This thesis examines how drug policy and enforcement affect drug manufacturers. The approach taken is a comparative institutional analysis of cannabis and methamphetamine production. I focus on the effects of prohibition, privacy, and clandestine markets on producer behavior for these two drugs and the unintended consequences that result. I demonstrate that cannabis and methamphetamine producers both face substantial transaction costs and that producers alter their behavior to manage these transaction costs. I conclude that cannabis producers can adopt indoor, small-scale operations to hide their activity, which are capable of yielding continuous, high-potency crops. Methamphetamine producers also adopt small-scale, decentralized strategies, but commodity control increases their exposure and leads to greater overall transaction costs during the manufacturing process.

In this paper, we argue that shadow activities and different levels of marketization of household production systematically distort international comparisons of aggregate gross household saving rates (HSRs): Higher shares of hidden income increase observed HSRs. Panel data for 18 (24) OECD-countries covering a period of a decade show that gross HSRs are positively related to the degree of corruption(used as a proxy for the propensity to shift economic activities into the shadow) and to the share of income from property and self employment. At the same time, gross HSRs are negatively related to the female employment rate, the ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes, and to the tax wedge. One plausible story behind these phenomena might be that unobserved consumption and wages in the shadow labor market induce an upward bias in observed HSRs and profit shares, while the price level effects of a higher share of indirect taxes and a 'welfare state' effect lower observed HSRs. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Why do some people in Halifax, Nova Scotia work collecting recyclables rather than in other—more formal—means of employment? Some scholars argue that informal economic activity is the product of a shift towards flexible work regimes and reductions to the social welfare system (the informalization thesis) and/or that increasingly marginalized people are forced into informal economic activities by economic necessity (the marginalization thesis). Drawing on a close analysis of provincial and municipal recycling policies and ethnographic fieldwork with informal recyclers, I argue that the informalization and marginalization theses are based on overly deterministic models of informal employment. Demand for informal recycling in Halifax is supported by a complex raft of environmental legislation designed to increase the rate of recycling. People willingly choose informal recycling as an alternative to formal employment for various reasons, but above all because it offers a tax-free, honest living, autonomy and a decent income.

This dissertation titled "Essays in the Political Economy of Inflation" is comprised of three papers which study the problem of inflation from a political-institutional perspective. All the three essays apply modern technical tools of macroeconomics to study different factors that affect the choice of policies. It is shown that these factors are crucial in shaping the governance structure conducive for policy effectiveness. The complex political-economic environment is difficult to study with traditional models of economic policy based on a benevolent social planner maximizing the utility of a representative individual. This thesis, therefore, approaches the political economy of inflation from a realistic practical side. The first essay titled "Taxing the unobservable: The impact of shadow economy oninflation and taxes", is motivated from several theoretical and empirical studies which argue that optimal inflation rate increases in the size of informal economy. In this paper, we construct a small theoretical model that has two key components. First, it explicitly models the government's choice for income or inflation tax. Our framework is general and does not impose any condition about the nature of the government (i.e., it does not require government to be necessarily benevolent or corrupt). Secondly, we explicitly consider the shadow economy in the government's objective function. It allows us to see how it impacts the tax burden and inflation. Our theoretical model indicates an increasing marginal cost of taxes and an increasing rate of inflation in the shadow economy. The principle of marginal substitution rationalizes the government's choice of inflation tax over income tax.

