In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In 'Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy', Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption.

This thesis analyses the nature, rationale, and implementation of United Kingdom and Australian regulation of research involving human embryos and cloning using legal materials, other documents and qualitative interviews with researchers, practitioners and regulators. It considers how law-makers have decided upon what to regulate and where to draw the line between permissible and prohibited activities, and the type of regulatory design strategies and enforcement approaches adopted in each jurisdiction (the ‘how to regulate’ question). It is argued that both jurisdictions have effectively decided upon permissible and prohibited activities as a result of thorough public consultation, research, reviews and the parliamentary process, and have appropriately balanced competing rationales for regulation. However, the type of regulation used in relation to those who are licensed to research in this area is unsuitable due to an over-emphasis on deterrence and the authoritarian approach taken by the regulatory bureaucracies. The central thesis is that a responsive regulatory system for licence-holders should be adopted. It is proposed that such a system would maintain the top level ‘command and control’ design strategies and deterrence approaches present in the current regulatory systems for breaches of legislation by non-licence holders and serious breaches by licence holders. However, greater use of co-regulatory design strategies and cooperative, educative and persuasive enforcement approaches should be used for regulating licensed research activities.

<p>Human reproductive cloning came to the public´s attention when Dolly the sheep was cloned in Scotland in 1997. This news quickly spread around the world causing both excitements at the possibilities of what cloning techniques could offer, as well as apprehension about the ethical, social and legal implications should human reproductive cloning become possible. Many international organisations and governments were concerned about the impact of human reproductive cloning on human health, dignity and human rights. To this day, many institutions have drafted resolutions, protocols and position statements outlining their concerns. This paper outlines some of the major ethical issues surrounding human reproductive cloning and the position towards this novel technique taken by three important international organisations - Council of Europe, World Health Organization, and United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization - expressed in different regulatory frameworks. Proponents of human cloning occasionally point out that cloned humans are already among us in the form of twins - people with identical sets of DNA - so what is the problem? Besides avoiding the fact that natural twins are always siblings, whereas a clone could be the twin of a parent or grandparent, this observation ignores a crucial moral difference: natural twins arrive as rare creations, not as specifically designed products. Instead of being an uncontrolled, self-regulated evolutionary process, creation of man through reproductive cloning are shifting from being natural to a state of instrumentality where parental interests constitutes what is important. This shift will inevitably lead to the child being a means for some other end (parental interests). However, this is not the same as being subdued into genetic determinism, but the point brought forward is the child´s lack of freedom caused by the interests of the parents. In this sense the clone´s genome constitutes a heavy backpack because of our pre-knowledge of its physical building blocks - or in other words its potentiality. Even though the argument of genetic determinism is a weak one, our subconscious"forces"us to create hopes upon the child because of its potentiality. No longer is the evolution the creator with the dices of randomness. A new gambler is in town and this time the dices are equilateral.</p>

Human reproductive cloning came to the public´s attention when Dolly the sheep was cloned in Scotland in 1997. This news quickly spread around the world causing both excitements at the possibilities of what cloning techniques could offer, as well as apprehension about the ethical, social and legal implications should human reproductive cloning become possible. Many international organisations and governments were concerned about the impact of human reproductive cloning on human health, dignity and human rights. To this day, many institutions have drafted resolutions, protocols and position statements outlining their concerns. This paper outlines some of the major ethical issues surrounding human reproductive cloning and the position towards this novel technique taken by three important international organisations - Council of Europe, World Health Organization, and United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization - expressed in different regulatory frameworks. Proponents of human cloning occasionally point out that cloned humans are already among us in the form of twins - people with identical sets of DNA - so what is the problem? Besides avoiding the fact that natural twins are always siblings, whereas a clone could be the twin of a parent or grandparent, this observation ignores a crucial moral difference: natural twins arrive as rare creations, not as specifically designed products. Instead of being an uncontrolled, self-regulated evolutionary process, creation of man through reproductive cloning are shifting from being natural to a state of instrumentality where parental interests constitutes what is important. This shift will inevitably lead to the child being a means for some other end (parental interests). However, this is not the same as being subdued into genetic determinism, but the point brought forward is the child´s lack of freedom caused by the interests of the parents. In this sense the clone´s genome constitutes a heavy backpack because of our pre-knowledge of its physical building blocks - or in other words its potentiality. Even though the argument of genetic determinism is a weak one, our subconscious"forces"us to create hopes upon the child because of its potentiality. No longer is the evolution the creator with the dices of randomness. A new gambler is in town and this time the dices are equilateral.

The aim of this dissertation is to examine and analyse the judicial framework with regard to embryonic stem cell research and cloning in South Africa. The examination is conducted within the framework of the South African and United Kingdom's legal systems. Focus is placed on aspects of medical law, human rights law as envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and the law of persons. The specific focus of this dissertation is to examine the intense debate on the moral and legal status of the embryo and fetus in South Africa. A comparative study is undertaken, with the United Kingdom as a background against which recommendations for the South African framework are made. The study firstly provides a clinical overview of stem cell research and cloning. Secondly, the concept of life, in particular human life; the protection of the embryo and fetus under the constitutional guarantee of the right to life, among other constitutionally protected rights, are examined. In this context, the most important finding is that although the fetus is not a bearer of constitutional rights the state has a constitutional duty to protect fetal life in terms of an objective value system. Thereby, the state is permitted to regulate abortion, fetal tissue research, and embryo research to protect fetal life. In particular, the aim of this dissertation is to present a critical summary of the major debates and policy responses relating to embryonic stem cell research and cloning techniques, drawing attention to some of the challenges posed by conflicting moral values in an era of global scientific endeavour, and to provide an analysis of the key ethical and regulatory implications for stem cell therapy. The most important findings are that current South African legislation remains fragmented and ineffective in the manner in which embryonic stem cell research and cloning are regulated. This finding leads to a summary of recommendations, which attempts to provide specific remedies in order to adapt the current regulatory framework in South Africa. / Dissertation (LLM (Public Law))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Public Law / LLM / unrestricted