In this work I want to assess the role of reason in human existence. I think, the best way to explore what it is possible for philosophers to do requires an assessment of "reason". This question is central today with the failure of foundationalist epistemology, which I seek to replace with an existential epistemology . The work falls into three sections, where the final section is a synopsis of the first two sections in relation to my original question. The first section is dedicated to examining the views of Hilary Putnam, and the second section is dedicated to an historical exploration of the concept "reason". In the first section, on Putnam, I elucidate the problems he sees with metaphysical realism ( e.g. conceptual relativity, and scientific imperialism). In order to avoid idealism, pace the failure of metaphysical realism and foundationalist epistemology, Putnam proposes a new theory of knowledge, internal realism. Here, Putnam, while recognizing that all knowledge rest$ on human interests, values, and hence, a given perspective, argues that how we choose to see the world, our values, is further grounded in our conception of human flourishing the good. Our conception of the good , in turn, is ground in a presupposed conception of human nature, such that there are parameters which define, stipulate, that some interests, values, are better than others. In short, although there is admitted to be no one canon of rationality, method, or algorithm which yields "knowledge", Putnam thinks truth, what is rationally acceptable , is rooted in what it means to be a human being (under ideal epistemic conditions ). Putnam concludes, then, that (1) we can have truth from a human point of view that pays heed to our experience in the world, and (2) that we should affirm a plurality of methods which yield a pluralistic knowledge (psychological, sociological, ethical, chemical, and so forth.) I utilize both Gadamer and Aquinas to further exemplify Putnam's call for a plurality of methods, different conceptions of rational acceptability, for different areas of inquiry. In my second section I set about to characterize "reason". The ancient and pre-modern conceptions of reason has little to do with our modern, instrumental conception, since, it contains a strong intuitive/experiential notion, such that truth, the Jivine, could just be grasped by what was taken to be divine in Man, reason. The modern and pre-modern conception of reason is shown to be an technological or procedural rationality. With the loss of the experiential element, instrumental reason legitimates different bodies of knowledge, yet is unable to assess one body of knowledge as superior to another. Instrumental reason, concurrently, I argue, gives birth to the intractable problems of foundationalist epistemology, whose failure facilitates relativism/idealism. I show there has been a resistance to instrumental reason by certain thinkers, like m¥self, who hold that instrumental reason can never capture t"ruth, something always escapee (e.g. Heidegger, Jaspers, Zamyatin, Bergson, and Tolstoy). I have two conclusions. First, lnstrumental reason was born when the experiential/intuitive aspect of reason was severed. Further, the adoption of an instrumental conception of reason subverted the enlightenment project, by leading to scepticism, via foundationalist epistemology. Secondly, I view philosophical theories as mere symbols which always indicate something beyond themselves, by pointing to truth, the Jivine or Sacred round. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Key to designing instruction for situated learning is ensuring the ability of learners to transfer acquired knowledge to a variety of situations. Common to models of instruction and frameworks for situated learning is the importance of including activities for promoting reflection within the design of the learning environment. However, these models currently do not include detailed support for reflective practice that will help instructional designers prepare learners to meet the demands of situated learning. One method to meet the demand of the ill-structured nature of situated learning and provide adaptability for instructional design is through reflection-in-action and mindfulness. The purpose of this study was to apply design and development research methodologies to develop a conceptual model of reflection that incorporates mindfulness to enhance reflection-in-action within a situated learning environment. This model illustrates the relationship of incorporating mindfulness to help learners increase and direct attention to the present moment in order to improve performance through reflection-in-action. Based on the results of the study, mindfulness and reflection strategies are incorporated before, during, and after the learning experience to enhance reflection-in-action. / Ph. D.