The Bush administration's decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol can be explained by prospect theory. The change in federal climate policy between the Clinton and Bush administrations was due to the difference in domain that each president operated under. President Clinton operated under a domain of losses as he associated continued fossil fuel use with future socio-economic and environmental damages from climate change. This domain of losses increased President Clinton's risk tolerances and explains his pursuit of the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, President Bush operated under a domain of gains where he did not connect fossil fuel use with future damages, rather with continued economic growth. President Bush's domain of gains reduced his risk tolerance and resulted in his pursuit of fossil fuel intensive economic development policies. This paper defines the domain that Presidents Clinton and Bush operated under regarding climate change, the independent variable of this analysis. A total of 26 speeches on climate change by these presidents were coded to explicate domain according to two categories of beliefs. The single most salient variable is the decision makers beliefs about the perceived robustness of the current state of scientific knowledge on climate change. The second most important aspect of these decision makers beliefs revolve around the role of fossil fuels in economic growth. Once domain has been defined through the cognitive maps and each decision makers corresponding risk tolerance explicated, the dependent variable of policy preferences are analyzed. Two policy options are analyzed; the business as usual (BAU) option associated with the status quo, as well as a climate protection policy that is reflective of the emissions reductions associated with US compliance with Kyoto. These two policy options are evaluated in three case studies; the economy wide costs of compliance with Kyoto targets for greenhouse gas emissions, the public health impacts of greenhouse gas reductions, and finally against a component of the Kyoto Protocol that allows for international trading of permits to emit greenhouse gases.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar.pdf: 2603035 bytes, checksum: 3b082ac06436aa640a2d72a08a30521d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-30 / Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo / This dissertation analyzes the domestic constraints that arose during the formulation and voting of US trade policy throughout Bill Clinton s administration (1993-2001) and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles. An analytical narrative is undertaken with emphasis on: 1) the approval of NAFTA (1993); 2) the constraints to the renewal of fast-track authority (1997); 3) trade relations with China (1993-1996) and with Japan (1993-1995), 4) the normalization of trade relations with China and the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle (1999-2000). The analytic framework contains elements of different approaches such as decision units approach and bureaucratic politics model, based on the assumption that decision is made through coalitions. We argue that the way trade policy was formulated was essential for the results achieved and that the constraints were the result of divisions in the Congress, society and Executive and the difficulties related to the coordination of these actors. We conclude that the analysis provided allows us to understand more clearly the domestic constraints to the US trade policy and the manner in which the Executive adjusted to these obstacles by considering the relationship among the main actors within the decision-making process / A dissertação analisa as dificuldades domésticas apresentadas à formulação e à aprovação de política externa comercial nos EUA durante o governo de Bill Clinton (1993-2001) e a forma pela qual o Executivo se ajustou a esses obstáculos. Faz-se uma narrativa analítica, tendo com ênfase 1) a aprovação do NAFTA (1993), 2) os entraves ao processo de renovação do fast-track (1997), 3) as relações comerciais com a China (1993-1996) e com o Japão (1993-1995), 4) a normalização das relações comerciais com a China e reunião ministerial da OMC em Seattle (1999-2000). O quadro analítico contém elementos de distintas abordagens, como a das unidades de decisão e da política burocrática, partindo da premissa de que o processo decisório em política externa comercial se dá por meio de coalizões. Argumenta-se que a forma como se elaborou a política comercial durante o governo Clinton foi essencial para que se chegasse aos resultados obtidos, sendo que os entraves no processo foram resultado das divisões no Congresso, na sociedade e no Executivo e das dificuldades de coordenação entre esses atores. Conclui-se que a análise oferecida, ao considerar os principais atores e seu relacionamento no processo decisório, permite entender com mais clareza os entraves domésticos à política externa comercial, bem como o modo pelo qual o Executivo se ajustou a tais entraves