participants clubs like QuixadÃ, Limoeiro e Boa Viagem, with negative receipts from games in the previous status, get now positive ones from those techniques. The results from Power Index Shapley-Shubik show that the bigger the football club the bigger the net receipt from games, except to Fortaleza Esporte Clube.

A content analysis of Leonard Karikoga Zhakata’s sungura music unpacks shared experiences of Zimbabweans during a decade of crises.Various musicians composed music pregnant with cultural meaning. These genres defied the ruling Zanu PF party‘s propaganda. The ZANU P.F. flagged enemy was imperialist history, whose characteristic was bankrupt in civil justice. Common sense ‘umunthu’ (‘Humaness)’ philosophy could have witnessed the ruling party stand by the people at the height of economic decline. This dissertation argued that the sungura genre became a formidable force. The music had dramatic effect of unifying citizens of different distinct cultural traditions, often which set Shona, Manyika, Korekore, Changana and Ndebele apart. ‘Mugove’ ‘(Reward) and ‘Hupenyu mutoro’ (Life is a burden) lyrics manifested thought processes, ideas and actions which projected popular unity against ruling elite hegemony. Zimbabweans’ collective cultural awareness that could have defined social experiences indirectly or directly motivated formations of oppositional political establishments. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was the brainchild of political disillusionment chorused in “Hupenyu Mutoro’ (Life is a burden) and ‘Mugove’ (Reward) lyrics. The musical texts unravelled the hidden sin of gross graft by the powerful built on self aggrandisement at the expense of the vulnerable subalterns. The sungura genre manifested an art of aggressive entertainment and enjoyment yet passively and remotely awakening citizens to the obtaining dire economic hardships. The genre’s scholarly fabric and dynamics, cut deep into life sensibilities as exemplified by ‘Hupenyu Mutoro’. The deplorable life style experienced by the suffering majority epitomised by political repression and economic meltdown became catalyst for political participation and opportunities for plural voices.This dissertation argues that academic curricula harnesses the influential sungura genre in teaching a people’s story. Sungura music authenticates national historical versions that comfortably orbits around official realities of civil governance processes, what Fanon refers to as ‘a zone of occult instability (Fanon, 1963 p. 253). Unemployment, hyper-inflation, cholera out breaks, empty shelves in shops compounded with a ravaging parallel market prices became food for thought. Disllusionment nagged Zimbabweans below and above the poverty datum peg vis a viz the material power index of a handful citizens in the ruling party. Hence Zhakata’s ‘Hupenyu mutoro’ (Life is a burden) and ‘Mugove’ (Reward) became a classical and contested terrain that motivated the teaching and learning of Zimbabwean history. / Communication / M.A. (Communication)