Societies will always fail to live up to the expectations of citizens one way or another, independent of their economic and political standards. Albert Hirschman proposed that citizens then have the option of expressing their voice for social change. This paper sets up a rational choice model of voice to empirically test whether higher levels of political and economic grievance make it more likely for citizens of a country to have a collective voice. The main result from the probit regression is that an increase in the level of democracy has a negative effect on the probability of voice, all else being equal.

Rational Choice theory includes a broad body of research that attempts to account for how people act in a variety of contexts, including economic, political and even moral situations. By proposing, most generally, that individuals rationally pursue their self-interests regardless of the context, rational choice has had extensive theoretical and empirical success, on the one hand, and has also faced wide criticism when applied in a variety of disciplines, on the other hand. While there is disagreement over what the defining assumptions of rational choice theory are, in this dissertation I focus on three on which there is widespread agreement. These three features of rational choice theory are: its assumption of egoism or self-interest as the central motivation of individuals; its reliance on consequences as part of a comparative decision-making framework; and finally, its focus on the individual and not on groups as the methodological and normative unit of analysis. In correspondence to these three features, my dissertation is divided into three parts and explores the separate topics of (I) egoism and altruism; (II) consequentialism and ethical decision-making; and, (III) individualism and group identity. The dissertation is not an exercise in showing the extensive problems of rational choice theory, although there are many. The dissertation rather engages these three topics with differing results, some of which in fact attempts to revitalize rational choice, or at least features of rational choice. For the part on altruism, my goal is to demonstrate why the central assumption of egoism in rational choice theory is problematic. More broadly, I argue for a different way of defining genuine altruistic motivation. A result of my analysis there is that altruism appears to be more widespread than has been traditionally assumed and is more amenable to empirical examination. For my discussion on consequentialism, my aim is to re-characterize rational choice as a mode of moral decision-making. I argue that the moral agent is one who frequently compares her particular moral ends in a stable fashion and for this reason cost-benefit analysis is a fully moral framework, one that encourages the agent to genuinely care for her ends and values. For the topic of individualism and group identity, my objective is to show how a previously dismissed topic, once unpacked, is fully consistent with rational choice theory and ought to be of interest to the rational choice theorist. I show that if the liberal political theorist, including the rational choice theorist, is to value group identity, the commitment is only limited to valuing a form of group identity--particularized identity--that is individualist in character. / Dissertation

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-166). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Uppsatsen handlar om huruvida sociologin fortfarande är relevant när ekonomivetenskapen breddar sitt studiefält till att inte längre vara självklart ekonomisk utan också ställa frågor som traditionellt legat på sociologins bord. Genom en teoretisk analys av statistiska resultat angående användandet av inköpslista i samband med matvaruinköp undersöker uppsatsen huruvida ekonomins klassiska handlingsteori, rational choice, och dess antaganden om homo economicus är tillräckligt för att förklara de resultat som uppkommer. Jürgen Habermas teori om kommunikativt handlande, och Webers handlingsteori används som exempel på utpräglat sociologiska handlingsteorier vars förklaringsförmåga av de uppkomna resultaten jämförs med rational choice theory. Arbetet visar hur ekonomivetenskapen i sin strävan att bredda sitt studiefält behöver ifrågasätta vissa klassiska antaganden, något som under senare årtionden har inträffat, och att sociologin kan ge förklaringar där klassisk ekonomisk teori faller kort.

This research aims to explore if rational choice theory can be applied to explain money laundering in Hong Kong by drawing on the characteristics of stooges and their motives for colluding in money laundering activities and the effectiveness of imprisonment or other forms of punishments as a means of deterrence. An actor has limited cognitive capacity, makes decisions based on incomplete information and his actions reflect personal optimal beliefs (Piquero and Tibbetts, 2002; Hindmoor, 2006). Findings from the seven in-depth interviews conducted as part of the research and documentary reviews of local court cases support that financial reward is the major reason “why” offenders engage in money laundering activities at both the individual and institutional level. The findings also show that, in addition to ignorant and vulnerable individuals being chosen as stooges, well-regarded individuals and charitable organizations are also possible candidates. The research highlights a luring process experienced by the stooges which supports the psychosocial dynamics of rational choice. The research findings also challenge one of the cornerstones of classical criminology that maximum penalty is an effective means of deterrence. / published_or_final_version / Criminology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

