Thesis (Ph. D.)--Texas Woman's University, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1939. / Includes bibliography and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Texas Woman's University, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

The Anthropological Papers of the University of Arizona is a peer-reviewed monograph series sponsored by the School of Anthropology. Established in 1959, the series publishes archaeological and ethnographic papers that use contemporary method and theory to investigate problems of anthropological importance in the southwestern United States, Mexico, and related areas.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

No description available.

A HISTORICAL CASE STUDY OF THE ARIKARA, HIDATSA, AND MANDAN INDIANS AT HAMPTON NORMAL AND AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE, VIRGINIA, 1878-1911 By Nancy E. Jones-Oltjenbruns, Ph.D. A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012 Director: Maike I. Philipsen, PhD Professor, School of Education Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute played a role in the education of American Indians. This facet of American Indians education was examined through the lives of Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan students from the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota. The Three Affiliated Tribes’ students attended Hampton between 1878 and 1911. The federal government generally viewed American Indians as a problem so efforts were made to assimilate them into the majority culture. Education was a component of that process. The lack of knowledge about the Plains Indians contributed to their selection for this study. Lesser known tribes do not have a prominent place in the scholarship on 19th century Indian education. This study contributes to the literature by providing historical evidence related to the Fort Berthold Reservation students. The majority of teachers who instructed Indian students were non-Indian, but it was important for them to understand the specifics of Indian culture. Early staff at Hampton thought of themselves as civilizers, missionaries, and teachers. When the doors of Hampton opened, it was the role of staff to instruct the African American students in those skills that would allow them to advance in the White world. This was the same mandate regarding American Indians. The staff was instrumental in every aspect of American Indian education. Although Indian students including the Fort Berthold students never gained equal standing with African Americans or Whites on campus, they acquired a level of acceptance by staff and students. Views of Indian students toward staff, their education, school, and fellow students varied. There were members of the Fort Berthold Reservation who appreciated their education at Hampton, while some students did not complete their educational endeavors. Generally, Fort Berthold students learned skills that would be useful upon their return home. The Indian students felt they had an obligation to their people and that education was more than groundwork for their own prosperity. While education could provide a respectable living, the Fort Berthold Reservation students had a responsibility to teach those back on the reservation.

The work focuses on the use of online reservation systems for the hotel industry. The first part is dedicated to the development of the Internet and describes the online sales. The second part describes the electronic distribution systems, global distribution systems and Internet reservation systems. The third section demonstrates the practical use of these systems in practice applied to a concrete hotel. At the end is described the current situation of on-line sales and the assumption of its development in the future. The goal is to unify the information about the online reservation systems currently used in the hotel industry.

