It is commonplace in wage determination models and, in general, in economic models as a whole, to treat the workers' outside option as given. The main purpose of the present work is to remove, in various ways, this assumption. The work is organized as follows. The first chapter is devoted to introducing the thesis topic and the related literature. The second chapter describes an economy in which the workers hired by a firm acquire without cost a firm-specific skill that enables them to potentially become independent producers. Thus, by modelling explicitly the workers' decision to stay or to leave the firm, a stable earning profile for the economy is characterized. Such a stable earning profile can allow for a workers' compensation higher than the basic neoclassical wage and for pay differentials across industries even for initially homogenous workers. The third chapter shows that the existence of a concrete outside option for firms' managers can induce, under specific circumstances, oligopolistic firms to adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the conditions under which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot model, are carefully defined. The fourth chapter considers the problem of producer co-operatives' (PCs) stability. It shows that PCs' instability argued in the literature can fail to hold in very competitive and low barrier-to-entry markets in which, potentially, dismissed members have a chance to set up new firms. In the fifth and conclusive chapter a new concept of core-stability for n-cooperative games is introduced and applied both to the problem of cartel formation under oligopoly and to an economy with a public good. Such a solution concept, denoted o-core, assumes that when a coalition deviates from an agreement, it possesses a first-mover advantage with respect to all other players.

Tout d'abord, nous traitons des jeux d'oligopole de Cournot sous forme caractéristique gamma. Nous montrons que ces jeux sont balancés lorsque les fonctions de profit individuel sont concave. Ensuite, lorsque les fonctions de coût individuel sont linéaires, la «valeur au prorata de Nash» appartient au cœur. Par la suite, nous étudions les jeux d'oligopole de Cournot sous forme d'intervalle gamma. Nous prouvons que le cœur intervalle (standard) est non-vide si et seulement si le jeu d'oligopole de Cournot sous forme caractéristique gamma associé à la meilleure (plus faible) capacité qu'obtient chaque coalition admet un cœur non vide. Ensuite, nous analysons les jeux d'oligopole de Stackelberg sous forme caractéristique gamma. Nous montrons que le cœur est égal à l'ensemble des imputations. Ensuite, nous donnons une condition nécessaire et suffisante, qui dépend de l'hétérogénéité des coûts marginaux, assurant la non-vacuité du cœur. Enfin, nous considérons les jeux d'oligopole de Bertrand. Nous prouvons que les jeux sous les formes caractéristiques alpha ou bêta satisfont à la propriété de convexité. Ensuite, nous prouvons que la valeur de partage égalitaire appartient au cœur des jeux sous forme caractéristique gamma et nous donnons une condition suffisante qui assure que ces jeux satisfont à la propriété de convexité. Nous prolongeons cette analyse en supposant que les coûts marginaux sont distincts. Si la constante de la demande est suffisamment petite, alors les jeux sous forme caractéristique bêta satisfont à la propriété de balancement total. Autrement, ces jeux satisfont à la propriété de convexité. / In the first essay, we study Cournot oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form. First, we prove that if any individual profit function is concave, such games are balanced. Then, when the individual cost functions are linear, we provide a solution in the core, called NP(Nash Prorata) value. The second essay considers Cournot oligopoly interval game in gamma-set function form. The first (second) result states that the interval (standard) core is non empty if and only if the Cournot oligopoly TU-game associated with the best (worst) worth of every coalition in its worth interval admits a non-empty core. In the thirdessay, we focus on Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form. First, we prove that the core is equal to the set of imputations. Th en, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition, depending on the heterogeneity of firms' marginal costs, under which the core is non-empty. In the fourth essay, we show that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games inalpha and beta-characteristic function forms are convex. Then, we prove that the equal division solution is in the core of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form and we give a sufficient condition under which such games are convex. The fifth essay studies the case where the marginal costs are distinct. If the intercept of demand is sufficiently small then games in _beta-characteristic function form are totally balanced. Otherwise, these games are convex.

