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As negociações apresentam uma zona de possível acordo sempre que o valor de reserva do comprador excede o valor de reserva do vendedor. Howard Raiffa permitiu uma formalização para analisar as negociações, ao representá-las por meio dessa zona de acordo. Neste estudo, propõe-se que esse modelo seja utilizado para análise das renegociações. Para tanto, foram incorporados alguns elementos da Economia dos Custos de Transação já que, entre a negociação e a renegociação, ocorre a deterioração do valor de reserva detido pelo agente que promoveu investimentos em ativos específicos à transação. Os elementos incorporados dessa teoria foram: racionalidade limitada, especificidade de ativos e comportamento oportunista. Em razão da racionalidade limitada, os acordos e contratos são incompletos, porque a previsão de todas as contingências é impossível ou, na melhor das hipóteses, demasiado dispendiosa. Com isso, muitas vezes as partes necessitam promover revisões contratuais, o que demanda o estabelecimento de renegociações. Porém, entre a negociação e a renegociação, sempre que uma das partes investir em ativos específicos à transação, o seu valor de reserva se torna menos favorável, reduzindo o seu poder relativo de negociação. Nessas condições, a contraparte pode agir oportunisticamente, expropriando quase-rendas que antes eram auferidas pelo agente responsável pelos investimentos específicos. Apesar de a Economia dos Custos de Transação adotar o comportamento oportunista como pressuposto comportamental, não afirma que todos os indivíduos agem oportunisticamente o tempo todo. A freqüência das transações e a reputação apresentam-se como restrições a esse comportamento. Além disso, alguns estudiosos entendem que os agentes podem não empregar o comportamento oportunista nas renegociações, já que muitas pessoas procurariam recompensar os indivíduos que no passado lhe fizeram alguma ação favorável. Para examinar que comportamento a contraparte emprega nessa situação, foi realizada uma pesquisa experimental com alunos da Universidade de São Paulo. Os participantes, agrupados em pares, deveriam negociar um determinado bem. A pesquisa envolveu dois estágios: negociação de preços para o primeiro ano, em que as partes tinham seus valores de reserva originais, pois os investimentos específicos ainda não haviam sido realizados; e negociação de preços para o segundo ano. Neste último estágio, denominado de renegociação, o valor de reserva de uma das partes havia se deteriorado, em razão dos investimentos específicos. A comparação entre os resultados da negociação e da renegociação permitiu constatar que alguns agentes empregaram o comportamento oportunista. Em 62,7% dos casos, houve alguma redução de preços entre a negociação e a renegociação. Em alguns casos, a pilhagem na renegociação foi tão intensa que o agente expropriado obteve um valor menor do que aquele proporcionado pelo valor de reserva original. A pesquisa revelou que o comportamento oportunista foi mais freqüente e ocorreu com maior intensidade com alunos que já se conheciam. Por fim, o comportamento oportunista não apresentou associações significativas com idade e sexo dos participantes, com o ano de ingresso na faculdade ou com a postura competitiva na primeira etapa das negociações. / A possible agreement zone appears in negotiations whenever the buyer's reservation value exceeds that of the seller. Howard Raiffa brought a fairly structured manner to the analysis of negotiations by representing them through this agreement zone. Our intention is for this model to be used in the analysis of renegotiations. To that end, some elements of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) have been incorporated inasmuch as deterioration occurs, between the negotiation and the renegotiation, in the reservation value detained by the agent that made investments in transaction specific assets. The elements incorporated from the TCE were the following: limited rationality, asset specificity and opportunistic behavior. Limited rationality leads to incomplete agreements and contracts because forecasting all contingencies is impossible or, in the best of hypotheses, too expensive. For that reason, the parties often need to carry out contractual revisions, which require setting up renegotiations. Nevertheless, whenever one of the parties invests in transaction-specific assets between the negotiation and the renegotiation, its reservation value becomes less favorable thus reducing its relative negotiation power. Under those conditions, a counterpart can have an opportunistic behavior, thus expropriating the quasi rents that were before received by the agent responsible for the specific investments. Although TCE adopts opportunistic behavior as the behavior premise, it does not state that all individuals act opportunistically all of the time. Both the frequency of the transactions and the reputation limit this kind of behavior. Besides, some scholars understand that agents might not act opportunistically in negotiations, insofar as many people would seek to reward individuals who took a favorable action toward them. In order to examine which behavior becomes active in the counterpart in this situation, an experimental research was accomplished with students from the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Paired participants were instructed to negotiate a specific asset. The research involved two stages: price negotiation for the first year, in which the parties had their original reservation values, since specific investments had not yet been made; and price negotiation for the second year. In this last stage, called renegotiation, the reservation value of one of the parties had deteriorated due to specific investments. The compared outcomes of the negotiation and renegotiation allowed verifying that some agents did act opportunistically. In 62.7% of the cases there was a price reduction between the negotiation and the renegotiation. In some cases, hold-up in the renegotiation was so intense that the expropriated agent obtained a lower value than that of the original reservation value. The research revealed that opportunistic behavior was more frequent and more intense among students who already knew each other. Final conclusion was that the opportunistic behavior was not significantly associated with participants' age or gender, the year of college entrance or competitive stand in the first round of negotiations.

