No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis advisor: Brian Robinette / Thesis advisor: Dominic Doyle / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

The goal of this thesis is to explore the debate between Bas van Fraassens constructive empiricism and scientific realism. For this purpose I discuss the existence of observable and unobservable entities, the observation/theoretical dichotomy, inference to the best explanation, the no miracles argument, pessimistic induction, and epistemic risk. I strive to show that, contrary to the view of constructive empiricism, there is no clear demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities, and that not only naked eye observation but also the instrument-based observation plays an important role in acquiring knowledge. I agree with scientific realists that there is no highest point to the human power of observation; it is open-ended for further development. Moreover, naked eye observations are not themselves beyond doubt, as sometimes even naked eye observations deceive us. In that context, theoretical explanations help us to understand the real situation. As such, there is no reason to give more credit to naked eye observations than to instrument-mediated, theory-informed observations. <p>Scientific realists are confident in their knowledge of unobservables, and reject the epistemic significance of the observable/unobservable distinction. To justify their knowledge of unobservables, they use inferences to the best explanation. Such inferences play an important role in choosing the best theory amongst a group of theories. For their part, constructive empiricists use what is called the bad lot argument to refute these inferences. I try to show that such bad lot arguments fail to succeed at undermining inferences to the best explanation. Following scientific realists, I assert that nothing is miraculous in the domain of science, and that we can be assured of the approximate truth of successful scientific theories. It is true that many contemporary scientific theories contradict previously successful scientific theories, but that does not compel us to be pessimistic about such contemporary theories. Instead of pessimism, we can have an optimistic attitude about the progress of science. Considering the different arguments of constructive empiricism and scientific realism, this thesis gives more credit to scientific realism than to constructive empiricism.

The twentieth century was dominated by two rival views of scientific explanation. The first is the causal view in which causation is primitive. According to this view, the best explanations are the ones that tell us the cause of a phenomenon, organism, or state of affairs. The second is the unification view, which seeks to unify seemingly disparate bodies of knowledge. Philip Kitcher shook up the debate by synthesizing the two views. He developed a unification theory in which causation is derivative of explanation. The intuitive idea is that the best explanations are the ones that can draw the most conclusions from the fewest basic premises, and these premises just are the causal explanations. There is a problem though. Like any theory of scientific explanation, Kitcher must show that his respects explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we want our scientific theories to say that the height of a flagpole is explanatory of the length of the flagpole's shadow, and not vice versa. Kitcher's view has come under serious attack from Eric Barnes, who claims that Kitcher's theory cannot respect the problem of asymmetry. He gives three examples in which he thinks Kitcher's view fails. Todd Jones tried to defend Kitcher in a paper, but there is still much left to be said. One of his arguments, involving a Newtonian particle system, fails. The status of two of his other arguments is unclear. My goal is to step into the debate between Jones and Barnes and tip the scales in favor of the position that Jones defended. Additionally, I consider new potential cases of asymmetry and show how Kitcher's theory is equipped to accommodate these cases too.

The goal of this thesis is to explore the debate between Bas van Fraassens constructive empiricism and scientific realism. For this purpose I discuss the existence of observable and unobservable entities, the observation/theoretical dichotomy, inference to the best explanation, the no miracles argument, pessimistic induction, and epistemic risk. I strive to show that, contrary to the view of constructive empiricism, there is no clear demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities, and that not only naked eye observation but also the instrument-based observation plays an important role in acquiring knowledge. I agree with scientific realists that there is no highest point to the human power of observation; it is open-ended for further development. Moreover, naked eye observations are not themselves beyond doubt, as sometimes even naked eye observations deceive us. In that context, theoretical explanations help us to understand the real situation. As such, there is no reason to give more credit to naked eye observations than to instrument-mediated, theory-informed observations. <p>Scientific realists are confident in their knowledge of unobservables, and reject the epistemic significance of the observable/unobservable distinction. To justify their knowledge of unobservables, they use inferences to the best explanation. Such inferences play an important role in choosing the best theory amongst a group of theories. For their part, constructive empiricists use what is called the bad lot argument to refute these inferences. I try to show that such bad lot arguments fail to succeed at undermining inferences to the best explanation. Following scientific realists, I assert that nothing is miraculous in the domain of science, and that we can be assured of the approximate truth of successful scientific theories. It is true that many contemporary scientific theories contradict previously successful scientific theories, but that does not compel us to be pessimistic about such contemporary theories. Instead of pessimism, we can have an optimistic attitude about the progress of science. Considering the different arguments of constructive empiricism and scientific realism, this thesis gives more credit to scientific realism than to constructive empiricism.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Paris. / Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Queensland, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

The progress of science depends partly, upon the acceptance of indeterminate tacit premisses about the nature of science and the object of science. These premisses are tacit because (i) they extend to what is beyond the limitations of present data, -not the empirical or the imaginative- and therefore involve heuristic anticipations. (ii) they also involve personal and interpersonal mechanisms such as the personal presuppositions and commitments of the scientist operating within a given community. This community confers values on scientific work in the form of publications, research grants, professional positions, etc.. This transcends the objective subjective dichotomy since the scientist submits to requirements acknowledged by himself with universal intent, that is the scientist's responsibility to pursue his research and confer his judgements as his vision of reality would have him hold as universally necessary. (iii)their acceptance is largely a-critical - they are functional interpretative systems rather than static objects. Although when they are the object of study, they are facts, they are not the fact since they play a vectorial role in establishing facts. They make factuaiity possible. There is a strong case for tacit knowledge. Therefore, Polanyi submits, we should question a concept of scientific objectivity which rests solely upon logical and empirical foundations. Even though numerous mathematics and technical procedures can be employed, the objective value of a scientific theory cannot be wholly formally assessed. Polanyi's theory, in differentiating rationality from formal inference, shows the way towards a non-normative but non-subjectivist epistemology of science beyond the accounts of the practice of science of Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan.