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This research is aimed at assessing the quantitative risks involved with an ethanol pipeline. Pipelines that run from the Midwest, where the vast majority of ethanol is produced, to the target areas where reformulated gasoline is required (California, Texas Gulf Coast, New England Atlantic Coast) will be of particular interest. The goal is to conduct a quantitative risk assessment on the pipeline, truck, and rail transportation modes to these areas. As a result of the quantitative risk assessment, we are able to compare the risk associated with the different modes of transportation for ethanol. In order to perform and compare the quantitative risk assessment, the following challenges are addressed: • Identify target areas requiring reformulated gasoline • Map detailed route for each transportation mode to all three target areas • Perform a quantitative risk assessment for each transportation mode • Compare quantitative risk assessment results for each route and transportation mode The focus is on California, Texas Gulf Coast, and New England Atlantic Coast because of the large volume. It is beneficial to look at these areas as opposed to the smaller areas because pipeline transportation requires very large volumes. In order to find a meaningful comparison between all three transportation modes, only the areas with the three large volumes were evaluated. Since the risk assessment is completed using historical data, each route is segmented in a way that is consistent with the data that is available. All of the curves support the hypothesis that pipeline transportation poses the least societal risk when transporting ethanol from the Midwest to target areas. Rail transportation poses the largest amount of societal risk. While overall rail incidents are not as frequent as road incidents, the frequency of a fatality is much higher when an incident does occur.

This research is aimed at assessing the quantitative risks involved with an ethanol pipeline. Pipelines that run from the Midwest, where the vast majority of ethanol is produced, to the target areas where reformulated gasoline is required (California, Texas Gulf Coast, New England Atlantic Coast) will be of particular interest. The goal is to conduct a quantitative risk assessment on the pipeline, truck, and rail transportation modes to these areas. As a result of the quantitative risk assessment, we are able to compare the risk associated with the different modes of transportation for ethanol. In order to perform and compare the quantitative risk assessment, the following challenges are addressed: 1) Identify target areas requiring reformulated gasoline 2) Map detailed route for each transportation mode to all three target areas 3) Perform a quantitative risk assessment for each transportation mode 4) Compare quantitative risk assessment results for each route and transportation mode The focus is on California, Texas Gulf Coast, and New England Atlantic Coast because of the large volume. It is beneficial to look at these areas as opposed to the smaller areas because pipeline transportation requires very large volumes. In order to find a meaningful comparison between all three transportation modes, only the areas with the three large volumes were evaluated. Since the risk assessment is completed using historical data, each route is segmented in a way that is consistent with the data that is available. All of the curves support the hypothesis that pipeline transportation poses the least societal risk when transporting ethanol from the Midwest to target areas. Rail transportation poses the largest amount of societal risk. While overall rail incidents are not as frequent as road incidents, the frequency of a fatality is much higher when an incident does occur.

In this work, a new approach to optimize facility layout for toxic release, fire and explosion scenarios is presented. By integrating a risk analysis in the optimization formulation, safer assignments for facility layout and siting have been obtained. Accompanying with the economical concepts used in a plant layout, the new model considers the cost of willing to avoid a fatality, i.e. the potential injury cost due to accidents associated with toxic release near residential areas. For fire and explosion scenarios, the building or equipment damage cost replaces the potential injury cost. Two different approaches have been proposed to optimize the total cost related with layout. In the first phase using continuous-plane approach, the overall problem was initially modeled as a disjunctive program where the coordinates of each facility and cost-related variables are the main unknowns. Then, the convex hull approach was used to reformulate the problem as a Mixed Integer Non-Linear Program (MINLP) that identifies potential layouts by minimizing overall costs. This approach gives the coordinates of each facility in a continuous plane, and estimates for the total length of pipes, the land area, and the selection of safety devices. Finally, the 3D-computational fluid dynamics (CFD) was used to compare the difference between the initial layout and the final layout in order to see how obstacles and separation distances affect the dispersion or overpressures of affected facilities. One of the CFD programs, ANSYS CFX was employed for the dispersion study and Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) for the fires and explosions. In the second phase for fire and explosion scenarios, the study is focused on finding an optimal placement for hazardous facilities and other process plant buildings using the optimization theory and mapping risks on the given land in order to calculate risk in financial terms. The given land is divided in a square grid of which the sides have a certain size and in which each square acquires a risk-score. These risk-scores such as the probability of structural damage are to be multiplied by prices of potential facilities which would be built on the grid. Finally this will give us the financial risk. Accompanying the suggested safety concepts, the new model takes into account construction and operational costs. The overall cost of locations is a function of piping cost, management cost, protection device cost, and financial risk. This approach gives the coordinates of the best location of each facility in a 2-D plane, and estimates the total piping length. Once the final layout is obtained, the CFD code, FLACS is used to simulate and consider obstacle effects in 3-D space. The outcome of this study will be useful in assisting the selection of location for process plant buildings and risk management.

Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is widely applied in several industries as a tool to improve safety, as part of design, licensing or operational processes. Nevertheless, there is much less academic research on the validity and validation of QRA, despite their importance both for the science of risk analysis and with respect to its practical implication for decision-making and improving system safety. In light of this, this paper presents a review focusing on the validity and validation of QRA in a safety context. Theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions in the scientific literature are reviewed, focusing on three questions. Which theoretical views on validity and validation of QRA can be found? Which features of QRA are useful to validate a particular QRA, and which frameworks are proposed to this effect? What kinds of claims are made about QRA, and what evidence is available for QRA being valid for the stated purposes? A discussion follows the review, focusing on the available evidence for the validity of QRA and the effectiveness of validation methods.

Great Smoky Mountains National Park (GRSM) received 12.5 million visitors in 2020. With a high traffic volume, it is imperative roadways remain open and free from obstruction. Annual unanticipated rockfall events in GRSM often obstruct traffic flow. Using the Unstable Slope Management Program for Federal Land Management Agencies (USMP for FLMA) protocols, this study analyzes high priority unstable rock slopes through 1) creation of an unstable slope geodatabase and 2) generation of a final rockfall risk model using Co-Kriging from a preliminary risk model and susceptibility model. A secondary goal of this study is to provide risk estimation for the three most traveled transportation corridors within GRSM, as well as investigate current rockfall hazard warning sign location to ultimately improve visitor safety with regards to rockfall hazards.

Prescriptively, the requirement of fire safety protection systems for distribution substations is not provided in the compliance document for fire safety to the New Zealand Building Code. Therefore, the New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) has proposed a list of fire safety protection requirements for distribution substations in a letter, dated 10th July 2002. A review by Nyman [1], has considered the fire safety requirements proposed by the NZFS and discussed the issues with a number of fire engineers over the last three years. Nyman concerned that one of the requirements regarding the four hour fire separation between the distribution substation and the interior spaces of the building may not be necessary when considering the risk exposure to the building occupants in different situations, such as the involvement of the sprinkler systems and the use of transformers with a lower fire hazard. Fire resistance rating (FRR) typically means the time duration for which passive fire protection system, such as fire barriers, fire walls and other fire rated building elements, can maintain its integrity, insulation and stability in a standard fire endurance test. Based on the literature review and discussions with industry experts, it is found that failure of the passive fire protection system in a real fire exposure could potentially occur earlier than the time indicated by the fire resistance rating derived from the standard test depending on the characteristics of the actual fire (heat release rate, fire load density and fire location) and the characteristics of the fire compartment (its geometric, ventilation conditions, opening definition, building services and equipment). Hence, it is known that a higher level of fire safety, such as 4 hour fire rated construction and use of sprinkler system, may significantly improve the fire risk to health of safety of occupants in the building; however, they could never eliminate the risk. This report presents a fire engineering Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) on a transformer fire initiating in a distribution substation inside a high-rise residential and commercial mixeduse building. It compares the fire safety protection requirements for distribution substations from the NZFS to other relevant documents worldwide: the regulatory standards in New Zealand, Australia and United States of America, as well as the non-regulatory guidelines from other stakeholders, such as electrical engineering organisation, insurance companies and electricity providers. This report also examines the characteristics of historical data for transformer fires in distribution substations both in New Zealand and United States of America buildings. Reliability of active fire safety protection systems, such as smoke detection systems and sprinkler systems is reviewed in this research. Based on the data analysis results, a fire risk estimate is determined using an Event Tree Analysis (ETA) for a total of 14 scenarios with different fire safety designs and transformer types for a distribution substation in a high-rise residential and commercial mixed-use building. In Scenario 1 to 10 scenarios, different combinations of fire safety systems are evaluated with the same type of transformer, Flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated transformer. In Scenario 11 to Scenario 14, two particular fire safety designs are selected as a baseline for the analysis of transformer types. Two types of transformer with a low fire hazard are used to replace the flammable liquid (mineral oil) insulated transformer in a distribution substation. These are less flammable liquid (silicone oil) insulated transformers and dry type (dry air) transformers. The entire fire risk estimate is determined using the software package @Risk4.5. The results from the event tree analysis are used in the cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit ratios are measured based on the reduced fire risk exposures to the building occupants, with respect to the investment costs of the alternative cases, from its respective base case. The outcomes of the assessment show that the proposed four hour fire separation between the distribution substations and the interior spaces of the building, when no sprinkler systems are provided, is not considered to be the most cost-effective alternative to the life safety of occupants, where the cost-benefit ratio of this scenario is ranked fifth. The most cost-effective alternative is found to be the scenario with 30 minute fire separation and sprinkler system installed. In addition to the findings, replacing a flammable liquid insulated transformer with a less flammable liquid insulated transformer or a dry type transformer is generally considered to be economical alternatives. From the QRA analysis, it is concluded that 3 hour fire separation is considered to be appropriate for distribution substations, containing a flammable liquid insulated transformer and associated equipment, in non-sprinklered buildings. The fire ratings of the separation construction can be reduced to 30 minute FRR if sprinkler system is installed. This conclusion is also in agreement with the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).