This Thesis contains three essays on the economic behavior of individuals. The first essay, co-authored with Andreas Blume and Douglas DeJong is an experimental investigation into the contribution of cognition in a strategic setting where the goal is to coordinate by choosing different courses of action. Specifically, we study whether cognitive limits affect the ability of agents to achieve dispersion outcomes and; further, how these limits affect the means by which dispersion outcomes are attained. We find that in the self-play treatment when agents are allowed to play against themselves, dispersion outcomes are relatively easy to obtain; however, when paired with others, cognitive differences increase the difficulty in achieving a dispersion outcome. When we relax the cognitive constraints, the ability of participants to achieve dispersion outcomes increases to approximately the same level as those in the self-play treatment; further, the means by which dispersion outcomes are achieved does not differ from those in the self-play treatment. In the second essay I investigate how noise impacts incentives provided by contracts that are structured with option-style payoffs. Existing theory suggest that one cannot commit to not renegotiate based on the receipt of a non-contractible signal; however, others suggest that in the presence of a noise in the non-contractible signal may not result in partners wanting to renegotiate since the initial contract may still provide incentives for subsequent periods. Using an experimental economics approach I find that players who receive a perfect non-contractible signal do not put forth high effort in a subsequent period; however, the presence of noise in the signal may result in players continuing to put forth high effort in a subsequent period. A behavioral explanation is provided for these observations. In the final essay for which this Thesis is named, I employ a field study methodology to investigate the incremental role that social capital plays in both individual lending decisions and outcomes. I find that lenders are more likely to choose borrowers who have social capital; however, social capital does not impact the interest rate that borrowers pay or the rate of default.

Orientador: Gilda Figueiredo Portugal Gouveia / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T05:30:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Camargo_OrsonJoseRobertode_M.pdf: 2056289 bytes, checksum: ed24a283a8afd82d09f42e75fd0a6eb5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: O presente trabalho analisa, do ponto de vista contextual, a Medida Provisória nº 114 de março de 2003, convertida em Lei nº 10.696 de julho do mesmo ano, a partir da ótica da elite política brasileira - especificamente a bancada ruralista. A bancada ruralista é tida como um dos grupos conservadores do Congresso Nacional, com forte coesão interna e intensa capacidade de pressão junto ao Executivo e Legislativo brasileiro, para que seus interesses sejam contemplados. O estudo considera a discussão, em plenário, dos parlamentares ruralistas sobre a MPV nº 114/03, que dispõe da renegociação das dívidas do crédito rural e visa analisar como as renegociações dos recursos públicos aplicados no financiamento da produção agropecuária brasileira reproduzem e aprofundam a desigualdade social. Tanto financiamento para a produção agropecuária como a renegociação das dívidas do crédito rural não consideram equitativamente todos os produtores rurais, colocando a discussão diante de questões de justiça social ao não propiciar mecanismos para a redução da desigualdade social / Abstract: Taking in consideration a contextual analyses, this dissertation investigates the March 2003 Governmental Decree 114, which was converted in the Federal Law number 10.696 in July 2003. This study focus on the thoughts and actions of the rural landowners members of the Congress (the bancada ruralista), which are considered one of the most conservative political sectors in the country. The Bancada Ruralista is also considered to be a very strong lobby, with internal cohesion and capacity of pressure on the Executive and the Legislative. The dissertation analyses the debates around the Governmental Decree 114 among the members of the Congress, particularly the bancada ruralista discussion on the defense of the large landowners' interests. The Governmental Decree 114 established new standards regarding the renegotiation of public rural credit and the landowner's federal debts. Therefore it was considered a crucial political issue for the bancada ruralista lobbies. The study demonstrates how the application of the federal resources on the large agribusiness reproduces and deepens the country social inequalities, since the rural producer are not equally considered in these negotiations, clearly favoring the large and most politically powerful rural landowners / Mestrado / Sociologia Politica / Mestre em Sociologia

