Submitted by Lucas Carvalho Peto null (lucaspeto@gmail.com) on 2017-02-15T19:19:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Peto, Lucas. NATUREZA, ATIVIDADE SENSÍVEL E PROCESSO DE TRABALHO: fundamentos para se pensar a corporeidade a partir da filosofia de Marx.pdf: 710301 bytes, checksum: c3c3ed955b959571a10e8c90d0e7f5cb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Juliano Benedito Ferreira (julianoferreira@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2017-02-21T18:08:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 peto_lc_me_assis.pdf: 710301 bytes, checksum: c3c3ed955b959571a10e8c90d0e7f5cb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-21T18:08:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 peto_lc_me_assis.pdf: 710301 bytes, checksum: c3c3ed955b959571a10e8c90d0e7f5cb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-01-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Objetiva-se apresentar os fundamentos que tornam possível pensar a questão da corporeidade [Leiblichkeit] a partir dos escritos de Marx. É importante observar que a questão da corporeidade não fora objeto de sistematização nos postulados marxianos. Não obstante, em Marx há fundamentos que possibilitam versar sobre a questão da corporeidade. De modo geral, pensar a corporeidade a partir dos postulados marxianos é concebê-la como o fundamento da atividade humana sensível que instala o ser humano na sensibilidade concreta. Para alcançar o objetivo estipulado, são apresentadas as conceituações de Marx acerca da atividade objetiva [gegenständliche Tätigkeit], da natureza [Natur] e do processo de trabalho [der Arbeitprozeß]. / The objective is to present the fundamental principles that make it possible to study the body [Leiblichkeit] based on Marx's writings. It is important to note that the body was not a systematic study object in the marxian postulates. Nevertheless, there are some principles in Marx that make it possibile to study the body based on his philosophy. To achieve the objective, we present Marx's concepts of objective activity [gegenständliche Tätigkeit], nature [Natur] and the labour process [der Arbeitprozeß]. / FAPESP: 2014/19916-8

This thesis is a defence of non-introspective simulationism. It seeks to explain how we acquire everyday behavioural and psychological beliefs (henceforth interpretational beliefs) regarding both ourselves and others. The thesis is in three parts; the first states non-introspective simulationism, the second surveys some relevant empirical findings and shows how simulationism explains (or at least accomodates) these, and the third compares simulationism with rival theories. The two main claims of non-introspecitve simulationism (as defended) are: simulation is central to the acquisition of interpretational beliefs. Introspection has no role whatever. Further central claims are: beliefs about our own currently intended behaviours are acquired by practical reasoning. Other interpretational beliefs are, in various ways, the product of simulation. Simulation requires little if any machinery not already required for practical reasoning. Knowledge of our own psychological states is acquired after and as a result of knowledge of others�. Knowledge of phenomenal states is unnecessary for mastery of folk psychology and the product of dinkum science.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 98-104).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-136). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-136). Also available on the Internet.

In this thesis a phenomenological-hermeneutic method of inquiry, coupled with an embracement of ecological and transpersonal principles, was employed to delve into the paradoxical nature of the transformational quest to awaken to non-dual living. In particular there is a specific focus on the difficulty of embracing and living out a traditionally Eastern spiritual tradition for Western individuals. Analysis of interview transcripts with three participants, as well as, the author’s own journals, found four major “stages” in the journey to daily living in a non-dual state, with 13 sub-themes. These interpretive themes delineate the chronological path followed by the three co-researchers on their journeys into embracing non-dual living. The first major theme – heeding the call: honouring what is – outlines childhood experiences and answering a call to walk the path. The second theme– the unfolding process: pulling back the veil – illuminates the depth at which consciousness development can impact one’s lived experience. The third major theme – the wonderful land of oz: pointing to the answer within – explores the individuals’ experience with various teachers on the path of consciousness development. The fourth, and final, major theme – finding a lotus in the muddy waters of life – reveals the need for beings on the path to return to the particular moment to face unresolved attachments and demons. These findings suggest the significance of an integrative approach to therapeutic/counselling experience, an approach that includes Eastern practices and philosophies in the repertoire of counselling tools, to ensure the deepest possible understanding between, and connection within, the partners in the therapeutic alliance. / viii, 249 leaves ; 29 cm.

This thesis is a defence of non-introspective simulationism. It seeks to explain how we acquire everyday behavioural and psychological beliefs (henceforth interpretational beliefs) regarding both ourselves and others. The thesis is in three parts; the first states non-introspective simulationism, the second surveys some relevant empirical findings and shows how simulationism explains (or at least accomodates) these, and the third compares simulationism with rival theories. The two main claims of non-introspecitve simulationism (as defended) are: simulation is central to the acquisition of interpretational beliefs. Introspection has no role whatever. Further central claims are: beliefs about our own currently intended behaviours are acquired by practical reasoning. Other interpretational beliefs are, in various ways, the product of simulation. Simulation requires little if any machinery not already required for practical reasoning. Knowledge of our own psychological states is acquired after and as a result of knowledge of others�. Knowledge of phenomenal states is unnecessary for mastery of folk psychology and the product of dinkum science.

Dissertation (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2008. / Directed by Glenn Hudak; submitted to the School of Education. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Aug. 12, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 191-205).

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-55).

M.A. (Politics) / The human rights discourse is flawed in theory and practise. Despite this, it remains legally entrenched in the South African constitution and enjoys a high degree of rhetorical popularity. This thesis will suggest a theory that will explain the longevity of the human rights discourse based on its ability to open spaces for the development of political agency. This ability is derived from its essentially emotive nature as a discourse comprised of value judgments. The discourse is in turn shaped by the agents that are mobilized through human rights. Hence, human rights will be described as a dynamic, evolving system as opposed to the a priori, deontological facts that they have traditionally been conceived to be.