Social behaviours have been widely studied in behavioural economics and psychology. However, the origins of these behaviours in the brain are poorly understood. In this dissertation I will discuss two main avenues of study which constituted separate projects during my PhD candidacy. The first section contains experiments in which I collaborated with Dr Raymundo Báez-Mendoza on the topic of inequity. The second part includes a study on coordination and cooperation behaviour in macaques. Inequity is a concept ubiquitous in daily life. It is the difference between one’s own reward and that of another. There have been several studies that have suggested inequity affects brain activity. However, few studies have touched upon how this parameter is incorporated in neuronal activity. In the experiments that will be described here, monkeys (Macaca mulatta) performed actions to obtain rewards for both themselves and another. The level of inequity in these rewards was manipulated by varying the magnitude of own and other’s rewards. We then proceeded to study neuronal activity by means of single neuron recordings in the striatum of two macaques. We found that inequity modulated task related activity in about 32% of recorded striatal neurons. In addition to this study on inequity we also recorded some sessions in which one of the animals made choices with varying rewards for self and other. From these results, I attempted to characterise behaviour with regards to own reward and inequity in choice situations. Inequity has been considered a contributing factor in explaining cooperation behaviour. Coordination and cooperation are important and frequently observed behaviours. To study coordination and cooperation, I designed an experiment in which the combination of two monkeys’ choices determined the rewards for both animals. In this dissertation I attempt to address how the animals perform combined choices (playing together vs. alone) as well as the nature of their behaviour (e.g. pro-social vs. self-interested). The aim of this work was to characterise what type of information the animals use to solve these tasks. This is vital if one is to study these concepts in the brain using macaques as a model. In summary, this work contributes to a better understanding of social behaviour and provides an example of how this social behaviour is computed in the brain.

Any decentralized retail or wholesale system of competing entities requires a benefit sharing arrangement when competing entities collaborate after their demands are realized. For instance, consider a distribution system similar to the observed behavior of independent car dealerships. If a dealership does not have in stock the car requested by a customer, it might consider acquiring it from a competing dealer. Such behavior raises questions about competitive procurement strategies that achieve system optimal outcomes. This dissertation consists of three main bodies of work contained respectively in chapters 2, 3, and 4. In the first work -- chapter 2, we examine a decentralized system that adopts an ex-post agreed transfer payment approach proposed by Anupindi et al. (Manuf. Serv. Oper.Manag. 4(3):349-368, 2001). In particular, we state a set of conditions on cost parameters and distributions that guarantee uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In the second work -- chapter 3, we introduce a multilevel graph framework that links decentralized inventory distribution models as a network of stochastic programming with recourse problems. This framework depicts independent retailers who maximize their individual expected profits, with each retailer independently procuring inventory in the ex-ante stage in response to forecasted demand and anticipated cooperative recourse action of all retailers in the system. The graph framework clarifies the modeling connection between problems in a taxonomy of decentralized inventory distribution models. This unifying perspective links the past work and shades light on future research directions. In the last work -- chapter 4, we examine and recast the biform games modeling framework as two-stage stochastic programming with recourse. Biform games modeling framework addresses two-stage games with competitive first stage and cooperative second stage without ex-ante agreement on profit sharing scheme. The two-stage stochastic programming view of biform games is demonstrated on examples from all the known examples regarding operational decision problems of competing firms from the literature. It allows an “old” mathematical methodology to showcase its versatility in modeling combined competitive and cooperative game options. In short, this dissertation provides important insights, clarifications, and strategic limitations regarding collaborations in decentralized distribution system.