As negociações apresentam uma zona de possível acordo sempre que o valor de reserva do comprador excede o valor de reserva do vendedor. Howard Raiffa permitiu uma formalização para analisar as negociações, ao representá-las por meio dessa zona de acordo. Neste estudo, propõe-se que esse modelo seja utilizado para análise das renegociações. Para tanto, foram incorporados alguns elementos da Economia dos Custos de Transação já que, entre a negociação e a renegociação, ocorre a deterioração do valor de reserva detido pelo agente que promoveu investimentos em ativos específicos à transação. Os elementos incorporados dessa teoria foram: racionalidade limitada, especificidade de ativos e comportamento oportunista. Em razão da racionalidade limitada, os acordos e contratos são incompletos, porque a previsão de todas as contingências é impossível ou, na melhor das hipóteses, demasiado dispendiosa. Com isso, muitas vezes as partes necessitam promover revisões contratuais, o que demanda o estabelecimento de renegociações. Porém, entre a negociação e a renegociação, sempre que uma das partes investir em ativos específicos à transação, o seu valor de reserva se torna menos favorável, reduzindo o seu poder relativo de negociação. Nessas condições, a contraparte pode agir oportunisticamente, expropriando quase-rendas que antes eram auferidas pelo agente responsável pelos investimentos específicos. Apesar de a Economia dos Custos de Transação adotar o comportamento oportunista como pressuposto comportamental, não afirma que todos os indivíduos agem oportunisticamente o tempo todo. A freqüência das transações e a reputação apresentam-se como restrições a esse comportamento. Além disso, alguns estudiosos entendem que os agentes podem não empregar o comportamento oportunista nas renegociações, já que muitas pessoas procurariam recompensar os indivíduos que no passado lhe fizeram alguma ação favorável. Para examinar que comportamento a contraparte emprega nessa situação, foi realizada uma pesquisa experimental com alunos da Universidade de São Paulo. Os participantes, agrupados em pares, deveriam negociar um determinado bem. A pesquisa envolveu dois estágios: negociação de preços para o primeiro ano, em que as partes tinham seus valores de reserva originais, pois os investimentos específicos ainda não haviam sido realizados; e negociação de preços para o segundo ano. Neste último estágio, denominado de renegociação, o valor de reserva de uma das partes havia se deteriorado, em razão dos investimentos específicos. A comparação entre os resultados da negociação e da renegociação permitiu constatar que alguns agentes empregaram o comportamento oportunista. Em 62,7% dos casos, houve alguma redução de preços entre a negociação e a renegociação. Em alguns casos, a pilhagem na renegociação foi tão intensa que o agente expropriado obteve um valor menor do que aquele proporcionado pelo valor de reserva original. A pesquisa revelou que o comportamento oportunista foi mais freqüente e ocorreu com maior intensidade com alunos que já se conheciam. Por fim, o comportamento oportunista não apresentou associações significativas com idade e sexo dos participantes, com o ano de ingresso na faculdade ou com a postura competitiva na primeira etapa das negociações. / A possible agreement zone appears in negotiations whenever the buyer's reservation value exceeds that of the seller. Howard Raiffa brought a fairly structured manner to the analysis of negotiations by representing them through this agreement zone. Our intention is for this model to be used in the analysis of renegotiations. To that end, some elements of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) have been incorporated inasmuch as deterioration occurs, between the negotiation and the renegotiation, in the reservation value detained by the agent that made investments in transaction specific assets. The elements incorporated from the TCE were the following: limited rationality, asset specificity and opportunistic behavior. Limited rationality leads to incomplete agreements and contracts because forecasting all contingencies is impossible or, in the best of hypotheses, too expensive. For that reason, the parties often need to carry