In 1991, the Federal Communications Commission began regulating the tariffed rates of the nation's largest local exchange carriers under a new regulatory scheme: price-cap regulation. Price caps were intended to "remedy" the ills of traditional rate-of-return regulation. They were to provide incentive for the telephone companies to adopt innovative technology, cost-cutting measures and provide telephone services more efficiently. To test the effectiveness of this incentive, this study examined productivity of the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) under both rate-of-return regulation and price-cap regulation. A total factor productivity model was developed and productivity gains were calculated under both regulatory regimes. The assumption of total factor productivity was then relaxed and value-added productivity and labor productivity measures were also examined. The point estimates of productivity gains indicate that price caps have led to greater productivity gains. Although productivity gains varied greatly across individual RBOCs, use of total RBOC data indicated that average productivity gains improved 1.3 percent under price caps using the TFP model. Similar improvements under price caps were estimated using the value-added (1.1 percent) and labor productivity measurements (1.3 percent). However, because of the variability of the annual estimates, none of the productivity improvements are statistically significant. In conclusion, calculations of RBOC productivity gains suggest that price caps have led to more efficient use of inputs--labor; materials, rents and services; and capital--in the production of telephone company output. Yet, the statistical evidence is not strong enough to unequivocally support the assertion that price cap regulation has led to great productivity gains. / Master of Arts

A legislação brasileira estabelece que o Estado tem a obrigação de preservar o equilíbrio econômico financeiro das concessões de serviços públicos. Assim o Estado deve garantir que as tarifas dessas concessões sejam capazes de cobrir os seus custos operacionais e ainda ofereçam um retorno justo para os agentes privados que nelas investiram. Nas concessões de distribuição de gás natural canalizado e de energia elétrica os reguladores brasileiros optaram por aplicar uma regulação baseada em incentivos, que se inspira no modelo inglês de regulação por preço teto. Esta opção regulatória fez com que a Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica adicionasse à remuneração dos acionistas das concessionárias um prêmio de risco regulatório refletindo a diferença entre o risco das distribuidoras inglesas e o risco das norte americanas, pois as inglesas praticam uma forma de determinação de tarifas considerada mais arriscada que as norte americanas. Tal adição de retorno encontra amparo na teoria econômica, mas é questionada por estudos empíricos que mostram que a diferença entre os graus de risco do regime inglês e norte americano não é estatisticamente significativa. Nesta dissertação é testada a hipótese de que o grau de risco de mercado da regulação por preço teto é maior do que o da regulação por custo de serviço. Para tanto são usados dados de distribuidoras de gás natural e energia elétrica da Argentina, Brasil, Chile e Estados Unidos, sendo que apenas neste último país se pratica regulação por custo de serviço e nos demais é adotada a regulação por preço teto de inspiração inglesa. Os testes aqui realizados indicam que não há evidências de que o risco de mercado seja maior em países com regulação por preço-teto do que em países com regulação por custo de serviço. Mais do que isso, esta dissertação conclui que o principal determinante do diferencial entre o risco de mercado das concessionárias brasileiras e o risco de mercado das empresas norte americanas comparáveis de distribuição de energia elétrica e de gás natural é a volatilidade do índice IBOVESPA e não o modelo tarifário adotado pelos reguladores. / Brazilian Law establishes that preservation of the economic balance of utilities is an obligation of the Brazilian State. Thus the State must set tariffs that not only cover utilities operational costs but also cover its capital cost, giving a fair return for utilities investors. In tariff setting, Brazilian regulators estimate a weight average cost of capital, of which market risk is one of the components. Brazilian regulators of natural gas and electricity distribution utilities choose an incentive based model of regulation, inspired in the English regulatory model of price cap, or RPI X. This regulatory model is considered riskier than the American model of cost of service, or (fixed) rate of return regulation. Thus, the choice for a price cap model made Brazilian electricity regulator (ANEEL) add a regulatory risk premium in the equity component of WACC to incorporate the risk differential between the English and the American regulatory models. Such regulatory risk premium is validated by economic theory, but is questioned by empiric studies that show that, across many countries, the difference between the risk of English and American models are not statistically significative. This dissertation tests the hypothesis that the market risk of price cap regulation is greater than cost of service regulation. In order to test such hypothesis data from natural gas and electric energy distributors from Argentia, Brazil, Chile and United States is used. Only the latter practices cost of service regulation and all other countries adopt the english inspired price cap regualation. The tests performed indicate that there is no evidence that the market risk is greater in countries adopting price cap regulation than in countries using cost of service regulation. Moreover, this dissertation concludes that the main aspect determining the difference between market.risk of Brazilian utilities providers and American comparable natural gas end electric energy distributors is the volatility of the IBOVESPA índex in spite of the tariff model adopted by the regulators.