In this dissertation, the central objective is to achieve fairness in bandwidth sharing amongst selfish users in a distributed system. Because of the inherent contention-based nature of the distributed medium access and the selfishness of the users, the distributed medium access is modeled as a non-cooperative game; designated as the Access Game. A p-CSMA type medium access scenario is proposed for all the users. Therefore, in the Access Game, each user has two actions to choose from: "transmit" and "wait". The outcome of the Access Game and payoffs to each user depends on the actions taken by all the users. Further, the utility function of each user is constructed as a function of both Quality of Service (QoS) and Battery Power (BP). Various scenarios involving the relative importance of QoS and BP are considered. It is observed that, in general the Nash Equilibrium of the Access Game does not result into fairness. Therefore, Constrained Nash Equilibrium is proposed as a solution. The advantage of Constrained Nash Equilibrium is that it can be predicated on the fairness conditions and the solution will be guaranteed to result in fair sharing of bandwidth. However, Constrained Nash Equilibrium is that it is not self-enforcing. Therefore, two mechanisms are proposed to design the Access Game in such a way that in each case the Nash Equilibrium of the Access Game satisfies fairness and maximizes throughput. Hence, with any of these mechanisms the solution of the Access Game becomes self-enforcing.

Orientador: Sergio Azevedo de Oliveira / Banca: Carlos Roberto Minussi / Banca: Ivan Mathias Filho / Resumo: Na resolução de problemas de engenharia existem diversas metodologias que podem ser aplicadas. Normalmente, estas envolvem novos conceitos, as vezes inéditos em termos de aplicação como é o caso da teoria dos jogos. Por outro lado, pesquisadores vêm buscando novas técnicas para o desenvolvimento de ferramentas computacionais para o auxílio no processo ensino- aprendizado em diferentes níveis. Nesta dissertação apresenta-se um simulador computacional que apresenta uma interface gráfica, denominada ENGTJ, como proposta para o ensino de conceitos básicos da teoria dos jogos, via Web. Os conceitos relacionados com a teoria dos jogos , são apresentados sob forma de exemplos, no contexto dos jogos não-cooperativos e cooperativos, com os módulos do Jogo Dilema do Prisioneiro (JDP) e o Jogo Coalizacional entre Empresas (JCE). Estes módulos foram desenvolvidos utilizando-se a linguagem de programação Java, sob a forma de Java applets, com o auxílio do ambiente de desenvolvimento Eclipse. O processo de desenvolvimento de software baseado nos padrões de engenharia de software foi utilizado para criar a interface da aplicação, e apresenta uma série de técnicas e atividades que procuram dar suporte a definição de processos de desenvolvimento, levantamento e especificação de requisitos, projeto e testes. Como resultado, tem-se uma interface gráfica que permite ao usuário interagir através de jogos modulares referentes a teoria dos jogos, permitindo ao mesmo inferir alguns conceitos básicos abordados nesta teoria, suportada por tutoriais, geral e específicos / Abstract: In solving engineering problems there are several methodologies that can be applied. Typically, these methods involve new concepts, sometimes unprecedented in terms of application as game theory. Moreover, researchers are seeking new techniques to develop computational tools to aid in the teaching-learning at different levels. This paper presents a computational simulator that presents a graphical interface, called ENGTJ, as proposed for teaching basic concepts of game theory, through Web. The game theory concepts are presented using examples, in the context of non-cooperative games and cooperative, especially the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (JDP) and the Coalitional Games between Companies (JCE). These modules were developed using the Java programming language, under "Java applets" form with the Eclipse developing environ- ment. The software development process based on software engineering patterns was used to create an application interface combining several techniques and activities that could support the developing procedures, requirements, projects and tests. Therefore, there is a graphical in- terface that allows the user interacting with modular games referred to the game theory and the concepts approached in this work, supported by tutorials, general and specific / Mestre