out contractual revisions, which require setting up renegotiations. Nevertheless, whenever one of the parties invests in transaction-specific assets between the negotiation and the renegotiation, its reservation value becomes less favorable thus reducing its relative negotiation power. Under those conditions, a counterpart can have an opportunistic behavior, thus expropriating the quasi rents that were before received by the agent responsible for the specific investments. Although TCE adopts opportunistic behavior as the behavior premise, it does not state that all individuals act opportunistically all of the time. Both the frequency of the transactions and the reputation limit this kind of behavior. Besides, some scholars understand that agents might not act opportunistically in negotiations, insofar as many people would seek to reward individuals who took a favorable action toward them. In order to examine which behavior becomes active in the counterpart in this situation, an experimental research was accomplished with students from the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Paired participants were instructed to negotiate a specific asset. The research involved two stages: price negotiation for the first year, in which the parties had their original reservation values, since specific investments had not yet been made; and price negotiation for the second year. In this last stage, called renegotiation, the reservation value of one of the parties had deteriorated due to specific investments. The compared outcomes of the negotiation and renegotiation allowed verifying that some agents did act opportunistically. In 62.7% of the cases there was a price reduction between the negotiation and the renegotiation. In some cases, hold-up in the renegotiation was so intense that the expropriated agent obtained a lower value than that of the original reservation value. The research revealed that opportunistic behavior was more frequent and more intense among students who already knew each other. Final conclusion was that the opportunistic behavior was not significantly associated with participants' age or gender, the year of college entrance or competitive stand in the first round of negotiations.

Quoique l'obligation de renégocier constitue un outil ordinaire du paysage juridique, son appréhension par le droit positif n'est guère satisfaisante. Réduisant l'obligation de renégocier à un simple devoir d'entrer en pourparlers, la jurisprudence altère considérablement l'efficacité des clauses de hardship. Politiquement dangereuse, une telle solution apparaît aussi techniquement inexacte au regard de la notion d'obligation de renégocier. L'obligation de renégocier ayant pour finalité d'aménager ou d'alléger la dette de l'un des contractants, il apparaît nécessaire d'imposer à celui qui doit renégocier qu'il fasse des sacrifices sans lesquels l'obligation de renégocier ne peut produire son effet utile. Cette dernière ne va pas, pour autant, jusqu'à constituer une obligation de réviser: non seulement car l'échec de la renégociation n'est jamais fautif en soi, mais aussi parce que l'exercice de la liberté de ne pas réviser reste licite lorsqu'il se justifie par la préservation d'un intérêt raisonnable. Le sens de cette étude est ainsi de rétablir la véritable portée de l'obligation de renégocier, en exposant à la fois les exigences et les limites inhérentes à cette notion. / Accordingly, the duty to renegotiate could appear at first sight as a well-known and familiar device of contract drafting. Yet, the current state of the law is nonetheless quite unsatisfactory. Case law tends indeed to limit drastically the efficiency of hardship clauses by adopting an overly restrictive conception of the duty to renegotiate. This solution is not only unsatisfactory in practice, but also technically inaccurate regarding the concept of a duty to renegotiate. The purpose of this duty is indeed to reduce the debt of one of the parties. Therefore, the duty to renegotiate imposes to make some sacrifices without which the efficiency of the duty is drastically restricted. But it does not mean that the duty to renegotiate imposes to modify the contract. Not only because the failure of the renegotiation is not perse a case of breach of contract, but also because the parties can legitimately refuse to modify the contract in order to protect their reasonable interests. The purpose of this study is therefore to restore its true scope to the duty, by unveiling both the requirements and the limits that are inherent to the concept of a duty to renegotiate.