Submitted by Anna-Katharina Lenz (anna.lenz@fgvmail.br) on 2018-02-06T17:48:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PHD_THESIS_LENZ.pdf: 4850763 bytes, checksum: a3934582f5eeb8d71db1b0f401811ecc (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2018-02-06T18:33:55Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 PHD_THESIS_LENZ.pdf: 4850763 bytes, checksum: a3934582f5eeb8d71db1b0f401811ecc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-08T11:34:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PHD_THESIS_LENZ.pdf: 4850763 bytes, checksum: a3934582f5eeb8d71db1b0f401811ecc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-18 / This PhD thesis aspires to contribute to the literature on entrepreneurship and economic development by engaging in the discussion of how to foster formalization of microentrepreneurs in developing countries in the short and long-run and microentpreneurs’ drivers for the acceptance of external learning activities. How can we increase formalization of microentrepreneurs? (Paper 1) I address the first question in the paper “Nudging into Budging” in which I conduct a Randomized Field Experiment in one of the major Favelas in Rio de Janeiro. While missing information about the existence of the MEI program and it’s features might be a plausible reason for low take-up, I hypothesize that information alone is not enough to move a large number of microentrepreneurs to take-up due to attention biases. To test this hypothesis, the intervention makes use of additional nudges to remind people in cellphone messages about the content of the information session. My results show that neither an information session nor text messages alone can increase take-up, but that the combination of both increases formalization by seven percent. The results suggest that combining information with behavioral nudges in order to induce the take-up of a public policy program can be a cost-efficient approach. How can we increase microentrepreneurs tax and social security payments? (Paper 2) The paper “Take the wind out or hoist the sails? Heterogeneous treatment effects of a behavioral intervention on small entrepreneurs” addresses my second research question. I hypothesize that public policy intervention can be fruitful and cost-efficient in increasing payments if they account for individual pre-performance trends. For this purpose, I study the payment of microentrepreneurs contributions in Brazil before and after a nationwide intervention in which bills were sent in a booklet for one calendar year to all formalized microentrepreneurs’ households. My results show that the policy intervention works well for microentrepreneurs with irregular payment histories in the first half year after formalizing, but that the intervention has a negative effect on those microentrepreneurs with flawless payment history in this period. In the light of increasing public policy initiative that try to “nudge” people into desired behavior, the paper contributes to the literature by emphasizing the need to account for heterogeneity in behavioral interventions. What explains the take-up of business support programs by microentrepreneurs? (Paper 3) I conclude this PhD thesis with the paper “Distress calls for help: The effect of a business crisis on the take-up of business support services by microentrepreneurs”, in which I hypothesize that microentrepreneurs may be more inclined to take-up training in moments of distress. I study an individual-level longitudinal dataset of monthly tax payments of microentrepreneurs who procure business support services and those who do not. My results show that microentrepreneurs are particularly prone to the take-up of business support services if they undergo a critical business situation represented by a decline in tax payment and in credit scores.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:50:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5522.pdf: 1352042 bytes, checksum: 83c353b1b981d5dfbac220b467cccf50 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-07-12 / The non-inspected slaughter is a serious problem that affects the sheep-raising sector in Brazil. Estimates indicate that more than 90% of the sheep meat traded nationwide, is carried out in non-inspected places. Several are the agents of this production chain who perform the non-inspected slaughter, among whom are farmers. The aim of this study was to analyze, from the perspective of institutional environment, the reasons that lead farmers to carry out slaughter on farm, as a commercial activity, at the city of Tauá (CE), Brazil. Under this scope, comparative analyzes of the socioeconomic, technological and marketing of farmers who do not slaughter their sheep were performed, as well as with sheep-slaughterer farmers in the county. The city of Tauá was chosen as the location for this study due to its importance to sheep sector in Ceará State and the Northeastern Brazil. Using the survey research methodology, 336 sheep-raising farmers were interviewed. The following methods were used for statistical analysis: chi-squared test, Mean-testing and Fisher's exact test. The results demonstrated that 16.7% of the producers perform sheep slaughtering, while 83.3% usually trade live sheep to dealers. The theoretical referencing used was the New Institutional Economics and literature on the informal economy, from which hypotheses were developed, about possible determinants for farmers decision.. Eight determinant factors were identified and 2 distinguishing characteristics of producers who slaughter, from those who do not, in the Tauá county. / O abate não inspecionado é um grave problema que afeta o setor da ovinocultura de corte em todo o Brasil. Estimativas indicam que mais de 90% da carne ovina comercializada em todo território nacional seja proveniente de abate realizado em locais não inspecionados. Diversos são os agentes desta cadeia produtiva que realizam o abate não inspecionado, dentre os quais estão os produtores rurais. O objetivo do presente estudo foi analisar, a partir das características do ambiente institucional, quais são os fatores que levam os produtores rurais a realizarem o abate de ovinos para fins comerciais nas propriedades rurais no município de Tauá (CE). Para tanto, foram realizadas as análises comparativas do perfil socioeconômico, tecnológico e de comercialização dos produtores que não abatem e dos produtores que abatem ovinos no município. O município de Tauá foi escolhido como o local para a realização deste estudo em função de sua relevância para a ovinocultura de corte do Estado do Ceará e da região Nordeste. Utilizando o método de pesquisa do tipo survey foram entrevistados 336 produtores rurais criadores de ovinos. Foram utilizados os seguintes métodos de análise estatística: Qui-quadrado, Teste das Médias e Teste Exato de Fisher. Os resultados da análise mostram que 16,7% dos produtores realizam o abate de ovinos, enquanto 83,3% costumam vender os ovinos vivos para os atravessadores ou para os marchantes. O referencial teórico que fundamentou as análises foi a Nova Economia Institucional e literatura sobre economia informal, a partir do qual foram elaboradas as hipóteses sobre os possíveis determinantes para a realização do abate de ovinos pelos produtores rurais. Foram identificados oito fatores determinantes do abate realizado pelos produtores rurais e duas características diferenciadoras dos produtores que realizam esta atividade em relação aos produtores que não realizam o abate no município de Tauá.

This masters thesis deals with the phenomena of corruption and its methods of measuring. The objective of this thesis was to fully analyze the problem of corruption, its types, causes and consequences. This work describes organizations that measure corruption and the methods of its measuring. Most of the methods are based on the soft data gained in opinion polls. That is why the aim of this thesis was to link Corruption Perception Index with the truly measurable data as world tax index and size of shadow economy. The main finding of the work is negative correlation between world tax index and CPI and positive correlation between size of shadow economy and CPI.

