I present a critical analysis and comparison of the early modern critiques of Christianity and of the institutional strategies for achieving religious toleration through an examination of the thought of Rawls Hobbes, Locke, and Tocqueville. I argue that the contemporary dialogue over religion is limited by its uncritical acceptance of the American experience with the constitutional regime of religious freedom, which takes its bearings from the scheme of religious disestablishment that Locke articulated in the Letter Concerning Toleration. The aim of my dissertation is to correct this distortion of the history and theory of liberalism, to restore the original theological and practical flexibility of liberal politics, and to articulate competing constitutional arrangements for theocratic reform and transition that are not exhausted by “neutrality.” Instead of presenting a monolithic argument in favor of disestablishment, the early modern liberal thinkers favored a combination of different institutional and educational strategies, tailored to national and local conditions, for reforming the Church and for advancing popular enlightenment. I turn to Hobbes and Hume to recover this case for religious establishment, and contrast and compare their arguments to those of Locke and Smith. In revealing the peculiar strengths and weakness of both church establishment and free exercise, early modern rationalists presented a set of flexible institutional and practical guidelines that could inform political statesmanship in its pursuit of the agenda of popular religious reform. Through an analysis of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and the Old Regime, I show that the uncritical focus on Locke’s regime of disestablishment captures only one side of the complex and multifaceted historical experience of liberalism with religion in Europe and America, and does not do justice to the rich theoretical and political debate that shaped liberalism. Not just Hobbes and Hume, but even Locke himself, in his early Two Tracts and even in the Letter, presented strong practical arguments for and theoretical justifications of limited but real state religious establishments as institutional engines of theological reform. The recovery of this debate is meant to contribute to the capacity of liberal theory to engage in a critical dialogue with non-liberal religion, and to its capacity to articulate competing constitutional and institutional structures that , while unfamiliar to us, may be more suited for theocratic transitions in non-Western and non-Christian societies than the regime of neutrality. / text

Since the drafting of the Establishment Clause, a pronouncement contained within the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has debated how to interpret the meaning of, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." In Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the Court took its first action in an Establishment Clause case concerning funding for parochial school students that set a course that has been marked by confusion in the Court, inconsistent decision-making, and ultimately the creation of a policy of accommodation that provides opportunities for parochial school students to receive public financial assistance, including tuition reimbursement for their attendance at parochial schools. This study tracks the history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence with a research emphasis from Everson v. Board of Education (1947) to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) and illustrates how the philosophy of the United States Supreme Court has changed over time. Further context of the shift is provided with a discussion of the Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) decision that served as an effective court-interpreted barrier to the use of public resources and funds for parochial schools for several years. Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have eroded gradually the barrier, coined the Wall of Separation between Church and State by Thomas Jefferson, culminating currently with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002). The purpose of the study is to analyze the aforementioned shift in the context of public funding flowing for private church schools. It became clear through this study that the decision in Everson v. Board of Education was the decision which led to a history of conflict and confusion in the Court which set off a chain of events that ultimately led to public funding for parochial schools where allowable by State Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that public funding for a sectarian school is allowable so long as the funding is neutral and at the personal discretion of the parents receiving it as opposed to directly supporting a sectarian school. / Ed. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1978. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, leaves 751-789). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

No description available.

Liberals claim that the exercise of state power must be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably accept. They also support democracy. The challenge is to bring these two desideratum in line-- to ensure that democratic deliberations are somehow predicated on claims that all citizens can reasonably accept. Put differently, the challenge is to set the terms of public reason. Liberal philosophers advance grand theories of political justice towards this end. They claim that a reasonable argument in the political sphere is one that conforms to theory x. The difficulty is that there will be those who reasonably reject theory x, preferring theory y or z, or eschewing theory altogether. Pessimism at the prospect of agreement on higher-order theories of justice leads some to advocate simple majority rule. The thesis argues that convergence on higher order theory is not essential to public reason. The Supreme Court of Canada’s method of adjudication under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is used as a model. Where basic rights are engaged, or are alleged to be engaged, the Court examines the reasonableness of law and policy using a series of open-ended tests. These tests discipline their deliberations by focusing attention on generally accepted facts and values (notably, the values expressed by the Charter). The thesis contends that the Court’s open-ended, contextual approach can serve as a model for broader public reasoning. The thesis then explores the role of religious arguments within this model. In a polity committed above all to Charter values, what is the place of religion in the justification of law? It is argued that religion is understood to be private and inscrutable under the Charter. This is what justifies the Court’s generous reading of the right to religious freedom. It also justifies our forbidding state coercion in the name of religion. With the preceding ideas in mind, the thesis examines Canadian law and public discourse on the issues of therapeutic cloning (ch.4) and same sex marriage (ch.5).

