Bien qu’en théorie étrangère à notre modèle juridique, la notion de précédent n’est plus un tabou pour lesacteurs juridictionnels qui osent enfin « parler » d’une pratique jusqu’alors restée officieuse, voire hérétique dans notre tradition juridique. Attentifs à la réception et au respect de leurs décisions, les juges suprêmes français ont relancé la réflexion autour du précédent. S’inscrivant dans un questionnement global sur la fonction de juger, le recours au précédent exprime une certaine représentation de l’art de juger. Dès lors, il convient de s’interroger sur les raisons qui conduisent les juges suprêmes français à y faire référence en dépit des interdits historiques et théoriques. Manifestation de la mémoire du juge, la référence au précédent est inhérente à la fonction de juger ce qui explique que le juge y ait recours. Ancré dans son passé et acteur de son temps, le juge peut alors affirmer son propre pouvoir et s’arracher à la représentation traditionnelle de son office. En convoquant son précédent, le juge convoque sa loi source de son propre pouvoir, lui permettant en retour de s’imposer comme un être conscient de lui-même et de son pouvoir normatif. / Although foreign to our legal model, the rule of precedent is no longer a taboo for judicial actors who finally dare to speak of a practice hitherto remained unofficial and even heretical in our legal tradition. Attentive to the reception and respect for their decisions, the French supreme judges have revived the debate around the precedent. As part of a global questioning of the judicial function, use of precedent expresses a certain representation of the art of judging. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the reasons that lead French supreme judges to refer to their precedent in spite of the historical and theoretical prohibited. Judge’s memory manifestation, the reference to the precedent is inherent in the judicial function which explains that the judge would resort. Rooted in its past and actor of his present, the judge can assert his own power and break away from the traditional representation of his office. By calling its precedent, the judge summoned the source of his power law, enabling it in turn to establish itself as a conscious being of himself and of its normative power.

in English The Binding Effect of Arbitral Awards in International Investment Disputes The purpose of this thesis is to analyse binding effect an award has on parties to the dispute and most importantly on future tribunals. Further discussed is the de facto precedent and its development in international investment treaty arbitration. Theoretical research is supported by an empirical study of case law. The reason for my research is the existence of conflicting awards in international investment law which undermines legal certainty of investors and States. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is introductory and concerns with the general characteristics of international investment dispute. This part describes the system of bilateral treaties for the reciprocal encouragement of investment and the dispute mechanism in which investors are left with a choice before which body the dispute will be heard. The chapter then distinguishes two different perceptions of tribunals: the principal-agent relationship where tribunal acts only as an agent of parties to the dispute independent of other tribunals; and tribunal as an agent of parties and also agent of the whole investment community. The second chapter focuses on the binding nature of an award. It looks at the wording of ICSID Convention...

My goal was to attempt to analyze impact of Kosovo crisis on international relations. Kosovo issue and its solutions have shaped two important principles of international relations in the last decade, which by repeating tend to become precedents. The first principle is humanitarian intervention without the mandate of UN, which was first applied in Yugoslavia in 1999. Similar action was applied in several different states during the last decade. Second principle, which is the main subject of my thesis, is unilateral declaration of independence which was recognized by more sovereign states then in previous occasions. By analysis of events in Georgia I tried to prove that separatism could become an instrument of international relations in future. Authority of UN is shaken in last decade and it could lead to reshaping of world order. Single-sided interpretation of morality and principles can replace international law. Apart from analyzing global impact of Kosovo crises I have tried to explore the problem in detail by researching the causes that let to conflict. Most of the attention I have devoted to period between 1974 and 1999, which I find crucial in the forming a situation that led to unilateral declaration in 2008. In the first part of my work I tended to explore international law arguments that were used by both followers and opponents of independence and tried to preview aspects of teory of secession