A legislação brasileira estabelece que o Estado tem a obrigação de preservar o equilíbrio econômico financeiro das concessões de serviços públicos. Assim o Estado deve garantir que as tarifas dessas concessões sejam capazes de cobrir os seus custos operacionais e ainda ofereçam um retorno justo para os agentes privados que nelas investiram. Nas concessões de distribuição de gás natural canalizado e de energia elétrica os reguladores brasileiros optaram por aplicar uma regulação baseada em incentivos, que se inspira no modelo inglês de regulação por preço teto. Esta opção regulatória fez com que a Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica adicionasse à remuneração dos acionistas das concessionárias um prêmio de risco regulatório refletindo a diferença entre o risco das distribuidoras inglesas e o risco das norte americanas, pois as inglesas praticam uma forma de determinação de tarifas considerada mais arriscada que as norte americanas. Tal adição de retorno encontra amparo na teoria econômica, mas é questionada por estudos empíricos que mostram que a diferença entre os graus de risco do regime inglês e norte americano não é estatisticamente significativa. Nesta dissertação é testada a hipótese de que o grau de risco de mercado da regulação por preço teto é maior do que o da regulação por custo de serviço. Para tanto são usados dados de distribuidoras de gás natural e energia elétrica da Argentina, Brasil, Chile e Estados Unidos, sendo que apenas neste último país se pratica regulação por custo de serviço e nos demais é adotada a regulação por preço teto de inspiração inglesa. Os testes aqui realizados indicam que não há evidências de que o risco de mercado seja maior em países com regulação por preço-teto do que em países com regulação por custo de serviço. Mais do que isso, esta dissertação conclui que o principal determinante do diferencial entre o risco de mercado das concessionárias brasileiras e o risco de mercado das empresas norte americanas comparáveis de distribuição de energia elétrica e de gás natural é a volatilidade do índice IBOVESPA e não o modelo tarifário adotado pelos reguladores. / Brazilian Law establishes that preservation of the economic balance of utilities is an obligation of the Brazilian State. Thus the State must set tariffs that not only cover utilities operational costs but also cover its capital cost, giving a fair return for utilities investors. In tariff setting, Brazilian regulators estimate a weight average cost of capital, of which market risk is one of the components. Brazilian regulators of natural gas and electricity distribution utilities choose an incentive based model of regulation, inspired in the English regulatory model of price cap, or RPI X. This regulatory model is considered riskier than the American model of cost of service, or (fixed) rate of return regulation. Thus, the choice for a price cap model made Brazilian electricity regulator (ANEEL) add a regulatory risk premium in the equity component of WACC to incorporate the risk differential between the English and the American regulatory models. Such regulatory risk premium is validated by economic theory, but is questioned by empiric studies that show that, across many countries, the difference between the risk of English and American models are not statistically significative. This dissertation tests the hypothesis that the market risk of price cap regulation is greater than cost of service regulation. In order to test such hypothesis data from natural gas and electric energy distributors from Argentia, Brazil, Chile and United States is used. Only the latter practices cost of service regulation and all other countries adopt the english inspired price cap regualation. The tests performed indicate that there is no evidence that the market risk is greater in countries adopting price cap regulation than in countries using cost of service regulation. Moreover, this dissertation concludes that the main aspect determining the difference between market.risk of Brazilian utilities providers and American comparable natural gas end electric energy distributors is the volatility of the IBOVESPA índex in spite of the tariff model adopted by the regulators.