This thesis is aimed at cashless payments which have recently gained worldwide significance. Cash is being gradually phased-out by card transactions and mobile payments via non-bank provider of payment services. A question arises of what would happen if cash would disappear in its entirety and we would find ourselves in a "cashless society". This topic which at first glance appears to be utopian is the subject of this thesis. The first part compares the market of cashless payments in the Czech Republic and in northern Europe (which is amongst the most developed), in particular with regard to the use of cards and mobile payments. The second part is concerned with the phenomenon of shadow economy and the influence of cashless payments on its volume. Concrete recommendations for the Czech economy are also the part of this chapter. The final part hits the essence of the issue and deals with concrete pros and cons of going cashless. The chapter is systematically divided into three parts - security, cost-benefit analysis and legal aspects.

The diploma thesis deals with the motivation factors of a rightful tax return. The aim of the thesis was to identify influence of attitude, subjective norms and behavioural control on a truthfulness of a taxpayer when filling in the tax return. The first part of the thesis is aimed on definition of a tax evasion. Furthermore, this part deals with the causes of tax evasions as well as with ethical point of view on tax evasions in general. The second part of the thesis deals with the indicators of extent and evolution of tax evasions in the Czech Republic and in the European Union. The indicators of tax evasions are the following: shadow economy, tax gap of VAT, tax quota, corruption index and frequency of tax control. The third part includes the results of the questionnaire survey that was realised among the Czech entrepreneurs. The results show the cases of tax evasions that the entrepreneurs may have consider as rightful. Thereafter, using the chi-squared test, the analysis examined whether the attitude of the entrepreneurs towards the tax evasions is influenced by the factors as company seat, annual turnover or number of employees. In several cases, the research confirmed an existence of dependence between attitude of entrepreneurs towards tax evasions and the factors stated above.

Cette dissertation intitulé « Essays in the Political Economy of Inflation » est compris de trois papiers qui étudient le problème d'inflation d'une perspective politique-institutionnel. Tous les trois essais appliquent des outils techniques modernes de macroéconomie pour étudier des facteurs différents qui affectent le choix de politiques. Il est montré que ces facteurs sont cruciaux dans former la structure de gouvernance favorable pour l'efficacité de politique. L'environnement politique-économique complexe est difficile d'étudier avec les modèles traditionnels de politique économique fondée sur un projeteur social bienveillant qui maximise l'utilité d'un individu représentatif. Cette thèse, donc, approche l'économie politique d'inflation d'un côté pratique réaliste.Le premier essai a autorisé «Taxing the unobservable: The impact of shadow economy oninflation and taxes», est motivé par plusieurs études théoriques et empiriques qui se dispute que le taux d'inflation optimal augmente dans la taille de l'économie simple. Dans ce papier, nous construisons un petit modèle théorique qui a deux composants clés. Premièrement, il modèle explicitement le choix du gouvernement pour l'impôt de revenu ou inflation. Notre cadre est général et n'impose pas de la condition de la nature du gouvernement (i.e., il n'exige pas le gouvernement pour être nécessairement bienveillant ou corrompu). Deuxièmement, nous considérons explicitement l'économie l’informel (shadow economy) dans la fonction du gouvernement objectif. Il nous permet de voir comment il influe la charge fiscale et l'inflation. Notre modèle théorique indique un coût marginal croissant d'impôts et un taux croissant d'inflation dans l'économie d'ombre (shadow economy). Le principe de remplacement marginal rationalise le choix du gouvernement d'impôt d'inflation sur l'impôt sur le revenu. / This dissertation titled “Essays in the Political Economy of Inflation” is comprised of three papers which study the problem of inflation from a political-institutional perspective. All the three essays apply modern technical tools of macroeconomics to study different factors that affect the choice of policies. It is shown that these factors are crucial in shaping the governance structure conducive for policy effectiveness. The complex political-economic environment is difficult to study with traditional models of economic policy based on a benevolent social planner maximizing the utility of a representative individual. This thesis, therefore, approaches the political economy of inflation from a realistic practical side. The first essay titled “Taxing the unobservable: The impact of shadow economy oninflation and taxes”, is motivated from several theoretical and empirical studies which argue that optimal inflation rate increases in the size of informal economy. In this paper, we construct a small theoretical model that has two key components. First, it explicitly models the government’s choice for income or inflation tax. Our framework is general and does not impose any condition about the nature of the government (i.e., it does not require government to be necessarily benevolent or corrupt). Secondly, we explicitly consider the shadow economy in the government’s objective function. It allows us to see how it impacts the tax burden and inflation. Our theoretical model indicates an increasing marginal cost of taxes and an increasing rate of inflation in the shadow economy. The principle of marginal substitution rationalizes the government’s choice of inflation tax over income tax.