This thesis develops a novel account of judicial common-law reasoning by precedent. If a new case is relevantly similar to a precedent case, judges are generally bound to follow the decision made in the precedent case. Important differences between cases can justify deciding the new case differently. The literature offers two main approaches to reasoning by precedent. According to rule-based-approaches, every case is decided by either following an existing rule or establishing a new one. I show that rule-based approaches are untenable. Analogy-based approaches claim that similarities and differences between two cases are determined through reasoning by analogy. These approaches are problematic because some similarity or difference can always be found between two cases. Accounts suggested so far cannot explain how precedents can provide significant guidance to judges. My dissertation salvages analogy-based approaches by supplementing them with insights from argumentation theory. Analogies contain a figurative part that is used to make someone see the analogy‘s literal part in a new way. An arguer can manipulate her interlocutor‘s perception of the literal part through the way she describes the figurative part by rhetorically drawing attention to those similarities that she considers relevant. Arguments by analogy use this to convince interlocutors of conclusions about the literal part. I propose to see judges in the role of interlocutors, evaluating arguments by precedent. The opinion that documents the precedent case from the point of view of the former judge is the figurative part of an analogy. The literal part is the new case. They form an analogical argument for repeating the precedent decision. The judge evaluates the argument by considering a number of critical questions. If all the critical questions can be answered, the precedent is applicable and must be followed. Otherwise, the precedent is either not applicable or has to be distinguished. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis describes reasoning by precedent in the common law. I discuss two important approaches to how reasoning by precedent works, rule-based theories and analogy-based theories. I reject rule-based theories as untenable. I describe the main problem analogy-based theories face: To show that precedents can constrain judicial reasoning so that judges cannot decide cases according to their own normative commitments. I use insights from psychological research into analogical reasoning and from argumentation theory to develop a new analogy-based account. I suggest that judges should be seen as interlocutors evaluating an argument by precedent. This argument contains an analogy between precedent case and present case, and a rule stating that the precedent decision needs to be followed if precedent case and present case are legally the same. The judge needs to first understand the analogy under the application of the principle of charity, and then evaluate it using critical questions.

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What is Binding in a Judicial Decision? (Czech-English Comparison) The aim of my thesis is to answer the question what is binding in judicial decision in Czech-English comparison. It thus deals with the issue of bind- ingness of the judicial decision and also, which part of the decision constiň tutes its binding element in the Czech law and in the law of England and Wales. The initial impulse was given by the fact that in judicial decisions of Czech highest courts there relatively often appear terms which originally come from common law systems. Therefore I try to compare the role which judicial decisions play in the civil law and common law in general and then more in detail in the Czech law and the law of England and Wales. The thesis is composed of eight chapters. Introductory Chapter states reasons for the choice of topic, aims and the method of research. Chapter Two examines the role of judicial decisions in civil law and consists of two subchapters. Subchapter One deals with the history of the role of judicial de- cisions. Subchapter Two then considers the significance and the normative force of judicial decisions at the present time. Chapter Three on the other hand examines role of judicial decisions in English common law and also consists of two subchapters. Subchapter One concisely...

Thesis advisor: Charles Gallagher / Thesis advisor: Peter Krause / Drone strikes are sensational events. The United States Government uses remotely piloted aircraft (or drones) equipped with precisions weapons systems to unilaterally hunt and kill its enemies across the globe. The American public, and many around the world, are startled by the pervasiveness of American lethal force. In many ways, drone strikes are unprecedented. The technology, the frequency of use, and the geographic scope are all by-products of the twenty-first century. However, the United States government has a deep history of debating whether to kill individual enemies, and has a history of authorizing operations to do so. Beneath the rhetoric, the arguments, and the opinions that dominate drone policy today there is something missing: the history. This thesis argues that there are historical precedents for targeted killings and signature strikes in American history that predate the September 11 terrorist attacks and examining these past operations can inform modern policy. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: History.