As negociações apresentam uma zona de possível acordo sempre que o valor de reserva do comprador excede o valor de reserva do vendedor. Howard Raiffa permitiu uma formalização para analisar as negociações, ao representá-las por meio dessa zona de acordo. Neste estudo, propõe-se que esse modelo seja utilizado para análise das renegociações. Para tanto, foram incorporados alguns elementos da Economia dos Custos de Transação já que, entre a negociação e a renegociação, ocorre a deterioração do valor de reserva detido pelo agente que promoveu investimentos em ativos específicos à transação. Os elementos incorporados dessa teoria foram: racionalidade limitada, especificidade de ativos e comportamento oportunista. Em razão da racionalidade limitada, os acordos e contratos são incompletos, porque a previsão de todas as contingências é impossível ou, na melhor das hipóteses, demasiado dispendiosa. Com isso, muitas vezes as partes necessitam promover revisões contratuais, o que demanda o estabelecimento de renegociações. Porém, entre a negociação e a renegociação, sempre que uma das partes investir em ativos específicos à transação, o seu valor de reserva se torna menos favorável, reduzindo o seu poder relativo de negociação. Nessas condições, a contraparte pode agir oportunisticamente, expropriando quase-rendas que antes eram auferidas pelo agente responsável pelos investimentos específicos. Apesar de a Economia dos Custos de Transação adotar o comportamento oportunista como pressuposto comportamental, não afirma que todos os indivíduos agem oportunisticamente o tempo todo. A freqüência das transações e a reputação apresentam-se como restrições a esse comportamento. Além disso, alguns estudiosos entendem que os agentes podem não empregar o comportamento oportunista nas renegociações, já que muitas pessoas procurariam recompensar os indivíduos que no passado lhe fizeram alguma ação favorável. Para examinar que comportamento a contraparte emprega nessa situação, foi realizada uma pesquisa experimental com alunos da Universidade de São Paulo. Os participantes, agrupados em pares, deveriam negociar um determinado bem. A pesquisa envolveu dois estágios: negociação de preços para o primeiro ano, em que as partes tinham seus valores de reserva originais, pois os investimentos específicos ainda não haviam sido realizados; e negociação de preços para o segundo ano. Neste último estágio, denominado de renegociação, o valor de reserva de uma das partes havia se deteriorado, em razão dos investimentos específicos. A comparação entre os resultados da negociação e da renegociação permitiu constatar que alguns agentes empregaram o comportamento oportunista. Em 62,7% dos casos, houve alguma redução de preços entre a negociação e a renegociação. Em alguns casos, a pilhagem na renegociação foi tão intensa que o agente expropriado obteve um valor menor do que aquele proporcionado pelo valor de reserva original. A pesquisa revelou que o comportamento oportunista foi mais freqüente e ocorreu com maior intensidade com alunos que já se conheciam. Por fim, o comportamento oportunista não apresentou associações significativas com idade e sexo dos participantes, com o ano de ingresso na faculdade ou com a postura competitiva na primeira etapa das negociações. / A possible agreement zone appears in negotiations whenever the buyer's reservation value exceeds that of the seller. Howard Raiffa brought a fairly structured manner to the analysis of negotiations by representing them through this agreement zone. Our intention is for this model to be used in the analysis of renegotiations. To that end, some elements of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) have been incorporated inasmuch as deterioration occurs, between the negotiation and the renegotiation, in the reservation value detained by the agent that made investments in transaction specific assets. The elements incorporated from the TCE were the following: limited rationality, asset specificity and opportunistic behavior. Limited rationality leads to incomplete agreements and contracts because forecasting all contingencies is impossible or, in the best of hypotheses, too expensive. For that reason, the parties often need to carry out contractual revisions, which require setting up renegotiations. Nevertheless, whenever one of the parties invests in transaction-specific assets between the negotiation and the renegotiation, its reservation value becomes less favorable thus reducing its relative negotiation power. Under those conditions, a counterpart can have an opportunistic behavior, thus expropriating the quasi rents that were before received by the agent responsible for the specific investments. Although TCE adopts opportunistic behavior as the behavior premise, it does not state that all individuals act opportunistically all of the time. Both the frequency of the transactions and the reputation limit this kind of behavior. Besides, some scholars understand that agents might not act opportunistically in negotiations, insofar as many people would seek to reward individuals who took a favorable action toward them. In order to examine which behavior becomes active in the counterpart in this situation, an experimental research was accomplished with students from the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Paired participants were instructed to negotiate a specific asset. The research involved two stages: price negotiation for the first year, in which the parties had their original reservation values, since specific investments had not yet been made; and price negotiation for the second year. In this last stage, called renegotiation, the reservation value of one of the parties had deteriorated due to specific investments. The compared outcomes of the negotiation and renegotiation allowed verifying that some agents did act opportunistically. In 62.7% of the cases there was a price reduction between the negotiation and the renegotiation. In some cases, hold-up in the renegotiation was so intense that the expropriated agent obtained a lower value than that of the original reservation value. The research revealed that opportunistic behavior was more frequent and more intense among students who already knew each other. Final conclusion was that the opportunistic behavior was not significantly associated with participants' age or gender, the year of college entrance or competitive stand in the first round of negotiations.