Cette thèse vise à développer les opportunités et conséquences d’une demande incertaine pour le réseau de transport de gaz. Ce sujet est décliné en quatre contributions. Les deux premières adoptent une perspective de long terme : on cherche à évaluer l’efficacité de la réglementation du taux rendement lorsqu’il s’agit d’inciter à la réalisation de projets d’infrastructures gazières dans des pays en développement. Une première contribution analytique présente le développement d’une représentation simplifiée du réseau de transport de gaz, de forme Cobb-Douglas. Inspiré par les projets d’acheminement de gaz naturel au Mozambique, celle-ci est ensuite utilisée pour évaluer dans quelles conditions il est possible pour une autorité de régulation de choisir un taux de rendement régulé qui améliore l’efficacité du système dans le cas où la demande réelle serait plus importante que la demande anticipée par la firme régulée. A moyen terme ensuite, l’efficacité face à une demande de plus en plus variable de la structure tarifaire actuelle dite « entrée-sortie » pour l’accès au réseau européen est évaluée. Après avoir démontré l’existence d’inefficacités dans un tel système, celles-ci sont évaluées numériquement. Enfin, la dernière contribution explore la possibilité d’offrir directement la flexibilité du réseau de transport de gaz à ses utilisateurs, dans le cadre d’enchères et du système de prix nodaux. Après avoir souligné la complexité d’un tel mécanisme, les limites à son efficacité sont présentées. A chaque fois, l’analyse repose sur la modélisation simultanée du réseau de transport de gaz (en régime statique ou transitoire) et des mécanismes économiques en jeu. / This PhD thesis is centered on the opportunities and impact of demand uncertainty for the gas transport networks. We study the ability of various market designs to foster an efficient network allocation in liberalized gas markets when demand is variable or uncertain. We introduce and solve operation research models that bind an economic representation of the gas market and its associated regulation, to a technical representation of the gas network. The complex interactions at stake in liberalized gas markets, where shippers trade gas for its economic value and coordinate with system operators that allocate and operate the network, result in MCP or MPEC formulations. While a detailed network representation is necessary to assess the feasibility of gas flows under any market organization, the physics and engineering of gas transport networks adds non-linearities and non-convexities to those already challenging formulations. This thesis is divided in four contributions. We first introduce an approximated network representation of the Cobb-Douglas form and use it to study the impact of long-term demand uncertainty on investment problems in developing markets subject to rate-of-return regulation. We then study the effect of demand variability on daily gas dispatch in the European Entry-Exit system, using a linearized steady-state network representation. Finally, we assess the benefits of introducing flexibility products in gas locational marginal pricing auctions to handle intraday demand uncertainty. This requires the use of a linearized transient network formulation to account for linepack dynamics.

從2000年費率主管機關公布有線電視基本頻道收視費用之每月每戶上限為新臺幣600元，並逐年核定其價格上限。本研究透過超越對數成本函數及需求函數，探討我國有線電視2004年至2008年間經營概況，實證結果得知： 一、我國實施價格上限管制法，管制有線電視基本頻道收視費用之機制是具有效性，且費率主管機關近年來價格管制，是增加消費者剩餘方向前進。 二、在每年所核價格上限下，系統經營者平均每戶約新臺幣107元獲利空間；系統經營者對於將所節省的成本反應至收視費用上，是不積極的。 三、有線電視產業之價格需求彈性為-0.8107，顯示有線電視服務已逐漸成為國人生活上的常用品，符合目前社會經濟現象。 四、有線電視產業之家戶所得需求彈性為0.6951，顯示有線電視服務為正常財。 五、有線電視平均成本隨著訂戶數逐年增加而下降趨勢，顯示有線電視產業具有規模經濟特性，其平均成本下降原因主要來自於固定成本下降。 六、系統經營者之邊際成本隨著年度增加而趨向新臺幣300元至400元間集中或收斂。以組織結構來看，各集團5年平均邊際成本在新臺幣348元至405元間。以整體有線電視來看，5年平均值約為新臺幣367元。 七、以組織結構來看，各集團5年平均成本在新臺幣417元至470元間。以整體有線電視來看，5年平均值約為新臺幣438元。