O conceito de precedente judicial é fundamental não apenas nos países de common law, mas também nos de civil law. Essa dicotomia está enfraquecida, de modo que os precedentes, na condição de normas jurídicas construídas de casos concretos, devem ser tidos como vinculantes em ambos os sistemas. Precedente não se confunde com uma decisão judicial proferida no passado, mas, sim, com razões de decidir extraídas de decisões colegiadas pretéritas. Não são todas as Cortes do Brasil competentes para a produção de precedentes, mas apenas os tribunais com a atribuição de dar a última palavra sobre a interpretação do Direito. A produção contínua de precedentes pelas Cortes competentes dá origem a sistemas normativos. Os precedentes extraídos de acórdãos do Supremo Tribunal Federal e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça formam o sistema nacional de precedentes. Nos estados e regiões (Justiça Federal) formam-se subsistemas de jurisprudência vinculante e de definição de sentido do “direito local”. Existe uma relação inexorável entre sistemas normativos e a ideia de coerência. Os sistemas devem ser coerentes. Coerência não se limita à imposição de que sejam evitadas contradições entre as normas. É preciso que critérios de coerência sejam construídos com o objetivo de impor deveres relacionados à fundamentação de cada nova norma que ingressa no sistema. As decisões judiciais devem apresentar justificação interna e justificação externa. Os fundamentos dos precedentes encontram-se na justificação externa da decisão. A coerência impõe, portanto, limites ao intérprete no que se refere a determinadas escolhas relacionadas à justificação externa. A eleição dos argumentos interpretativos utilizados na construção de um novo precedente deve ter como parâmetro o sistema de precedentes. Da mesma forma, os conceitos jurídicos utilizados na formação da normaprecedente devem ter o sistema de precedentes como referência. Por uma imposição de coerência normativa, os conteúdos atribuídos pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal aos princípios constitucionais devem, necessariamente, ser observados. A coerência consta em texto de lei federal brasileira (novo Código de Processo Civil), tendo, assim, status de norma federal, mais especificamente, de um postulado hermenêutico (norma de segundo grau). Diante do caráter normativo, deve ser observada fielmente pelas Cortes competentes para a elaboração de precedentes. Sua inobservância pode ser enfrentada pelas partes imediatamente interessadas, por meio da interposição de recurso de embargos de divergência ou, ainda, por meio de recurso especial quando o desrespeito se der pelas Cortes de Justiça. O controle ainda deve ocorrer de ofício pelas próprias Cortes de precedentes, haja vista o caráter cogente da norma, o que poderá ensejar o overruling. / The concept of precedent is fundamental not only in common law systems but also in civil law systems. This dichotomy is dimmed, since, as legal rules built on concrete cases, precedents must be considered binding on in both systems. Precedents do not relate to the decisions issued in the past, but rather to the reasoning extracted from previous Court decisions. In Brazil, only the Courts with the attribution of giving the last word on the interpretation of the Law have competence to rule precedents. The continuous making of precedents by competent Courts gives rise to normative systems. The precedents resultant from judgments of the Federal Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice form the national system of precedents. At local level, it is the States (State Tribunals) and in the Federal Regions (Federal Regional Tribunals) that form the binding jurisprudence systems and the definition of "local law". There is an indispensable bond between normative systems and the idea of coherence. Normative systems must be coherent. Coherence is not limited to avoiding contradictions between legal standards. Coherence criteria shall be developed on the purpose of guiding the reasoning of every new legal standard that enters the system. Judicial decisions must present internal and external justification. Grounds for precedents are found in the external justification of the decision. Coherence therefore requires the interpreter limits to adopt reasons for external justification. The arguments chosen to substantiate new precedent must be ground on the system of precedents. Likewise, the legal concepts used to holdup precedents also should stand on the precedent system. By imposition of normative coherence, the contents attributed by the Federal Supreme Court to the constitutional principles must be observed. Coherence is provided by the Brazilian federal law (new Code of Civil Procedure) and therefore has the status of a federal rule and, specifically, a hermeneutical postulate (second degree rule). As formal law, coherence is required to be observed by competent Courts while issuing precedents. The affected parties by the noncompliance with coherence can challenge it through a Motion for Resolution of Conflict in Decision or a Special Appeal, in its case when the disregard comes from Courts of Justice. Given that coherence is mandatory, the Courts with competence to issue precedent must examine its compliance ex officio, which may lead to overruling.