Liberals claim that the exercise of state power must be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably accept. They also support democracy. The challenge is to bring these two desideratum in line-- to ensure that democratic deliberations are somehow predicated on claims that all citizens can reasonably accept. Put differently, the challenge is to set the terms of public reason. Liberal philosophers advance grand theories of political justice towards this end. They claim that a reasonable argument in the political sphere is one that conforms to theory x. The difficulty is that there will be those who reasonably reject theory x, preferring theory y or z, or eschewing theory altogether. Pessimism at the prospect of agreement on higher-order theories of justice leads some to advocate simple majority rule. The thesis argues that convergence on higher order theory is not essential to public reason. The Supreme Court of Canada’s method of adjudication under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is used as a model. Where basic rights are engaged, or are alleged to be engaged, the Court examines the reasonableness of law and policy using a series of open-ended tests. These tests discipline their deliberations by focusing attention on generally accepted facts and values (notably, the values expressed by the Charter). The thesis contends that the Court’s open-ended, contextual approach can serve as a model for broader public reasoning. The thesis then explores the role of religious arguments within this model. In a polity committed above all to Charter values, what is the place of religion in the justification of law? It is argued that religion is understood to be private and inscrutable under the Charter. This is what justifies the Court’s generous reading of the right to religious freedom. It also justifies our forbidding state coercion in the name of religion. With the preceding ideas in mind, the thesis examines Canadian law and public discourse on the issues of therapeutic cloning (ch.4) and same sex marriage (ch.5).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

The evolution of America's religious liberty was birthed by a separate church and state. As America strides into the twenty first century the origin of separation of church and state continues to be a heated topic of debate. Conservatives argue that America's version of separation of church and state was birthed by principles of Christian liberty. Liberals reject this idea maintaining that the evolution of a separate church and state in America was based on enlightened thinking that demanded rational men should have religious liberty. The best way to achieve this was by erecting a wall of separation between church and state. Sources used in this study include The Letters of Roger Williams, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and the Diary of Isaac Backus, along with many other primary and secondary sources. This study concludes that America’s religious freedom, conceptualized in its separate church and state is a creation of both reason and religion.

Master of Arts / Department of Communication Studies, Theatre, and Dance / Charles J. Griffin / This rhetorical history study attempts to refocus the narrow debate on the concept of the “Separation of Church and State.” Most scholars and popular organizations primarily focus their determination of the original intent of the Establishment Clause on the views of James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Virginia. However, according to the United States Constitution it takes three-fourths of the states and two-thirds of Congress to ratify an amendment. As a result, most arguments on this topic center on an extremely small minority of evidence: one of fourteen states, and only one of eighty-one members of Congress to determine the Founders’ original intent. This study reverses this trend and consults evidence from all the states involved as well as the records of Congress. Since comparable documents are vital to understanding history, all the state constitutions, state bills of rights, and state proposed amendments to the Federal Constitution are consulted as evidence at the beginning of this study. Additionally, every reference of religion in the above documents are individually presented in order to alleviate concerns of potential evidence manipulation. Further, the debates in Congress and the multiple drafts of the Establishment Clause are evaluated in the process of determining the Founders’ original intent. Throughout the study, several useful tables have been constructed in order to facilitate the processing and evaluation of such a large base of evidence. The results of this study indicate a lack of evidence for the contemporary view that the Founders’ intent was to create a total separation between church and state. From the specific religious concerns voiced in the state ratification debates of the Constitution, what religious limits were written into state constitutions/bills of rights, and the amendments that states proposed concerning religion; it becomes evident that the Founders’ intention was only to prevent a particular Christian denomination from becoming the established "National American Church.”

Projet de canonisation de Pie XII, caricatures de Mahomet, procès de l'Eglise de scientologie en octobre 2009, interdiction de la burqa, tous ces évènements récents soulèvent le problème des relations entre religions, pouvoirs publics, particuliers et droits fondamentaux, qui nourrissent la problématique de la thèse.La conception des droits fondamentaux selon l'Eglise catholique contredit-elle celle consacrée par l'ordre juridique national français, garanti par le juge constitutionnel ? Le phénomène religieux en France comme dans de nombreux Etats européens, n'a cessé d'évoluer à partir du tournant des XVIIIe - XIXe siècles. chaque pays, en raison de son substrat philosophique, aborde cette évolution de manière différente : Aufklärung, Lumières françaises notamment. A chaque renouveau religieux l'Eglise catholique, comme la société civile, a associé, voire érigé, des théologiens, Ozanam, Lacordaire, Joseph de Maistre, abbé de Lamennais, père Portal, abbé Alfred Loisy par exemple. Cette association - évolution de la pensée de la doxa/ des intellectuels/ des Eglises locales - a abouti concrètement à une évolution de la doctrine du Saint-siège. Celui-ci a ainsi progressivement reconnu les droits fondamentaux, précédemment condamnés au nom de la primauté de l'Eglise sur l'homme. Il s'agit donc d'étudier l'évolution des rapports entre droits fondamentaux et doctrine de l'Eglise catholique, alors que ces deux concepts ne sont pas figés. Le cadre historique et les termes du sujet nécessitent d'abord une exégèse des textes, nationaux, internationaux, canoniques et laïcs. Ce travail épistémologique oblige, dans un second temps, à s'interroger sur la nature des rapports entre Eglise catholique et droits fondamentaux, notamment sur leur conflictualité. A partir des discours officiels de l'Eglise catholique il est intéressant d'apprécier leur influence, à la fois au sein de l'Eglise catholique et à l'égard de la société civile. / It should demonstrate the originality of the papal position about human rights and focus on the following paradox: the creation and use of a specific concept by the Catholic Church "the rights" whereas it is built by borrowing tools including the secular law order. Indeed, it used the tools of Roman law, particularly its normative and territorial functioning. This contribution tries to identify the context in which human rights have emerged in catholic speech and in canon law. The factors and the issues contribute to understand the canon process of recognition by the Catholic Church. This work investigates three classic themes in public law: the scope of the rights involved, the persons, and finally the guaranties regime.