How do legislatures develop or institutionalize? Our knowledge about legislative development is mostly based on studies of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. state legislatures. However, we know next to nothing about legislative development in the emerging democracies of Latin America. Given the need to develop effective democratic institutions in that region, it is critical to understand how institutions change and how legislatures in particular develop. In this study, I develop a model of legislative development that complements rational choice and path dependent explanations of change. In particular, this model provides an answer to the question: how does a legislative organization change into a legislative institution?In particular, I hypothesize that legislative development varies depending on the extent to which electoral and constitutional reforms balance executive-legislative power asymmetries. To test this hypothesis, I compare legislative development in Nicaragua (1979-2005) and Costa Rica (1871-2005). Central to the process of legislative development are: (1) power asymmetries between presidents and assemblies, (2) the rules and organizations that are established to balance these asymmetries, (3) how rules and organizations affect the development of the legislatures from simple, subordinate organizations into complex and autonomous institutions, and (4) how the broader social, political, and economic environment contributes to legislative development.I find that political actors do not act or function within an historical or contextual vacuum, nor does history and context alone determine political choices and outcomes. Instead, political actors function within rational, institutional, and historical boundaries, so an approach that incorporates aspects of both rational choice and path dependent explanations is preferable to existing models of legislative change. Therefore, part of my contribution is (1) to clarify the conceptual confusion surrounding institutions, organizations, and rules, and reduce ambiguity relating to their incorrect use in current scholarship; (2) to conceptualize legislative development as a process - not an outcome - that unfolds in a causally related sequence; and (3) to develop a Bounded Rationality Model that complements rational choice with path dependent explanations of legislative development to explain how organizations become institutions.

No description available.

La théorie moderne de la dissuasion et la rationalité coûts/bénéfices sont étroitement liées l’une à l’autre. En fait, sans cette dernière, la théorie de la dissuasion n’aurait plus de fondements puisqu’elle repose sur la croyance voulant que sous certaines conditions — ayant trait notamment à sa sévérité et à sa certitude — la sanction pénale peut décourager quiconque aurait l’audace de défier la norme pénale. La rationalité coûts/bénéfices constitue donc cette prémisse selon laquelle l’être humain gouvernerait son comportement, incluant le comportement criminel, à partir d’un calcul fait de coûts et de bénéfices. La généralisation de la portée de cette théorie de la décision constitue notre objet de recherche. La question qui se pose est celle de savoir si la théorie elle-même n’aurait pas trop exagéré la portée de cette rationalité coûts-bénéfices. Il ne s’agit pas tant de remettre en question le fait qu’elle puisse opérer ici et là, mais bien de réfléchir aux limites de sa généralisation, de se poser la question de savoir si compte tenu des données dont on dispose il est encore raisonnable, aujourd’hui, d’entretenir cette croyance à l’effet que tous les comportements dits criminels sont opérés dans le cadre de cette rationalité coûts/bénéfices. C’est la question que nous posons dans cette recherche exploratoire dont l’objectif est de cerner une rationalité inédite développée théoriquement par Pires (2002) et vérifiée empiriquement par Dubé (2012) : la rationalité du risque. Dans cette recherche, ces dernières considérations nous amènent à traiter les postulats de la rationalité coûts/bénéfices comme des hypothèses et non comme des faits. Cette posture épistémologique se situe en dehors du positivisme et réintroduit le doute dans l’observation. Ce doute est alors confronté à une empirie particulière : il ne s’agit plus de tester la sévérité ou la certitude des peines telles que les conçoivent le droit criminel, mais bien de comprendre comment, dans la commission de leurs infractions, les individus se les représentent, comment ils les perçoivent, et quel poids leur attribuent-ils dans la décision de commettre ou de commettre à nouveau une infraction. Dans cette perspective qui s’inspire directement des approches phénoménologiques, la dissuasion est ainsi conçue comme un phénomène d’abord et avant tout subjectif. Au plan méthodologique, nous avons cherché à saisir ces « réalités subjectives » à partir d’entretiens qualitatifs semi-dirigés réalisés auprès d’individus ayant commis des crimes graves. Dans ces entretiens, plusieurs postulats de la théorie de la dissuasion sont ébranlés sous le poids d’une phénoménologie faisant ressortir les traits et fondements de la rationalité du risque, rationalité qui réduit la portée de la rationalité coûts/bénéfices tout en frappant d’impertinence le réductionnisme qui associe à la qualité de la peine la qualité de l’effet dissuasif. À partir de nos observations empiriques, nous avons élaboré quatre (4) idéaux-types de trajectoires décisionnelles : pris dans leur ensemble, ceux-ci suggèrent que l’effet dissuasif de la sanction pénale est loin d’être aussi déterminant que nous a habitués à le croire le droit criminel moderne. Les résultats de notre recherche semblent en effet indiquer que dans bien des cas, la menace de la conséquence pénale se retrouve neutralisée par la rationalité du risque qui intervient dans l’esprit de l’individu pour reconvertir la « certitude » du coût en incertitude, en probabilité. Le coût n’est alors plus vécu comme un coût, mais bien comme un risque, comme une possibilité parmi d’autres et que l’individu a l’impression de pouvoir contrôler. La dissuasion générale se retrouve ainsi fragilisée. Par ailleurs, face à la condamnation, lorsque l’individu l’associe à l’échec du passage à l’acte, la rationalité du risque intervient encore pour remettre en question non pas tant, dans l’absolu, la décision de commettre le crime, mais bien la manière de le commettre. L’échec est alors associé soit à une mauvaise décision (qui n’est pas celle de commettre le crime), soit au fruit du hasard contre lequel on ne pouvait rien. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, la dissuasion spécifique se retrouve ainsi fragilisée.

