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Interpretationism about the mind claims that we can gain a philosophical understanding of the nature of thought by considering how we interpret the thoughts of others. My thesis aims to develop a version of this theory which is plausible in the sense that: (1) it has the potential to retain certain advantages attaching to theories of mind which focus on the behaviour, rather than the internal make-up of candidate thinkers; (2) it can fend off certain apparent counterexamples. The thesis is split into four parts. Part I explains why one might want to answer ‘No’ to the question ‘Are there particular sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in order to count as a thinker?’ It then introduces interpretationism as a position which will allow us to answer ‘No’ to this question. My version of interpretationism claims that a being has a thought iff it is interpretable as having that thought, and that all thinkers are rational. Both claims face several apparently obvious counter-examples. Parts II and III address these counterexamples by developing the crucial notions of interpretability and rationality. Part II starts by considering the problem of seemingly hidden thoughts which occur during dreams, and uses this to develop an account according to which a subject is interpretable as having a thought if either a) there is sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the subject’s actual situation and actions, or b) there would be sufficient evidence in at least one suitable counterfactual situation. I consider and reject an objection that this understanding of interpretability is incompatible with a commitment to the holism of interpretation, and then show how it can be used to address further proposed counter-examples, such as cases involving deception or paralysed thinkers. However, I agree with Block (1981) and Peacocke (1983) that their string-searching machine and Martian marionette must be counted as thinkers by this account. I argue that these are not counterexamples to the theory, however, because the intuitions against counting such beings as thinkers can be discredited. Part III uses considerations about human limitations and propensities towards reasoning errors to argue that the interpretationist cannot adopt a deontological understanding of rationality that seems prevalent in the literature, nor a purely consequentialist account of rationality. I explain how Cherniak’s (1986) conception of minimal rationality may be adapted for the interpretationist’s purposes. I then consider and reject the idea that the emphasis on the rationality of thinkers will leave us unable to fit paradigmatically non-rational thoughts and thought processes (dream thoughts, imaginings and association) into our account. Part IV shows why interpretationism so developed is well placed to retain the advantages of a theory of mind which focuses on behaviour, and outlines potential avenues for further research.

The number self-identified non-theists is on the rise in the United States. With a recent influx of religious skepticism in various forms of media, the existence of this ideological minority is becoming more salient. This growing population remains understudied in the social sciences. The present survey research attempts to improve this deficit by examining prejudice toward atheists among college students and exploring possible correlates and predictors, including irrational beliefs, self-esteem, and religiosity. More than 80% of respondents exhibited some form of bias against atheists, with religiosity emerging as a viable predictor. This study found a significant correlation between prejudice scores and irrational beliefs. This significance does not hold true, however, for all demographic groups.

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This dissertation consists of three research papers on cheap talk game and satisficing behaviour. The first chapter examines the potential for communication via cheap talk between an expert and a decision maker whose type (preferences) is uncertain. The expert privately observes states for each type of the decision maker and wants to persuade the decision maker to choose an action in his favour by informing her of the states. The decision maker privately observes her type and chooses an action. An optimal action for the decision maker depends upon both her type and type-specific states. In equilibrium the expert can always inform the decision maker in the form of comparative statements and the decision maker also can partially reveal her type to the expert or public. The second and third chapters build a dynamic model of satisficing behaviour in which an agent’s “expected” payoff is explicitly introduced, where this expectation is adaptively formed. If the agent receives a payoff above her satisficing level she continues with the current action, updating her valuation of the action. If she receives a payoff below her satisficing level and her valuation falls below her satisficing level she updates both her action and satisficing level. In the second chapter, we find that in the long run, all players satisfice. In individual decision problems, satisficing behaviour results in cautious, maximin choice and in normal form games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, they in the long run play either cooperative or defective outcomes conditional on past plays. In coordination games like the Battle of the Sexes, Choosing Sides and Common Interest, they in the long run coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes. In the third chapter, we find that satisficing players in the long run play subgame dominant paths, which is a refinement of subgame perfection, and identify conditions with which they ‘always cooperate’ or ‘fairly coordinate’ in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes games, respectively, and truthfully communicate in sender-receiver games. Proofs and simulations are provided in appendices.

This is a theoretical and empirical study of leadership. Although sociologists have contributed important theories and research on authority and power, there is not yet a developed leadership theory in sociology. On the other hand, leadership studies in other disciplines are not satisfying, and they will not be satisfying in the foreseeable future if they adhere to their basic theoretical orientations, e.g. focusing on leadership personal traits and characteristics. I elaborate the important sociological theories that can be used in the study of leadership. I also intend to link sociological theories of leadership to social background analysis. The social backgrounds considered are family status, education, religion, military service, and more. Particular attention is paid to military background and its impact on business, because military has always been such an important social phenomenon but the theories of it have been controversial.The study of leadership inevitably involves both individuals and their groups. With evidence obtained from different data sources on leaders and on business organizations, I studied the impact of military social background of business leaders. This research unpacks the rise of business leaders with military experience in the late 20th century, using a database on the 20th century Great American Business Leaders. This research also measures the organizational performance of these leaders, incorporating information from Standard & Poor's Compustat database. Statistical techniques like logistic regressions and hierarchical linear models are used in the analysis to test various effects on personal and organizational performance. I found that military experience does not help a business leader in aspects like time taken to become a CEO and time to be a CEO, but it does help organizational performance as measured by profitability. Both rank and number of years in the military contribute to profitability. I also found that ex-military business leaders differ from non-military business leaders in certain organizational behaviors, e.g. they are less likely to downsize the organizations.The theory of institutional logics and social background analysis were combined in this study. I also attempted to link institutional logics with theories of rationality. From the idea of institutional leadership and inter-institutional relationship, I suggested a theory of extended rationality.

We know things about the world in spite of our cognitive limitations and imperfections. Occasions of stress impact memory retrieval, resources for attention can be depleted by non-epistemic factors, and our visual system has limited resolution and discriminatory ability. Yet we know many propositions, ranging from the mundane to the arcane, and we often are able to know that we know these things. In this dissertation I explore the relationship between our cognitive limitations and the limits to what we know, and what we know that we know. I begin by considering a simple model of knowledge. Because it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to have intuitions about many higher-order or iterative knowledge claims ("I know that you know that she knows that I know that ..."), a modeling approach can help clarify and explain how various cognitive limitations impact knowledge and higher-order knowledge. In Chapter 2 I discuss the epistemic requirements for the rational coordination of our actions. While it may seem that coordination is rational only if each coordinating member has what may be called "common knowledge" of some relevant proposition, the model of knowledge I employ helps show the informational complexity of common knowledge. I argue that common knowledge is unattainable. In Chapter 3 I discuss epistemic closure. Perfectly ideal agents may know every deductive consequence of what they know, but if the aim is to understand how deduction extends human knowledge then it is necessary to model our cognitive access to information. In Chapter 4 I turn to the issue of higher-order or iterative knowledge. I argue that memory limitations and various information processing errors all result in failures of higher-order knowledge. The argument I give does not require epistemic closure or a principle of self-knowledge. I conclude, in Chapter 5, by discussing interpretive issues for models of knowledge and I discuss our awareness of what we know and what we do not know.

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In this paper, a view of non-compliance in practical healthcare is provided that identifies certain non-compliant behaviours as rational. This view of rational non-compliance is used to update a current form of doctor patient relationships with the aim of reducing non-compliance. In addition to reforming one standard doctor patient relationship model, the normative implications of understanding non-compliance as a rational form of human behaviour are described.