Trust law has hindered beneficiaries from exerting their voice in the administration of their funds. Yet, individuals do have opinions on how they want their funds to be invested and wish to direct the investments to align with their values. For a majority of individuals, this influence is mainly through their retirement fund investments. However, trust law means that the ultimate power to decide on the investment process rests in the hands of trustees to act on behalf of all beneficiaries. And trustees also further delegate most investment decisions to the investment managers. The findings of this research, as other researchers have also found, suggests that individuals who have some knowledge of SRI show a greater willingness to invest in sustainable funds. It also suggests that after choosing the type of funds that they wish to invest in, individuals place a lot of trust in their trustees to act in their best interests by investing responsibly. The research explores the various dynamics that are at play that explain individual behaviour and attitudes towards financial planning with regards to their retirement investments. The implications of my findings may have relevance in understanding what drives individuals to become active in the investment arena and may serve as a harbinger to changes in fiduciary relationships as we know them. Further research can be done in this area that will assist policy makers to consider regulation changes that could lead to the greater inclusion of final beneficiaries in the investment management process.

Gli amministratori delegati e le aziende sono sempre più sotto i riflettori dei media e del pubblico in generale. Ad oggi pochi studi hanno compreso quali variabili influenzano l’attivismo degli azionisti, così come quali variabili portano a far sì che gli stakeholder aziendali reagiscano negativamente di fronte a determinate caratteristiche aziendali. La tesi intende quindi approfondire tre fenomeni: le reazioni degli individui nei confronti del compenso percepito dal CEO e nei confronti della performance aziendale; l’attivismo degli azionisti nei confronti del linguaggio utilizzato dal CEO; l’attivismo degli azionisti nei confronti delle politiche di CSR adottate dalle aziende. Il primo capitolo si intitola “Eccessività e merito del compenso del CEO” e mira a comprendere l’effetto che il compenso del CEO e la performance aziendale possono avere sulle percezioni degli stakeholder. Il secondo capitolo si intitola “Attivismo degli azionisti e linguaggio del CEO”. Lo studio dimostra che un linguaggio in cui è frequente l’utilizzo del simbolo “shareholder-value” porta gli azionisti a valutare il CEO in modo più favorevole e a ridurre il loro attivismo nei confronti dell'azienda. Il terzo capitolo si intitola “L’effetto delle politiche di CSR sull’attivismo degli azionisti” e mira a comprendere l’effetto delle politiche di CSR sulla probabilità che un'impresa venga presa di mira da azionisti attivisti. / CEOs and corporations are under the spotlight and relatively little is known about what influences shareholder activism and stakeholder reaction towards specific CEO-level and firm-level characteristics. This thesis aims at investigating three phenomena: individuals’ reactions towards CEO pay and firm performance; shareholder activism towards CEO’s use of language; shareholder activism towards CSR policies. The first chapter is entitled “CEO Compensation Excessiveness and Deservingness” and aims at investigating the effect of CEO pay and corporate performance on individuals’ negative reaction. The second chapter is entitled “Shareholder Activism and CEO’s Use of Language”. Drawing on signaling theory and the symbolic management perspective, the chapter shows that a CEO’s use of language that is congruent with the prevailing governance model of shareholder value maximization leads shareholders to evaluate the CEO more favorably and to reduce their activism toward the firm. The third chapter is entitled “The Effect of CSR Policies on Activist Shareholders” and aims at investigating whether CSR policies attract activist shareholders. The chapter theorizes and examines the effect of CSR policies on the probability of a firm being targeted by activist shareholders, as well as the moderating effect of firm positive reputation in the relationship between CSR policies and shareholder activism.