O conceito de precedente judicial é fundamental não apenas nos países de common law, mas também nos de civil law. Essa dicotomia está enfraquecida, de modo que os precedentes, na condição de normas jurídicas construídas de casos concretos, devem ser tidos como vinculantes em ambos os sistemas. Precedente não se confunde com uma decisão judicial proferida no passado, mas, sim, com razões de decidir extraídas de decisões colegiadas pretéritas. Não são todas as Cortes do Brasil competentes para a produção de precedentes, mas apenas os tribunais com a atribuição de dar a última palavra sobre a interpretação do Direito. A produção contínua de precedentes pelas Cortes competentes dá origem a sistemas normativos. Os precedentes extraídos de acórdãos do Supremo Tribunal Federal e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça formam o sistema nacional de precedentes. Nos estados e regiões (Justiça Federal) formam-se subsistemas de jurisprudência vinculante e de definição de sentido do “direito local”. Existe uma relação inexorável entre sistemas normativos e a ideia de coerência. Os sistemas devem ser coerentes. Coerência não se limita à imposição de que sejam evitadas contradições entre as normas. É preciso que critérios de coerência sejam construídos com o objetivo de impor deveres relacionados à fundamentação de cada nova norma que ingressa no sistema. As decisões judiciais devem apresentar justificação interna e justificação externa. Os fundamentos dos precedentes encontram-se na justificação externa da decisão. A coerência impõe, portanto, limites ao intérprete no que se refere a determinadas escolhas relacionadas à justificação externa. A eleição dos argumentos interpretativos utilizados na construção de um novo precedente deve ter como parâmetro o sistema de precedentes. Da mesma forma, os conceitos jurídicos utilizados na formação da normaprecedente devem ter o sistema de precedentes como referência. Por uma imposição de coerência normativa, os conteúdos atribuídos pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal aos princípios constitucionais devem, necessariamente, ser observados. A coerência consta em texto de lei federal brasileira (novo Código de Processo Civil), tendo, assim, status de norma federal, mais especificamente, de um postulado hermenêutico (norma de segundo grau). Diante do caráter normativo, deve ser observada fielmente pelas Cortes competentes para a elaboração de precedentes. Sua inobservância pode ser enfrentada pelas partes imediatamente interessadas, por meio da interposição de recurso de embargos de divergência ou, ainda, por meio de recurso especial quando o desrespeito se der pelas Cortes de Justiça. O controle ainda deve ocorrer de ofício pelas próprias Cortes de precedentes, haja vista o caráter cogente da norma, o que poderá ensejar o overruling. / The concept of precedent is fundamental not only in common law systems but also in civil law systems. This dichotomy is dimmed, since, as legal rules built on concrete cases, precedents must be considered binding on in both systems. Precedents do not relate to the decisions issued in the past, but rather to the reasoning extracted from previous Court decisions. In Brazil, only the Courts with the attribution of giving the last word on the interpretation of the Law have competence to rule precedents. The continuous making of precedents by competent Courts gives rise to normative systems. The precedents resultant from judgments of the Federal Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice form the national system of precedents. At local level, it is the States (State Tribunals) and in the Federal Regions (Federal Regional Tribunals) that form the binding jurisprudence systems and the definition of "local law". There is an indispensable bond between normative systems and the idea of coherence. Normative systems must be coherent. Coherence is not limited to avoiding contradictions between legal standards. Coherence criteria shall be developed on the purpose of guiding the reasoning of every new legal standard that enters the system. Judicial decisions must present internal and external justification. Grounds for precedents are found in the external justification of the decision. Coherence therefore requires the interpreter limits to adopt reasons for external justification. The arguments chosen to substantiate new precedent must be ground on the system of precedents. Likewise, the legal concepts used to holdup precedents also should stand on the precedent system. By imposition of normative coherence, the contents attributed by the Federal Supreme Court to the constitutional principles must be observed. Coherence is provided by the Brazilian federal law (new Code of Civil Procedure) and therefore has the status of a federal rule and, specifically, a hermeneutical postulate (second degree rule). As formal law, coherence is required to be observed by competent Courts while issuing precedents. The affected parties by the noncompliance with coherence can challenge it through a Motion for Resolution of Conflict in Decision or a Special Appeal, in its case when the disregard comes from Courts of Justice. Given that coherence is mandatory, the Courts with competence to issue precedent must examine its compliance ex officio, which may lead to overruling.

