Paranoia is increasingly considered to be a common phenomenon in the general population and is not just a symptom of diagnosable psychiatric disorders. Recently, Ellett, Allen-Crooks, Stevens, Wildschut & Chadwick (2013) argued that distrust-based competition in the Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG) is a novel behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. The present study sought to replicate the finding of Ellett et al. (2013) and to extend their research by looking to the social psychology literature on human values as additional potential motivations for competition in the PDG. Additionally, the study sought to examine relationships between paranoia in the nonclinical population and human values, and offer support for a recently refined theory of human values (Schwartz et al., 2012). Consistent with prediction, higher trait paranoia was associated with valuing face, that is, holding a commitment to security and power through maintaining one's public image and avoiding humiliation, and lower trait paranoia was associated with valuing universalism-tolerance, that is, showing acceptance and understanding for others. Secondly, and consistent with prediction, the current findings replicated that of Ellett et al. (2013) to show that distrust-based PDG competition is a behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. Thirdly, the present research offered a secondary behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia based on a commitment to valuing power. Lastly, the study offered support for the circular structure of values in Schwartz's (2012) refined theory. Collectively, the current findings provided further evidence for the role of the PDG in the measurement and investigation of nonclinical paranoia, and more specifically provided a foundation for further research into the role that values could play in furthering this understanding.

賽局理論(Game Theory)大多假設理性決策，單一回合賽局通常可由理論證明均衡(Equilibrium)或是最佳決策，然而如果賽局重複進行，不見得只存在單一均衡，光從理論推導可能無法找到所有均衡。以囚犯困境(Prisoner Dilemma)為例，理論均衡為不合作，若重複的賽局中存有互利關係，不合作可能不是最佳選擇。近年來，經濟學家藉由和統計實驗設計類似的賽局實驗(Game Experiment)，探討賽局在理論與實際間的差異，並以學習模型(Learning Model)描述參賽者的決策及行為，但學習模型的優劣大多依賴誤差大小判定，但誤差分析結果可能與資料有關(Data Dependent)。有鑑於學習模型在模型選取上的不足，本文引進統計分析的模型選取及殘差檢定，以實證資料、配合電腦模擬評估學習模型。 本文使用的實證資料，屬於囚犯困境的重複賽局(Repeated Game)，包括四種不同的實驗設定，參加賽局實驗者（或是「玩家」）為政治大學大學部學生；比較學習模型有四種：增強學習模型(Reinforcement Learning model)、延伸的增強學習模型(Extend Reinforcement Learning Model)、信念學習模型(Belief Learning Model)、加權經驗吸引模型(Experience-Weighted Attraction Model)。實證及模擬分析發現，增強學習模型較適合用於描述囚犯困境資料，無論是較小的誤差或是適合度分析，增強學習模型都有較佳的結果；另外，也發現玩家在不同實驗設定中的反應並不一致，將玩家分類後會有較佳的結果。 / In game theory, the optimal strategy (or equilibrium) of one-shot games usually can be solved theoretically. But, the optimal strategies of repeated games are likely not unique and are more difficult to find. For example, the defection is the optimal decision for the one-shot Prisoner Dilemma (PD) game. But for the repeated PD game, if the players can benefit from cooperation between rounds then the defection won’t be the only optimal rule. In recent years, economists design game experiments to explore the behavior in repeated games and use the learning models to evaluate the player’s choices. Most of the evaluation criteria are based on the estimation and prediction errors, but the results are likely to be data dependent. In this study, we adapt the model selection process in regression analysis and apply the idea to evaluate learning models. We use empirical data, together with Monte Carlo simulation, to demonstrate the evaluation process. The empirical data used are repeated PD game, including four different experimental settings, and the players of the game are from National Chengchi University in Taiwan. Also, we consider four learning models: Reinforcement learning (RL) model, Extend Reinforcement learning (ERL) model, Belief Learning (BL) model, and Experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model. We found that the RL model is more appropriate to describe the PD data. In addition, the behaviors of players in a group can be quite different and separating the players into different sets can reduce the estimation errors.

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This thesis proposes a reading of David Gauthiers moral contractarianism (hereinafter Mb(CM)A) that demonstrates how cooperation can be rational in situations where expected utilities (EU) are stacked too high against cooperation. The dissertation critically examines Mb(CM)A and contends that it breaks down in the test of application, i.e. the problem of secession because of the conception of rationality it appeals to. Mb(CM)A identifies rationality with utility-maximization, where utility is the measure of considered coherent preferences about outcomes. Mb(CM)A links morality to reason, and reason to practical rationality, and practical rationality to interest, which it identifies with individual utility. On this view, an action (or a disposition) is rational if that action (or disposition) maximizes an agents EU. This conception of rationality the essay claims is both nave and misleading because it does not take into account an agents considered preference for the acts that are available, in addition to the EU of those acts. Therefore, the thesis argues that Mb(CM)As account of rationality be abandoned in favor of a decision-value/symbolic utilitys or morals by decision-value agreements conception of practical rationality. Morals by decision-value agreement (henceforth Mb(DV)A), the dissertation claims, handles serious problems, like the problem of secession in ways that Mb(CM)A cannot. Mb(CM)A breaks down in the test of application because when applied to the problem of secession, it suggests a single-tracked silver bullet solution. Specifically, it tracks only EU-reasons and claims that insofar as cooperation does not maximize the EU of better-off agents, it is not rational for them to cooperate with or support those that are less well-off. By contrast, Mb(DV)A offers a multi-tracked framework for solutions to the problem, namely: it factors in an agents considered preference for the acts that are available, in addition to EU of those acts. It is the argument of the thesis that when EU is stacked too high against cooperation, it may or may not be rational for an agent to cooperate, depending on which way symbolic utility (SU) for that agent points toward. If SU points in the direction of secession, then it is DV-rational for an agent not to cooperate, but if SU points toward non-secession, then it is DV-rational for that agent to cooperate.