The objective of this study was to gain increased knowledge regarding BlackRock’s ability to influence their Swedish owned companies. The scope of this thesis has been to study eight companies where BlackRock have holdings. The actions of BlackRock are studied from two approaches, direct influence and indirect influence based on the literature review. The direct influence is a formal approach, including information regarding BlackRock’s participation in the nomination committee, the board of directors and their votes during the annual general meetings. The indirect influence consists of non-legal binding activities and includes information regarding BlackRock’s use of broad-based communication in form of CEO letter, where interpretations of the CEO letter have been compared to the studied companies’ annual reports. The study uses a qualitative method strategy with a deductive approach, together with data triangulation. The collected results and the analysis showed that BlackRock uses both direct and indirect methods to influence and deviates from the Swedish corporate code of governance in their methods of influence. One of the conclusions was that BlackRock, with their CEO letter, managed to influence their owned companies in regards to sustainability reporting according to SASB och TCFD framework.

Earnings management is widely implemented by managers, which may be the result of weak monitoring. This study is based on 140 companies to capture the effect of shareholder activism (proxied by shareholder proposals) on earnings management. This study adds to the literature by focusing on how the presence of foreign directors on the board moderates this relationship. This study investigatesthe influence of foreign directors by taking the proportion of foreign directors, as well as by measuring the regulation distance of their home countries to the U. S. The result from the empirical analyses implies that shareholder activism can lead to a lower level of earnings management due to improved monitoring. A higher proportion of foreign directors and a closer regulation distance of their home countries to the U. S do not help shareholder activists to reduce earnings management. Decreasing monitoring effectiveness leads to a higher level of earnings management.

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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to describe the perception of value and risk in CSR as well as analyzing how financial institutions influence responsible behavior in business in order to create sustainable economic growth. Methodology: The study has a qualitative research method used by an abductive process. Data has been collected through semi-structured interviews with respondents from three venture capital companies and three banks. The sample of respondents was done through a convenience sample with respect to access and expertise in the research area. Conclusion: The most important meanings of the research results have shown that CSR holds an intrinsic value concerning contributing value as its conceptual meaning in terms of sustainable development. CSR can also be regarded as a dimension of risk management to reduce the risk of negative externalities on corporate activities. Investors and financiers contribute to sustainable companies through active ownership and improvements in the CSR dimensions. Finally, research results demonstrated that the responsible behavior of companies contributing to profitability, which in turn is part of sustainable development.

The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring management's control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension fund's shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms' operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds' self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds' ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposal's likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the board's political profile is the primary determinant of public pension fund's propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firm's acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive; that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds' dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension fund's misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the management's benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect. / Business Administration

Over the last decade, awareness of sustainability issues has increased and changed the information needs of investors. This development is also reflected in a transition of corporate reporting – the increase in the importance of sustainability reporting in addition to traditional financial reporting. However, the changed information needs are not yet met by reporting companies. Therefore, this paper-based dissertation comprises four manuscripts dealing with the transition of corporate reporting. Overall, this dissertation contributes toward a more refined understanding of the changed needs to support practitioners and regulators in the transition process of corporate reporting.

Shareholder activism has exploded in popularity since the turn of the century, due in large part to impressive relative returns generated by its major participants. The result has thus been a surge in assets invested in the category, to in excess of $170 billion today up from less than $3 billion in 2000 (Inglis 2015; Romito 2015). This influx of capital, in absolute dollars and pace of growth, has caused many to wonder whether activists truly create shareholder value and, if so, if the value generated is sustainable. Numerous studies of activist interventions prior to 2009 reveal significant stock price gains around the time of activist arrival and positive longer term buy-and-hold abnormal returns as well. The question remains, however, whether those trends have continued as volume of transactions and number of activists have increased post the recent global financial crisis. In this report, we perform an empirical analysis focused on a hand-collected dataset of 1,088 activist interventions from 1995-present. This dataset includes all 13D filings, as well as Under the Threshold activist campaigns. First, we analyze stock price returns for this group over short- and long-term periods and find that activists continue to unlock shareholder value in recent deals comparable to that of earlier ones. We then perform a proprietary regression to identify which factors drive the most successful returns. Such insights should prove informative for investors employing an activist strategy and companies looking to manage areas of vulnerability.

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