<p>An empirical study of how Malaysian pluralism is understood through Islam Hadhari, Article 11 and the Inter-faith Commission against the backdrop of current Malaysian political and social history, coupled with a theoretical analysis through John Rawls' Political Liberalism, with particular emphasis on the idea of Overlapping Consensus.</p><p>The thesis is an attempt at applying Rawls' theory on the practical case of Malaysia, as a plural society, while at the same time using the practical case of Malaysia to highlight parts of Rawls' own theory.</p>

<p>The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory.</p><p>Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy.</p><p>The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances.</p><p>Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.</p>

An empirical study of how Malaysian pluralism is understood through Islam Hadhari, Article 11 and the Inter-faith Commission against the backdrop of current Malaysian political and social history, coupled with a theoretical analysis through John Rawls' Political Liberalism, with particular emphasis on the idea of Overlapping Consensus. The thesis is an attempt at applying Rawls' theory on the practical case of Malaysia, as a plural society, while at the same time using the practical case of Malaysia to highlight parts of Rawls' own theory.

Cette thèse concerne la pensée de trois auteurs qui s’interrogent quant à la manière dont les philosophes politiques devraient procéder pour en arriver à comprendre et à juger les phénomènes politiques de manière adéquate : Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre Manent. Plus spécifiquement, elle se propose d’étudier les critiques que ces derniers dirigent à l’endroit de l’approche dominante en philosophie politique contemporaine et qui est à leur avis le mieux exemplifiée par l’œuvre de John Rawls. Aux yeux de ces derniers, cette approche, qui consiste essentiellement à s’engager dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature de la justice définie comme l’ensemble des droits politiques dont les citoyens devraient légitimement pouvoir jouir, souffre d’un important manque de réalisme, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reflète très peu la délibération dans laquelle les citoyens et les hommes politiques doivent concrètement s’engager pour faire face aux problèmes politiques réels. Dans un premier temps, l’auteur expose les objections que Geuss, Mouffe et Manent formulent contre la philosophie rawlsienne et il présente les fondements de la pensée de ces trois auteurs. Il s’efforce ensuite de vérifier si leur critique du normativisme abstrait en philosophie politique nous permet toujours de penser un certain fondement aux jugements politiques.

The liberal tradition has borne great fruits since the dawn of the modern era by emphasizing the value of equality and personal liberty, and by developing a theory of rights. Despite its incredible success, many authors have been pointing to fissures in the liberal structure, including practical and theoretical problems with state neutrality, with the state’s stance vis-à-vis different cultures, and with liberalism’s purported radical individualism. It is my belief that the gains of liberalism can be reconciled within a new theory that better answers to such critiques. Citizenship Beyond Liberal Neutrality begins with an analysis of contemporary debate between liberalism and its critics. This leads to a discussion of the state’s relationship toward cultural identities, and to a discussion of the meaning of citizenship within a liberal-democratic state. What we need, I argue, is a civic identity that is both capable of judging cultural practices, and capacious enough for a citizenry characterized by reasonable pluralism. This common identity, moreover, provides a locus for attachment that is often found wanting in contemporary liberal theory. I draw on relevant insights from virtue theories, constitutional patriotism, and an ‘analogical’ understanding of public reason to inform a new, liberal-like conception of citizenship. In order to exemplify this conception, and to bolster the case for it, I consider how such a philosophy could play out with respect to two public policy areas that are central to citizenship, namely education and immigration. Distilled to its simplest, I argue for a theory of citizenship that admits a conception of the good, that can promote virtue while respecting autonomy, and that can provide a basis for civic unity.

Cette thèse concerne la pensée de trois auteurs qui s’interrogent quant à la manière dont les philosophes politiques devraient procéder pour en arriver à comprendre et à juger les phénomènes politiques de manière adéquate : Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre Manent. Plus spécifiquement, elle se propose d’étudier les critiques que ces derniers dirigent à l’endroit de l’approche dominante en philosophie politique contemporaine et qui est à leur avis le mieux exemplifiée par l’œuvre de John Rawls. Aux yeux de ces derniers, cette approche, qui consiste essentiellement à s’engager dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature de la justice définie comme l’ensemble des droits politiques dont les citoyens devraient légitimement pouvoir jouir, souffre d’un important manque de réalisme, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reflète très peu la délibération dans laquelle les citoyens et les hommes politiques doivent concrètement s’engager pour faire face aux problèmes politiques réels. Dans un premier temps, l’auteur expose les objections que Geuss, Mouffe et Manent formulent contre la philosophie rawlsienne et il présente les fondements de la pensée de ces trois auteurs. Il s’efforce ensuite de vérifier si leur critique du normativisme abstrait en philosophie politique nous permet toujours de penser un certain fondement aux jugements politiques.

This thesis investigates if Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks constitute a valid form ofcivil disobedience online. For this purpose a multi-dimensional framework is established,drawing on Brownlee’s paradigm case and classical theory of civil disobedience. Threedifferent examples of DDoS attacks are then examined using this framework - the attacksfrom the Electronic Disturbance Theater in support of the Zapatista movement;Anonymous’ Operation Payback; Electrohippies’ attack against the World TradeOrganization. Following the framework, none of these DDoS attacks are able to constitute acivilly disobedient act online. The thesis then goes on and identifies four key issues, drawingon the results from the examples: The loss of 'individual presence', no inimitable feature ofDDoS attacks, impeding free speech and the danger of western imperialism. It concludes thatDDoS attacks cannot and should not be seen as a form of civil disobedience online. Thethesis further proposes that online actions, in order to be seen as civilly disobedient actsonline, need two additional features: An 'individual presence' of the protesters online tocompensate for the remoteness of cyberspace and an inimitable feature in order to berecognizable by society. Further research should investigate with this extended framework ifthere are valid forms of civil disobedience online.

This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.” In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right. In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.

This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.” In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right. In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.

This thesis aims to contribute to Norman Daniels&#039 / expansion of Rawls&#039 / theory of Justice as Fairness to health care by considering individual responsibility in maintaining and restoring health. The thesis also considers transplantation as a special case and develops a Rawlsian model for transplantation.