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1	Intractable quarrels in argumentation theory : integrating argument and therapy / Friemann, Richard. January 2005 (has links) Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2006. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves247-266). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNR11573
2	Police in the middle: a study of police intervention in domestic disputes / Walter, James Dwight January 1973 (has links) No description available. Sociology Police Domestic relations Quarreling
3	Topography of the Splintered World: Hegel and the Disagreements of Right Blili-Hamelin, Borhane January 2019 (has links) For Hegel, serious, painful disagreement among reasonable individuals is part of the very fabric of our intellectual, moral, and social lives. Disagreement about what matters cannot be eliminated. Traditionally, this kind of interpretation is thought to be incompatible with Hegel’s epistemic and metaphysical ambitions: that reason has absolute power to explain all there is, leaving no significant question without an adequate answer. But if genuine disagreement cannot be eliminated, then at least some significant practical normative questions must remain without fully adequate answers. I develop a novel strategy for reconciling these two fundamental aspects of his approach to practical norms and values in his Philosophy of Right. Through what I call topographic explanations, Hegel takes on the task of explaining why the world is structured in such a way that (a) some significant questions necessarily remain open to painful disagreement, and that (b) the world remains a worthy home for our deepest aspirations. Philosophy Quarreling
4	Measurement of teacher response to young children's quarrels Samuel, Lansdale Dodge, January 1968 (has links) Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1968. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.
5	The Effects of Excluding Coalitions Hiller, Tobias 04 June 2018 (has links) (PDF) One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value ( φE value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent. ausgeschlossene Koalitionen Streit φE-Wert Shapley-Wert kooperative Spieltheorie TU Dresden Publikationsfond excluded coalitions quarreling φE value Shapley value cooperative game theory TU Dresden Publishing Fund ddc:510 rvk:SA 1075
6	The Effects of Excluding Coalitions Hiller, Tobias 04 June 2018 (has links) One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value ( φE value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent. info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/510 ddc:510

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