No description available.

Inaugural dissertation--Rostock. / Lebenslauf. "Quellennachweis": p. [5-7].

Thesis--Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Va., 1975. / Title from PDF t.p. (LLMC Digital, viewed on June 1, 2010). "23d Judge Advocate officer advanced course, March 1975". Typescript. Includes bibliographical references.

This paper is an attempt to present the history of the so-called "self-incrimination clause" of the Fifth Amendment from the time the idea was first conceived in the mind of man to the present day. It is an attempt to present the ideas of both legal and lay thinkers concerning this clause.

This thesis addresses the problem of the privilege against self-incrimination ("the privilege") in civil proceedings between private parties in Australia and New Zealand. This problem has been recognised by judges, law reform bodies and legislators in both countries for twenty years. However, the legislative response has been inadequate. The privilege is easily confused with other related concepts, particularly the right to silence in criminal proceedings. The reasons for the privilege in civil proceedings are not necessarily the same as for the right to silence. Care is therefore taken to define the terminology and scope of the thesis. It sets out the modern law on the privilege in civil proceedings between private parties. It describes how the privilege causes particular problems in those proceedings. It surveys the literature, finding that most of it concerns the right to silence. The thesis draws heavily on the history of the privilege. It argues that, although witness privilege came from the common law, the privilege in interlocutory civil proceedings had its origins in the discretionary remedies devised by the courts of equity. They were sensitive to abuse of their remedies. For the same reason, modern prosecutors should not be encouraged to rely excessively upon evidence acquired through compulsory powers. Derivative use immunity is one of several substitutes suggested for the privilege. The thesis looks at the various substitutes. It concludes that derivative use immunity is the only satisfactory substitute for the privilege in civil proceedings. Derivative use immunity originated in the United States. The thesis looks closely at the American experience. The history and scope of the Fifth Amendment are discussed in detail, particularly the supposed removal of its protection from documents. This will show that the removal of the privilege from documents is not as simple as law reform bodies in Australia and New Zealand suggest. Exaggerated claims have been made by Australian prosecutors about the problems caused by derivative use immunity. The claims are examined in the light of American case-law. This shows that an impossible burden is not imposed on prosecutors. The same point emerges when the thesis examines the operation of derivative use immunity under Australian certification procedures since 1995. Particular procedural and legislative difficulties need to be addressed, particularly when derivative use immunity replaces the privilege in interlocutory proceedings. However, certification by the court has an important advantage. The court�s exercise of its discretion provides the flexibility which automatic statutory immunity lacks. The question in the title is therefore answered in the affirmative. Derivative use immunity under a statutory certification procedure can provide the answer. Cooperation between the Commonwealth and States may be needed to overcome constitutional difficulties, but most other problems can be overcome if derivative use immunity is given a sound statutory basis.

This thesis addresses the problem of the privilege against self-incrimination ("the privilege") in civil proceedings between private parties in Australia and New Zealand. This problem has been recognised by judges, law reform bodies and legislators in both countries for twenty years. However, the legislative response has been inadequate. The privilege is easily confused with other related concepts, particularly the right to silence in criminal proceedings. The reasons for the privilege in civil proceedings are not necessarily the same as for the right to silence. Care is therefore taken to define the terminology and scope of the thesis. It sets out the modern law on the privilege in civil proceedings between private parties. It describes how the privilege causes particular problems in those proceedings. It surveys the literature, finding that most of it concerns the right to silence. The thesis draws heavily on the history of the privilege. It argues that, although witness privilege came from the common law, the privilege in interlocutory civil proceedings had its origins in the discretionary remedies devised by the courts of equity. They were sensitive to abuse of their remedies. For the same reason, modern prosecutors should not be encouraged to rely excessively upon evidence acquired through compulsory powers. Derivative use immunity is one of several substitutes suggested for the privilege. The thesis looks at the various substitutes. It concludes that derivative use immunity is the only satisfactory substitute for the privilege in civil proceedings. Derivative use immunity originated in the United States. The thesis looks closely at the American experience. The history and scope of the Fifth Amendment are discussed in detail, particularly the supposed removal of its protection from documents. This will show that the removal of the privilege from documents is not as simple as law reform bodies in Australia and New Zealand suggest. Exaggerated claims have been made by Australian prosecutors about the problems caused by derivative use immunity. The claims are examined in the light of American case-law. This shows that an impossible burden is not imposed on prosecutors. The same point emerges when the thesis examines the operation of derivative use immunity under Australian certification procedures since 1995. Particular procedural and legislative difficulties need to be addressed, particularly when derivative use immunity replaces the privilege in interlocutory proceedings. However, certification by the court has an important advantage. The court�s exercise of its discretion provides the flexibility which automatic statutory immunity lacks. The question in the title is therefore answered in the affirmative. Derivative use immunity under a statutory certification procedure can provide the answer. Cooperation between the Commonwealth and States may be needed to overcome constitutional difficulties, but most other problems can be overcome if derivative use immunity is given a sound statutory basis.

