Inaug.-Diss.--Würzburg. / Lebenslauf.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 125-129).

Robert Brandom has provided what is probably one of the best worked out accounts of how the meanings of linguistic expressions are determined by how they are used—in particular, used in inferences. There are three different types of inferential relations in terms of which Brandom gives his account: commitment-preserving, entitlement-preserving, and incompatibility relations. Brandom also recognizes that most of the reasoning we engage in is defeasible (or deductively inconclusive). For example, the inference from ‘Tweety is a bird’ to ‘Tweety can fly’ is defeasible, because it can be defeated if there is stronger overriding reason to deny that ‘Tweety can fly’—such as Tweety’s being a penguin. Surprisingly, Brandom’s three types of inferential relations are inadequate for describing defeasible inference. In my dissertation I explain how the problem arises—it’s actually two problems—and I propose a solution that is consistent with Brandom’s overall approach. The first problem is that although Brandom's account does explain how someone can lose entitlement to a claim by committing themselves to some other claim, as in the Tweety example, it doesn’t allow subsequent recovery of entitlement to that claim by the addition of yet further information—say, that Tweety is a penguin with a jetpack. Once defeated (by some information), an inference stays defeated, on Brandom's account. The second problem is that of interpretation: when should we interpret someone as committed to the propriety of an inference that is defeasible? Brandom's account of what it is to endorse an inferential relation has no room for the important distinction between endorsing an inference in a context in which it happens to be defeated, and not endorsing it at all. In the latter portion of this dissertation I propose various modifications to Brandom’s account that will allow it overcome these problems. I solve the first problem by modifying Brandom’s account of how someone is obliged to update their beliefs in light of the inferential relations they endorse. I solve the second problem by modifying Brandom’s account of when we can appropriately interpret someone as endorsing particular inferential relations.

La thèse propose une nouvelle théorie de l’argumentation – bidimensionnelle – reposant sur deux paramètres :la force et l’orientation. Quatre types de marqueurs sont identifiés, articulés autour de ces deux paramètres. <p>Le chapitre 1 porte sur le réductionnisme topique :la théorie selon laquelle tous les arguments sont défaisables, c’est-à-dire réfutables.<p>Le chapitre 2 retrace l’histoire du réductionnisme logique :la théorie selon laquelle tous les arguments valides sont indéfaisables. L’argument étudié est la définition.<p>Le chapitre 3 présente la théorie bidimensionnelle, qui explique à la fois les arguments défaisables et indéfaisables.<p>Les chapitre 3 et 4 sont une application de la théorie bidimensionnelle de l’argumentation.<p>Le chapitre 4 étudie l’argument appelé présomption. <p>Le chapitre 5 offre un traitement nouveau de l’argument a fortiori.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis deals with the bases of Ethics in comparison with the practice of Ethics in the Slovak and the Czech Republic. The first part describes and discusses the philosophical, pedagogical and psychological bases of teaching subject called Ethics. It presents a chronological overview of ethical theories and their comparison of the base of morality. It deals with the philosophy of education and dialogue as the principles of teaching. It represents Piaget's theory of moral development of the child, states stages of moral reasoning by Kohlberg and characterizes Frankl's logotherapy. The second part analyzes and compares the approaches to Ethics in primary and secondary education in the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic due to the bases of ethics set out in the first part. It represents the Slovak koncept of Olivar's prosocial education, the activities of Ethical Forum Czech Republic and the programme Philosophy for children.