[pt] O princípio nemo tenetur se detegere, em seu duplo aspecto vedação à autoincriminação e direito ao silêncio, é uma conquista civilizatória das sociedades democráticas. A importância do princípio, muitas vezes não explicitada nas discussões sobre a constitucionalidade dos institutos e leis, é de tamanha monta que, conjuntamente com o princípio da presunção de inocência, forma a base axiológica de todo o sistema processual penal democrático. Contudo, o poder Estatal, diante do apelo popular e em resposta aos altos índices de criminalidade e episódios notórios de corrupção no Brasil tem, nos últimos tempos, a partir de uma continuidade cronológica de legislações, relativizado ou erodido os sustentáculos do princípio nemo tenetur se detegere. Tal postura Estatal consubstancia o que na criminologia se denomina de direito penal do inimigo, que servirá de substrato teórico para explicar o porquê do fenômeno de hipercriminalização e recrudescimento Estatal. A pesquisa visa, portanto, reafirmar o valor do nemo tenetur se detegere, acentuando os casos em que está a sofrer ataques e oferecer, a partir de pesquisa doutrinária e da análise jurisprudencial nacional e estrangeira, possíveis salvaguardas ao princípio com vistas a garantir que o processo penal brasileiro continue a respeitar os direitos individuais inerentes a uma ordem constitucional de fato e não meramente de direito. / [en] The principle nemo tenetur se detegere, in its double aspect privilege against self-incrimination and right to silence, is a civilizational conquest of democratic societies. The importance of this principle, which is often not made explicit in the discussions on the constitutionality of institutes and laws, is so significant that, together with the principle of presumption of innocence, forms the axiological basis of the entire democratic criminal procedural system. However, the State power, in the face of popular appeal and in response to high crime rates and notorious episodes of corruption in Brazil, has recently, from a chronological continuity of legislation, relativized or eroded the pillars of the nemo tenetur se detegere principle. This state posture consubstantiates what in criminology is called the criminal law of the enemy, which will serve as a theoretical substrate to explain the phenomenon of hypercriminalization and State recrudescence. The aim of the research is to reaffirm the value of the nemo tenetur, to highlight the cases in which it is under attack and to offer possible safeguards to the principle, based on jurisprudencial research and national and foreign case analysis, with a view to ensuring that the Brazilian criminal proceeding continues to respect the individual rights inherent in a constitutional order of fact and not merely law.

As it is evident from the title, in my thesis I would like to provide an overview of the undertakings' procedural rights in proceedings under Article 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Given the extensive investigative powers that are granted to the European Commission by the Council Regulation No 1/2003 and the consequences of being found guilty of violating Article 101 and/or 102 of the TFEU, it is necessary to ensure that the undertakings have enough ways available to exercise their right to defence and other rights and privileges guaranteed by the EU law and international treaties such as European Convention on Human Rights (e.g. the right to respect for private life). For this reason the EU law provides a range of procedural rights that should guarantee that both all the fundamental rights are observed and also serve as a system of checks and balances that prevents the misuse of the Commission's investigative powers. My thesis will focus individual rights of undertakings that are provided to them by the Council Regulation No 1/2003 and EU courts judicature. I will analyse their scope and purpose, the conditions under which they can be exercised and their limitations. Simultaneously a comparison between the rights of undertakings in the EU and U.S. legal system will...

This Doctoral thesis entitled the Constitutionality of Employers' Investigative Procedures and Disciplinary Hearing Processes with Specific Reference to Dismissal of Employees on the Basis of Criminal Misconducts in South Africa, focusses on individual labour law principles of fair labour practices entrenched in section 23(1) of the Constitution. The thesis deals with fairness in situation where an employee who is suspected of committing a criminal act is investigated and subsequently goes through a disciplinary hearing for dismissal. It determines the extent to which an employee’s criminal guilt is decided before dismissal. As such, the thesis is based upon South African judicial interpretation of the right to fair dismissal. In the process the thesis examines the application of principles informing the employer’s duty to provide fair reason concerning the dismissal of employees criminal suspects. In examining if employers observe constitutional transformative objective when conducting criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings - the thesis reviews the extent to which the employer respects constitutional rationales of equity based on the principles of natural justice. These natural justice principles are the basis upon which section 23(1) fairness is founded. Section 23 (1) is implemented through the LRA provisions. The thesis then concludes that, only one principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem is respected within employer flexibility-based fairness while the other principle - nemo judex in propria sua causa is ignored. It is this denial that causes serious procedural challenges in the quest for equity intended in section 23(1) fair labour practices. It is upon these foundational equity concerns that this thesis opposes the flexibility in employer’s criminal investigations and disciplinary hearing processes entrenched in item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 of the LRA fair procedure for dismissal of employees suspected of criminal acts. The thesis interlinks labour law and criminal law to advocate for the missing constitutionally justiciable fairness for employees who have committed criminal misconducts. It argues that the current judicial interpretation of labour law fairness is based upon the principle of flexibility underlying dismissals, asserting that fairness based on flexibility breeds informal procedural processes which exempt employers from observing crucial constitutional fairness principles expressed through proportionality-based prescripts. The thesis concludes that the practice of including the right against self-incrimination in employment law, done in other common law countries be introduced into the South African labour law through section 39 of the Constitution so that the identified procedural challenges are regulated. / Mercantile Law / LL.D.

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage. / The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights.