本文以2003到2006年美國上市之不動產投資信託（REITs）的資產稅賦遞延交換做研究，並用資產出售交易作為比較，觀察稅賦遞延交換對股票報酬和股利的影響，研究結果發現稅賦遞延交換對於股票報酬有負的宣告效果，然而出售資產的交易有正的且顯著的宣告效果，由於美國REITs基於稅法規定，作為免稅體，每年要以股利的形式分配百分之九十的盈餘給股東，稅賦遞延交換並不能像資產出售交易一樣帶來現金流入，因此對於未來股東的股利所得有所影響，股東對於股票報酬沒有正向的反應，但是股東會考慮稅賦遞延交換會帶來資產重配置的效率，再加上REITs通常會支付比規定還要多的股利，因此稅賦遞延交換的對於股票報酬的負影響會因此而減弱，進一步針對交易方式還有REITs股利分配進行研究，研究的結果支持稅賦遞延交換後的股利比起直接出售交易後所發放的股利還要少。本文除了研究股東對於交易宣告的反應之外，也綜觀不同資產交易方式的現金流量和REITs股利的關連性，藉此瞭解影響REITs選擇交易方式的內涵因素，以及對股票報酬和股利的影響。 / This research examines the tax deferred exchanges made by public U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) over 2003-2006 as well as the transactions of sell-off. The purpose of this study attempts to explore the effects of tax deferred exchange on stock returns and dividend distribution. Result of this study shows that announcement effect of tax deferred exchange is negative in stock value. On the contrary, the relationship between sell-offs and stock value is significantly positive. The reason to explain the difference on announcement effect between two types of property transaction is the specific taxable earning distribution restriction on REITs. U.S REITs have to pay out 90 % of taxable earnings in the form of dividends to their shareholders to exempt from tax. As a result, tax deferred exchange doesn’t bring cash inflow contributing to dividend increase and then shareholders react a lower stock return on tax deferred exchange than on sell-offs. However, the negative effect is weakened by the efficiency of asset reallocation and the regular dividend distribution over tax law restriction. In the analysis of dividend payment, the result of dividend examination supports the hypothesis that tax deferred exchange without cash inflow make dividend fewer than sell-offs. This study may be of importance in explaining the reaction of shareholders on tax deferred exchange of REITs’ property, as well as in providing shareholders with a better understanding of the relationship between cash flow and dividend distribution in order to clarify the cause that affect REITs to utilize different types of transaction and the factors that affect stock return and dividend.

台灣不動產投資信託（T-REITs）自2005年發行至今已逾六年，然其市場表現仍不如發行之初所預期。過去國內已有許多研究針對T-REITs市場發展進行探討，然而目前就T-REITs與直接不動產投資市場價格表現間之相關研究尚付之闕如。有鑑於此，本研究藉由共整合與Granger因果關係檢定，檢視REITs與直接不動產市場間之關聯性，了解台灣與美國之REITs市場表現差異及其影響因素，進而作為改進T-REITs運作機制或架構之參考依據。 實證結果發現，美國之REITs與直接不動產市場之間存在共整合關係。此結果表示，長期而言，這兩者可能具有相似之風險分散效益。此外，透過Granger因果關係檢定發現REITs領先於直接不動產，乃因前者市場較具效率。另一方面，台灣之REITs與直接不動產市場之間則不具有共整合以及領先或落後關係，然直接不動產當期價格仍會受到本身與REITs之前期價格影響。 本研究進一步分析台、美兩國實證結果之差異原因如下：資料的樣本期間、REITs市場規模、存在於T-REITs市場之集中性風險以及潛在的代理問題。其中，針對T-REITs潛在代理問題，本研究藉由分析股票與T-REIT報酬率之波動性，發現T-REIT之不動產管理機構若與母集團相關者，則其市場表現較差。因此，我們得出T-REITs市場發展主要是受限於代理問題之結論。本研究成果不僅有助於改善T-REITs市場效率，亦可提供學術與實務之參考。 / The mechanism of Real Estate Investment Trusts in Taiwan (or T-REITs) was launched in 2005, however, T-REITs market did not perform as expected. What caused the limited development of T-REITs market? Current literature on the performance between T-REITs and direct real estate investment is limited. Through the cointegration and Granger causality tests, the purpose of this study is hence to explore the short-term and long-term dynamics between REITs and direct real estate markets in the U.S. and Taiwan, respectively. This study presents evidence of the cointegration relationship between REITs and direct real estate in the U.S. It implies that the diversification properties of these two assets are likely to be similar over the long horizon. According to the Granger causality test, REITs leads direct real estate due to the market information efficiency. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies. On the other hand, we find no cointegration and lead-lag relation between T-REITs and commercial real estate. Moreover, the current commercial transaction price is affected by both its and T-REIT previous price. By comparing the difference between the results of these two countries, there are several possible explanations for the different results between the U.S. and Taiwan, including difference in sample period, market capitalization, concentrated risk, and most importantly, the potential agency problem existing in T-REITs market. Finally, the underperformance of parent-related management T-REIT is verified through the volatilities of stock and T-REIT returns. Therefore, we conclude that the limited development of T-REITs is caused by the agency problem in REITs market. Results of this study may provide T-REITs market for improving its efficiency, as well as for the reference for both academics and real practices.