O conceito de precedente judicial é fundamental não apenas nos países de common law, mas também nos de civil law. Essa dicotomia está enfraquecida, de modo que os precedentes, na condição de normas jurídicas construídas de casos concretos, devem ser tidos como vinculantes em ambos os sistemas. Precedente não se confunde com uma decisão judicial proferida no passado, mas, sim, com razões de decidir extraídas de decisões colegiadas pretéritas. Não são todas as Cortes do Brasil competentes para a produção de precedentes, mas apenas os tribunais com a atribuição de dar a última palavra sobre a interpretação do Direito. A produção contínua de precedentes pelas Cortes competentes dá origem a sistemas normativos. Os precedentes extraídos de acórdãos do Supremo Tribunal Federal e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça formam o sistema nacional de precedentes. Nos estados e regiões (Justiça Federal) formam-se subsistemas de jurisprudência vinculante e de definição de sentido do “direito local”. Existe uma relação inexorável entre sistemas normativos e a ideia de coerência. Os sistemas devem ser coerentes. Coerência não se limita à imposição de que sejam evitadas contradições entre as normas. É preciso que critérios de coerência sejam construídos com o objetivo de impor deveres relacionados à fundamentação de cada nova norma que ingressa no sistema. As decisões judiciais devem apresentar justificação interna e justificação externa. Os fundamentos dos precedentes encontram-se na justificação externa da decisão. A coerência impõe, portanto, limites ao intérprete no que se refere a determinadas escolhas relacionadas à justificação externa. A eleição dos argumentos interpretativos utilizados na construção de um novo precedente deve ter como parâmetro o sistema de precedentes. Da mesma forma, os conceitos jurídicos utilizados na formação da normaprecedente devem ter o sistema de precedentes como referência. Por uma imposição de coerência normativa, os conteúdos atribuídos pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal aos princípios constitucionais devem, necessariamente, ser observados. A coerência consta em texto de lei federal brasileira (novo Código de Processo Civil), tendo, assim, status de norma federal, mais especificamente, de um postulado hermenêutico (norma de segundo grau). Diante do caráter normativo, deve ser observada fielmente pelas Cortes competentes para a elaboração de precedentes. Sua inobservância pode ser enfrentada pelas partes imediatamente interessadas, por meio da interposição de recurso de embargos de divergência ou, ainda, por meio de recurso especial quando o desrespeito se der pelas Cortes de Justiça. O controle ainda deve ocorrer de ofício pelas próprias Cortes de precedentes, haja vista o caráter cogente da norma, o que poderá ensejar o overruling. / The concept of precedent is fundamental not only in common law systems but also in civil law systems. This dichotomy is dimmed, since, as legal rules built on concrete cases, precedents must be considered binding on in both systems. Precedents do not relate to the decisions issued in the past, but rather to the reasoning extracted from previous Court decisions. In Brazil, only the Courts with the attribution of giving the last word on the interpretation of the Law have competence to rule precedents. The continuous making of precedents by competent Courts gives rise to normative systems. The precedents resultant from judgments of the Federal Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice form the national system of precedents. At local level, it is the States (State Tribunals) and in the Federal Regions (Federal Regional Tribunals) that form the binding jurisprudence systems and the definition of "local law". There is an indispensable bond between normative systems and the idea of coherence. Normative systems must be coherent. Coherence is not limited to avoiding contradictions between legal standards. Coherence criteria shall be developed on the purpose of guiding the reasoning of every new legal standard that enters the system. Judicial decisions must present internal and external justification. Grounds for precedents are found in the external justification of the decision. Coherence therefore requires the interpreter limits to adopt reasons for external justification. The arguments chosen to substantiate new precedent must be ground on the system of precedents. Likewise, the legal concepts used to holdup precedents also should stand on the precedent system. By imposition of normative coherence, the contents attributed by the Federal Supreme Court to the constitutional principles must be observed. Coherence is provided by the Brazilian federal law (new Code of Civil Procedure) and therefore has the status of a federal rule and, specifically, a hermeneutical postulate (second degree rule). As formal law, coherence is required to be observed by competent Courts while issuing precedents. The affected parties by the noncompliance with coherence can challenge it through a Motion for Resolution of Conflict in Decision or a Special Appeal, in its case when the disregard comes from Courts of Justice. Given that coherence is mandatory, the Courts with competence to issue precedent must examine its compliance ex officio, which may lead to overruling.