Malgré d’importants avantages, la dette comme source de financement implique un risque d’insolvabilité. La faillite et la liquidation des actifs ont un coût élevé non seulement pour l’emprunteur et le prêteur, mais aussi pour la société en général. La détresse des entreprises peut en effet d’une part se propager dans l’économie et provoquer une contagion et d’autre part impliquer des externalités négatives (telle la chute du prix des actifs liquidés). La renégociation de la dette survient donc comme une alternative à la faillite/liquidation, une solution qui peut se montrer avantageuse pour toutes les parties impliquées et pour la société. Cette thèse propose une analyse théorique de la renégociation de la dette dans deux contextes particuliers. Le premier concerne le cas de la dette d’entreprise. Le second concerne le cas des crédits hypothécaires. À notre connaissance, tous les modèles de la littérature sur la dette d’entreprise impliquent ou autorisent un nombre infini de renégociations de la dette. Cette caractéristique empêche l’analyse du nombre optimal de renégociations. Pour pallier cet inconvénient, nous introduisons des coûts fixes de renégociation dans un modèle structurel de renégociations multiples. On analyse la réduction optimale du coupon, le moment et le nombre de renégociations. En ce qui concerne la renégociation des crédits hypothécaires, nous contribuons au débat sur la crise actuelle des saisies immobilières en étudiant en premier lieu la décision d’un prêteur de renégocier ou de saisir, et en second lieu l’impact négatif de la saisie sur les prix immobiliers. Enfin, sont analysés le rôle de la titrisation des crédits dans les décisions de saisir les biens immobiliers ou de renégocier les dettes en souffrance, ainsi que les contrats des gestionnaires immobiliers / Despite important advantages debt financing entails a risk of impossibility of payment. Bankruptcy and foreclosure are costly not only for the borrower and the lender, but also to the community as a whole through contagion and negative externality effects. Renegotiation then arises as a win-win solution for the parties involved. This thesis focuses on the analysis of debt renegotiation for the cases of corporate debt and home mortgage debt. To our knowledge, all the previous work on corporate debt renegotiation implies an infinite number of renegotiations. This feature preempts the analysis of the optimal number of renegotiations. We address this drawback by incorporating fixed renegotiation costs in a structural model of multiple renegotiations, analyzing the optimal debt reduction, timing and the number of rounds. Regarding home mortgage renegotiation, we contribute to the debate about the current foreclosure crisis by studying a lender’s decision to renegotiate or to foreclose, and the negative effect of foreclosure on house prices. Finally, the role of securitization in foreclosure and renegotiation decisions, as well as servicer contract design are investigated.

In my first chapter I follow the methodology put forth by Bohn(1998), the market-based sustainability method to measure whether the sovereign debt is sustainable or not. I work with a panel of 125 countries for 26 years and along with incorporate different institutions ratings by ICRG’s political risk ratings. In my analysis I find out that the debt on average is sustainable for countries up to certain extent and thus giving us an inverted U shape debt-exports curve. I use country exports to find out if the debt is sustainable or not. I also find that better institutions do give an edge to countries when it comes to borrowing as it lowers the risk expectations on the lenders part. The findings do vary based on the country’s income level and based on its geographical location.