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:22:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-10-07Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:27:55Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 caldeira_r_me_ilha.pdf: 1405491 bytes, checksum: a0858eaf6dda7cbf16eaea50d40f67d6 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Na resolução de problemas de engenharia existem diversas metodologias que podem ser aplicadas. Normalmente, estas envolvem novos conceitos, as vezes inéditos em termos de aplicação como é o caso da teoria dos jogos. Por outro lado, pesquisadores vêm buscando novas técnicas para o desenvolvimento de ferramentas computacionais para o auxílio no processo ensino- aprendizado em diferentes níveis. Nesta dissertação apresenta-se um simulador computacional que apresenta uma interface gráfica, denominada ENGTJ, como proposta para o ensino de conceitos básicos da teoria dos jogos, via Web. Os conceitos relacionados com a teoria dos jogos , são apresentados sob forma de exemplos, no contexto dos jogos não-cooperativos e cooperativos, com os módulos do Jogo Dilema do Prisioneiro (JDP) e o Jogo Coalizacional entre Empresas (JCE). Estes módulos foram desenvolvidos utilizando-se a linguagem de programação Java, sob a forma de Java applets, com o auxílio do ambiente de desenvolvimento Eclipse. O processo de desenvolvimento de software baseado nos padrões de engenharia de software foi utilizado para criar a interface da aplicação, e apresenta uma série de técnicas e atividades que procuram dar suporte a definição de processos de desenvolvimento, levantamento e especificação de requisitos, projeto e testes. Como resultado, tem-se uma interface gráfica que permite ao usuário interagir através de jogos modulares referentes a teoria dos jogos, permitindo ao mesmo inferir alguns conceitos básicos abordados nesta teoria, suportada por tutoriais, geral e específicos / In solving engineering problems there are several methodologies that can be applied. Typically, these methods involve new concepts, sometimes unprecedented in terms of application as game theory. Moreover, researchers are seeking new techniques to develop computational tools to aid in the teaching-learning at different levels. This paper presents a computational simulator that presents a graphical interface, called ENGTJ, as proposed for teaching basic concepts of game theory, through Web. The game theory concepts are presented using examples, in the context of non-cooperative games and cooperative, especially the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (JDP) and the Coalitional Games between Companies (JCE). These modules were developed using the Java programming language, under “Java applets” form with the Eclipse developing environ- ment. The software development process based on software engineering patterns was used to create an application interface combining several techniques and activities that could support the developing procedures, requirements, projects and tests. Therefore, there is a graphical in- terface that allows the user interacting with modular games referred to the game theory and the concepts approached in this work, supported by tutorials, general and specific

In the present work we study theory of cooperative games and their solution. We assume that all players may form groups and cooperate, and we will try to find a solution, a rule how to divide the profit of the group among individual players. We will focus on a core of the game, its description, theoretical results and methods for analyzing its emptiness. We also investigate core-center, which is one of the known options of choosing single profit division from the core. Then we will construct mathematical model of oligopoly together with method for counting characteristic function from real data. Finally, we apply the model on data from oil market. 1

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T20:04:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 19 / Nenhuma / O estudo em questão objetiva investigar o impacto que os Jogos Cooperativos, nas ações do Programa A União a Vida, vem produzindo nos saberes e nas práticas docentes dos professores do ensino público da Região do Médio Alto Uruguai/RS, na perspectiva deste coletivo docente. A pesquisa foi realizada em quatro municípios, que implantaram o programa até 2004, do qual o resultado apresenta-se a médio/longo prazo. Os pressupostos que circunscreveram a pesquisa são: a) vivemos tempos de pautas sociais que têm potencializado posições individuais e fragilizado a escola, como espaço de experiências significativas de aprendizagem; b) os “jogos cooperativos” expressam uma experiência em “pedagogia da cooperação”; c) os docentes significam suas práticas, a partir da própria experiência; d) motivações e desafios advindos de espaços localizados fora dos muros do sistema oficial de ensino podem modificar saberes e práticas docentes sempre que os incluam em todo o processo. Os marcos teóricos que sustentam a concepção de Jog / The study in objective question to investigate the impact that the Cooperative Games, in the actions of the Program the Union the Life, comes producing in knowing them and the practical professors of the professors of the public education of the Region of the High Medium Uruguai/RS, in the perspective of this collective professor. The research was carried through in four cities, that had implanted the program up to 2004, of which the result presents average it/long stated period. Estimated that they had circumscribed the research is: a) we live times of social guidelines that have potencializado position individual and fragilizado the school, as space of significant experiences of learning; b) the “cooperative games” express an experience in “pedagogia of the cooperation”; c) the practical professors mean its, from the proper experience; d) motivations and happened challenges of spaces located outside of the walls of the official system of education can modify to know and practical professors whenever they al

A presente pesquisa buscou investigar a cooperação na Educação Infantil, de modo a refletir sobre o processo educativo envolvido na interação entre as crianças e estas com o professor, no sentido de analisar o papel do professor na promoção de atitudes cooperativas bem como a existência de jogos cooperativos neste nível de ensino. Com base na pesquisa qualitativa em educação, a metodologia adotada para este estudo é a do tipo etnográfico, em que a investigação proposta foi realizada através da observação participante, filmagens, entrevistas e pesquisa documental. Os subsídios teóricos estão baseados nos pressupostos de autores e pesquisadores que se dedicam ao estudo do lúdico e da Educação Infantil, como Kishimoto (2005), Friedmann (1992; 1996), Wajskop (1995), Nicolau (2003), Carneiro (2006), Kramer (2006), Vygotsky (1994), Brotto (2001), Teixeira (2001), Soler (2005; 2006), Brown (2006). A análise dos dados obtidos pela pesquisa aponta para uma prática em que o lúdico resume-se a passatempo e recreação apesar de aparecer no discurso como um instrumento de ensino; o brincar não é planejado, estruturado ou mediado pelas educadoras, restringindo-se a brincadeiras livres; as educadoras não conhecem os jogos cooperativos e não os utilizam na sua prática educativa; em suas falas não demonstraram clareza sobre o conceito de cooperação, apresentando dificuldades em desenvolver atividades que a objetivem. Entretanto, observou-se a possibilidade de promover atitudes cooperativas nas crianças de 4 a 6 anos de idade pela mediação de um adulto mais experiente quando estão brincando. Para melhoria desta realidade, é necessário a capacitação dos diretores, professores, monitores e funcionários das creches municipais através de cursos, treinamentos, formação continuada, voltados à Educação Infantil, contextualizando-a historicamente, definindo o seu papel como um nível de ensino e como lugar da socialização, trabalhando a teoria na prática, para que esta seja criativa e comprometida com a educação das crianças, uma educação que privilegie a cooperação. / This paper is aimed at investigating cooperation in Childhood Education, in order to reflect about the educational process involved in the interaction between children and their teacher. It intended to analyze the teacher\'s role when promoting cooperative attitudes as well as the existence of cooperative games in this level of education. Based on the qualitative study in education, the methodology used was the ethnographic research, using filming, observation, interviews and documentary research to gather data. The theory is based on authors and researchers who have dedicated their lives to the study of the ludic and the childhood education, such as Kishimoto (2005), Friedmann (1992;1996), Wajskop (1995), Nicolau (2003), Carneiro (2006), Kramer (2006), Vygotsky (1994), Brotto (2001), Teixeira (2001), Soler (2005;2006), Brown (2006). The analysis of the data gathered from the research points to a performance where the ludic is summarized to a pastime and recreation although it appears in the discourse as an education instrument; playing is not planned, structured or mediated by the educators, being restricted to free games; the educators do not know the cooperative games and they do not use them in their educational performance; in their speech they do not seem to be aware of the cooperation concept, presenting difficulties in developing activities that objectify it. However, it was observed the possibility to promote cooperative attitudes in 4 and 6 year-old children through the mediation of a more experienced adult when they are playing. To improve this reality, the qualification of principals, teachers, monitors and employees of municipal day-care centers through courses, training, continued formation is necessary, aimed at Childhood Education, contextualizing it historically, defining its role as an education level and as place of the socialization, bringing theory into practice so that it is creative and committed to children\'s education, an education that privileges cooperation.