Text in Afrikaans / Beskermi ng van fundamente le mense- en konst itus i one le regte het moderne regstelsels tot herbesinning oor tradisionele bewysregreels rakende die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis aangaande verklarings van 'n beskuldigde en die privilegie teen selfinkriminasie gedwing. Om die omvang van die stroming op die kwessie van getuienis oor aanwysings wat op 'n onvrywillige of onbehoorlike wyse bekom is vas te stel, word 'n analise gedoen van artikel 218 van die Strafproseswet, wat fokus op die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis oor aanwysings en getuienis wat as gevolg van aanwysings verkry is. Die Appelhofbeslissing in S v Sheehama oor die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis omtrent gedwonge aanwysings, word gesien as die beliggaming van 'n nuwe filosofie rakende die beskuldigde se privilegie teen selfinkriminasie. Die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat die bepalings van artikel 218(2) onbillik is, 'n skending van die beskuldigde se privilegie teen selfinkriminasie tot gevolg het en herroep moet word. Voorstelle vir regshervorming word in hierdie verband gemaak. / The protection of fundamenta 1 human and con st itut i ona 1 rights has caused modern legal systems to re-evaluate traditional rules of evidence regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning statements of an accused and the privilege against self-incrimination. To determine the extent of such a re-evaluation on evidence of paintings-out which are involuntarily or improperly obtained, an analysis of section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act is undertaken. It focuses on the admissibility of evidence of paintings-out and evidence obtained in consequence of pointingsout. The decision of the Appellate Division in S v Sheehama on the admissibility of evidence of pointing-outs, obtained by means of compulsion, is seen as an embodiment of a new philosophy towards an accused's privilege against nondiscrimination. It is concluded that the provisions of section 218(2) are unfair, infringe on an accused's privilege against self-incrimination and should be repealed. Proposals for law reform are made in this regard. / Criminology and Security Science / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / Beskermi ng van fundamente le mense- en konst itus i one le regte het moderne regstelsels tot herbesinning oor tradisionele bewysregreels rakende die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis aangaande verklarings van 'n beskuldigde en die privilegie teen selfinkriminasie gedwing. Om die omvang van die stroming op die kwessie van getuienis oor aanwysings wat op 'n onvrywillige of onbehoorlike wyse bekom is vas te stel, word 'n analise gedoen van artikel 218 van die Strafproseswet, wat fokus op die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis oor aanwysings en getuienis wat as gevolg van aanwysings verkry is. Die Appelhofbeslissing in S v Sheehama oor die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis omtrent gedwonge aanwysings, word gesien as die beliggaming van 'n nuwe filosofie rakende die beskuldigde se privilegie teen selfinkriminasie. Die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat die bepalings van artikel 218(2) onbillik is, 'n skending van die beskuldigde se privilegie teen selfinkriminasie tot gevolg het en herroep moet word. Voorstelle vir regshervorming word in hierdie verband gemaak. / The protection of fundamenta 1 human and con st itut i ona 1 rights has caused modern legal systems to re-evaluate traditional rules of evidence regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning statements of an accused and the privilege against self-incrimination. To determine the extent of such a re-evaluation on evidence of paintings-out which are involuntarily or improperly obtained, an analysis of section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act is undertaken. It focuses on the admissibility of evidence of paintings-out and evidence obtained in consequence of pointingsout. The decision of the Appellate Division in S v Sheehama on the admissibility of evidence of pointing-outs, obtained by means of compulsion, is seen as an embodiment of a new philosophy towards an accused's privilege against nondiscrimination. It is concluded that the provisions of section 218(2) are unfair, infringe on an accused's privilege against self-incrimination and should be repealed. Proposals for law reform are made in this regard. / Criminology and Security Science / LL.M.

Mercantile law / LLM (Tax Law)

Mercantile law / LLM (Tax Law)