Contratos de concessão de serviços públicos em setores de infraestrutura, e particularmente no setor portuário, deverão passar por um período de revisões contratuais no Brasil. O prazo de concessões realizadas na década de 1990 está se encerrando, e alterações substanciais nas condições de diversos contratos realizadas sem a devida preocupação com os impactos no equilíbrio econômico-financeiro aumentam a complexidade nos processos de renegociação. A renegociação de contratos de concessão é um tema de grande foco acadêmico, por ser uma grande fonte de ineficiências e custos de transação em concessões de serviços públicos, podendo eliminar os benefícios do processo de competição via licitação e acarretar em maiores tarifas e/ou menor qualidade no serviço aos usuários. Nesse contexto, esta dissertação tem como objetivo contribuir com os aspectos metodológicos associados ao reequilíbrio econômico-financeiro de contratos de concessão, com aplicação específica em arrendamentos do setor portuário. As mudanças no ambiente regulatório devem visar um aumento de transparência e previsibilidade no processo de renegociação, com vistas a garantir que serviços públicos sejam prestados de forma adequada e universal (objetivo do Poder Público) e que o agente privado receba uma remuneração justa em relação aos investimentos realizados. Ainda que os princípios sejam claros, a revisão de contratos firmados com o Poder Público e a quantificação de eventuais desequilíbrios não são exercícios 100% unívocos. A falta de dados históricos confiáveis e a sobreposição de fatores ordinários e extraordinários dificultam a definição de parâmetros e exigem uma arquitetura meticulosa para estabelecer a álgebra mais adequada e conceber uma solução satisfatória. / In Brazil, the first cycle of concession contracts of transport infrastructure assets is about to end, giving birth to a period of contract renegotiations. In the seaport industry, the concession contracts signed in the 1990s terminated or are about to expire. However, in most cases their clauses have not been adapted to meet the many factors that affected the implicit financial equilibrium, increasing the complexity of the renegotiation process. The renegotiation of concession contracts has been addressed in several academic works. The authors acknowledge that this process is a major source of inefficiencies and transaction costs in public service concessions, and may reduce or eliminate the benefits of competition through bidding processes, leading to higher costs and/or worst level of service to users. In this context, this thesis proposed a methodology to evaluate the financial equilibrium of concession contracts in seaport terminals, as well as to make sure this equilibrium is not affected whenever changes in contract conditions happen. Changes in regulatory framework should increase transparency and predictability of contract renegotiation processes, ensuring public services are properly provided and private agents investments are correctly recovered. Nevertheless, the concession contract renegotiations and the evaluation of the implicit financial equilibrium are usually difficult to accomplish due to lack of reliable data and miscomprehension of ordinary and extraordinary factors. As a result, is usually necessary to develop detailed and ad hoc approaches to achieve a satisfactory solution both for government and private parties.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Joao Luis Zaratin Lotufo.pdf: 1066752 bytes, checksum: c08d1640facec8f52948a384d4826e1f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-18 / The dissertation object is the study of the vicissitudes as a result of time in contractual relations, enough to break the contractual balance and overly encumber the provision of a party, in order to greatly hinder its fulfillment. The interpretation of the instrument requires the study of important prior diplomas and its root in the Brazilian Civil Code of 2002, influencing the legislator in the positivation of the theory of excessive burden of contract. Civil Codes of France, Germany and Italy are discussed more emphatically considering the direct influence on the Brazilian Code. The historical development requires the study of different theories that have addressed the occurrence of contractual relations, allowing doctrinal discussion and formulation of the theory of excessive burden, starting with the rebus sic stantibus clause, through other contractual theories. Entering the analysis of the Institute of excessive burden of contract, will be considered the explicit and implicit presuppositions required by the system to its configuration and opening the possibility of contract's resolution and alteration. At the end, the effects of excessive burden on business relationships will be analyzed as well as the duties and rights of the parties involved to achieve the most appropriate result / A dissertação tem como objeto o estudo das vicissitudes decorrentes do tempo nas relações contratuais, suficientes para romper o equilíbrio contratual e onerar excessivamente a prestação de uma das partes, de maneira a dificultar sobremaneira o seu cumprimento. A compreensão do instituto exige o estudo prévio dos diplomas que marcaram época e arraigaram suas raízes no Código Civil brasileiro de 2002, influenciando o legislador pátrio na positivação da onerosidade excessiva. Os Códigos Civis da França, da Alemanha e da Itália são abordados de forma mais enfática, considerando a influência direta sobre o Código brasileiro. A evolução histórica requer o estudo das diferentes teorias que trataram da superveniência nas relações contratuais, permitindo a discussão doutrinária e formulação da teoria da onerosidade excessiva, iniciando com a Cláusula rebus sic stantibus, passando pelas Teorias da Pressuposição, Base do Negócio e Imprevisão. Adentrando na análise do instituto da onerosidade excessiva, serão analisados os pressupostos explícitos e implícitos exigidos pelo sistema para a sua configuração e abertura de possibilidade da resolução e da revisão do contrato. Ao final, serão analisados os reflexos da onerosidade excessiva nas relações negociais, bem como os deveres e direitos das partes envolvidas para a consecução do resultado mais adequado