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis argues for the idea that there are deep interconnections between the notions of ontology and reflexivity. It starts from the idea that ontological claims are cognitionally prior to epistemological and methodological accounts. It is argued that ontology is of particular importance to social science because the boundary between the substantive and the ontological is less clear than in natural science. Furthermore, because social science is located within its object, society, it is argued that self-referential questions about the epistemic status of every social ontology emerge. In the face of these self-referential questions concerning ontological coherence, the ‘epistemic criterion of reflexivity’ is proposed in this thesis. Meeting this criterion is required to deal successfully with the self-referential problem emerging from the fact that the knowing subject is part of her object. I argue that it is only by conceptualizing agents as self-reflective knowing subjects that an ontology has a chance of satisfying the criterion of epistemic reflexivity which is proposed by this thesis. In Chapters 1 to 3, the works of Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu, Jügen Habermas, Alvin Gouldner and Andrew Sayer, as well as of several social constructionists and ethnomethodologists are examined, considering their contribution to the notions of ontology and epistemic reflexivity. It is argued that proponents of both relativistic and deterministic social theories cannot satisfy the criterion of epistemic reflexivity because they cannot coherently account for their knowledge-claims using their own ontologies. I thus argue that it is not enough for a social theory to provide an account of self-reflection – for the wider ontology in which it is situated may itself deny the possibility of such a self-reflective activity. It is in this sense that I argue for the need for an improved conceptualization of self-reflection in which agents are conceptualized as having the capacity of self-objectivation within context. It is through having such a presupposition that ontologies can fulfill the epistemic criterion of reflexivity proposed. The need for such a conceptualization of self-reflection leads me to explore two relevant approaches in Chapters 4 and 5, those of Archer and Castoriadis. I begin by looking at Margaret Archer’s account of the ‘internal conversation’. However, Archer’s internal dialogue will be shown problematic in the sense that it results in various contradictory claims. The thesis then considers Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion of self-reflective imagination which partially meets the epistemic criterion of reflexivity proposed in this thesis.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

by Wun Kwan Tai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-103). / Abstract and questionnaire also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.I / Dedication --- p.III / Acknowledgements --- p.IV / Table of Contents --- p.V / List of Table --- p.IX / Chapter Page / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Background of the study --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Purpose and significance of the study --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research questions --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- Review of relevant literature --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- Conceptualization of reflection --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Reflection as reflective thinking --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1.1.1 --- Reflection with attitude of open-mindedness --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1.1.2 --- Reflection with attitude of whole-heartedness --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1.1.3 --- Reflection with attitude of responsibility --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Reflection as reflective practice --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Process of reflection --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.3.1 --- Reflection occurred in doubt and perplexity --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.3.2 --- Reflection occurred in stepping back to analyze one's experience --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.3.3 --- Reflection occurred in reconstructing one's experience through problem setting and problem solving --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- What constitutes the evidence of reflections --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.4.1 --- Evidence found in teachers' core values --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.4.2 --- Evidence found in teachers' personal experience --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1.4.3 --- Evidence found in teachers' transmitted knowledge --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Levels of reflection --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Technical reflection --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Critical reflection --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Reflection-on-action --- p.18 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Reflection-in-action --- p.20 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- Framework on levels of reflection --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3 --- Writing as an instrument in finding evidence of reflection --- p.23 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Writing as an instrument in researches on reflection --- p.23 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Selection of question for reflective writing --- p.27 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- Reflective-writing on controversial educational issues --- p.27 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- Reflective writing on learning and teaching experiences --- p.29 / Chapter 2.3.2.3 --- Reflective writing on planning --- p.29 / Chapter 2.4 --- Summary --- p.30 / Chapter 3. --- Research method --- p.31 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.31 / Chapter 3.2 --- Participants --- p.31 / Chapter 3.3 --- Instruments 226}0ؤ reflective writing tasks --- p.31 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Validity of the reflective