In 2002, Reginald Bibby surprisingly asserted that a renaissance of religion is, or soon will be taking place in Canada. However, the assertion clashes with the dominant belief based largely on Bibby’s accumulated data about Canadians’ religious beliefs and practices, that Canada is becoming an increasingly secularized society. Based on forty-two in-depth interviews, this dissertation tests the “renaissance thesis” and improves our grasp of how Canadians subjectively understand their religious involvements by comparing the views of active religious affiliates (those who identify with a religious group and attend religious services nearly every week) and marginal religious affiliates (those who identify with a religious group and attend religious services primarily on Christmas or Easter, or for rites of passage such as weddings and funerals). What explains their higher and lower levels of religious involvement, what is the likelihood that marginal affiliates could eventually become active affiliates, and how does this understanding help us to assess the degree of religiosity or secularity in Canada? I argue that active and marginal affiliates are distinct mainly because of their different experiences with the supernatural or their local congregation, and the social influences that either encourage or discourage involvement in a religious group. These conclusions emerge from a close examination and testing of fundamental principles in Rational Choice Theory, a theory currently popular in the sociology of religion and in Bibby’s ongoing analysis of religion in Canada. Contrary to Bibby’s prediction, there is little reason to believe that marginal affiliates will eventually become active affiliates, regardless of changes to the supply of religion in Canada. In general, marginal affiliates appear content with their current levels of religiosity. As a result, I think it is likely that we will witness continued secularization at the individual level in Canada, which if proven correct, could strain Canada’s civic fabric in the future.

Since its reorganization in the early 1990s, the English School of international relations has emerged as a popular theoretical lens through which to examine global events. Those that use the international society approach promote it as a middle-way of theorizing due to its supposed ability to incorporate features from both systemic and domestic perspectives. A noticeable trend in the School since the end of the Cold War has been its interest with domestic and critical theory concerns, often focusing on individual, discursive or emancipatory issues. As a result, the English School has been able to accommodate the growing trends in international theory more generally, with the decline of problem-solving theory and the rise of critical projects. While the School and its practitioners may, for the most part, see value in discussing how domestic or critical variables impact the society of states, such examinations tend to neglect or overlook the systemic level of analysis. This project takes exception to the decline of the English Schools problem-solving foundations and argues that the School must place more emphasis on the systemic level of analysis if it hopes to be relevant in international theory debates. To this end, the criticisms of American scholars regarding the Schools lack of methodological rigour and explanatory power are addressed by demonstrating the added value to the international society approach if the constraints of the international system are included in theoretical explanations. In order to demonstrate how the systemic level alters English School analyses, two areas of popular examination within the School are explored, namely the role of international institutions and the debate over humanitarian intervention. Ultimately, the contention of this work is that English School scholars can greatly benefit from including systems-level thinking because of what it adds to the Schools explanatory power and also its ability to provide methodological rigour. In doing so, it is more likely the English School can penetrate the mainstream of international theory in the future.