writing tasks --- p.32 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Selection of questions for reflective writing --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3.2.1 --- Controversial educational issues --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3.2.2 --- Learning and teaching experiences --- p.36 / Chapter 3.3.2.3 --- Planning --- p.37 / Chapter 3.4 --- Pilot study --- p.39 / Chapter 3.5 --- Procedures --- p.39 / Chapter 3.6 --- Data analysis --- p.40 / Chapter 3.6.1 --- Specific features for each level of reflection --- p.40 / Chapter 3.6.1.1 --- Level one of reflection (Technical reflection) --- p.40 / Chapter 3.6.1.2 --- Level two of reflection (Descriptive reflection) --- p.41 / Chapter 3.6.1.3 --- Level three of reflection (Dialogic reflection) --- p.41 / Chapter 3.6.1.4 --- Level four of reflection (Critical reflection) --- p.41 / Chapter 3.6.2 --- Process of data coding --- p.42 / Chapter 3.6.3 --- General contents of the reflective writings --- p.42 / Chapter 3.6.4 --- Searching of evidence for different levels of reflection in reflective writings --- p.43 / Chapter 3.7 --- Summary --- p.44 / Chapter 4. --- Results --- p.45 / Chapter 4.1 --- General findings --- p.45 / Chapter 4.2 --- General contents for reflective writings --- p.48 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- General contents in answering questions on controversial educational issues --- p.48 / Chapter 4.2.1.1 --- General contents on question one --- p.49 / Chapter 4.2.1.2 --- General contents on question two --- p.51 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- General contents in answering questions on learning and teaching experiences --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2.2.1 --- General contents on question three --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2.2.2 --- General contents on question four --- p.55 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- General contents in answering questions on planning --- p.57 / Chapter 4.2.3.1 --- General contents on question five --- p.57 / Chapter 4.2.3.2 --- General contents on question six --- p.58 / Chapter 4.3 --- Evidence for different levels of reflection found in reflective writings --- p.60 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Level one (Technical reflection) --- p.60 / Chapter 4.3.1.1 --- Reflective writings on controversial educational issues --- p.60 / Chapter 4.3.1.2 --- Reflective writings on learning and teaching experiences --- p.61 / Chapter 4.3.1.3 --- Reflective writings on planning --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Level two (Descriptive reflection) --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3.2.1 --- Reflective writings on controversial educational issues --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3.2.2 --- Reflective writings on learning and teaching experiences --- p.67 / Chapter 4.3.2.3 --- Reflective writings on planning --- p.69 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Level three (Dialogic reflection) --- p.71 / Chapter 4.3.3.1 --- Reflective writings on controversial educational issues --- p.71 / Chapter 4.3.3.2 --- Reflective writings on learning and teaching experiences --- p.73 / Chapter 4.3.3.3 --- Reflective writings on planning --- p.75 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Level four (Critical reflection) --- p.77 / Chapter 4.4 --- Summary --- p.78 / Chapter 5. --- Discussion --- p.79 / Chapter 5.1 --- Research question one --- p.79 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Demonstration of evidence of reflection in response to controversial educational issues --- p.79 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Demonstration of evidence of reflection in response to learning and teaching experiences --- p.81 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- Demonstration of evidence of reflection in response to planning --- p.83 / Chapter 5.2 --- Research question two --- p.85 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Technical reflection --- p.85 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Descriptive reflection --- p.87 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Dialogic reflection --- p.88 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- Critical reflection --- p.39 / Chapter 5.3 --- Concluding remarks --- p.90 / Chapter 6. --- Summary and Conclusion --- p.91 / Chapter 6.1 --- Summary of findings --- p.91 / Chapter 6.2 --- Implications for teacher education and future research --- p.93 / Chapter 6.3 --- Limitation of the study --- p.97 / Chapter 6.4 --- Concluding remarks --- p.98 / References --- p.99 / Appendix 1 Consent form --- p.104 / Appendix 2 Reflective writing task --- p.105 / Appendix 3 Personal information form --- p.112 / Appendix 4 Coding scheme on levels of reflection --- p.113

This thesis argues that there is a philosophical attempt directed at combating the fragmentation of the sciences that starts with Heidegger and continues today through Trish Glazebrook's interpretations of the former's concept of "reflection," and Carl Mitcham and Robert Frodeman's concept of "critical interdisciplinarity" (CID). This is important as the sciences are both more implicated in our lives and more fragmented than ever. While scientific knowledge is pursued for its own sake, the pertinent facts, meaning, and application of the science is ignored. By linking Heidegger's views on the fragmentation of the sciences to Glazebrook's interpretations of reflection and Mitcham and Frodeman's CID, I show that CID is a concrete realization of Heidegger's reflection.