Together with an basic assumption of the main thesis of the theory of singular direct reference, this paper formulates two original theses grounded in the Kripkean notion of proper names. Regarding the assumption of the main thesis, efforts have been made to explicitly explain its essence as a reactionary theory against the description theory of proper names, a theory mainly due to Bertrand Russells (1905) influential article "On Denoting". Grounded in Russell, outlining the fundamental idea of proper names as abbreviated or disguised definite descriptions, this paper moves forward through the critiques of Strawsons (1950) "On Referring", Donnellans (1966) "Reference and Definite Descriptions" and Kripkes (1977) "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". With the historical background in place, in accordance with Salmons (1982) "Reference & Essence" the arguments against the theory of descriptions for proper names are put forward, which leads to the assumption of the mentioned main thesis. Regarding the papers more original theses, the first of these distinguishes between different kinds of proper names depending on whether or not they refer to an object capable of cognitive functioning. The main thrust of this paper is however made through the formulation of the second thesis, as it is being aimed at challenging Kripke's Millian notion of all proper names as being non-connoting. However, in contrast to this view in accordance with the view being put forward in this paper, cognition-referring proper names are connoting. Additionally, a finishing discussion is supplemented concluding descriptions of such connotations as being questions for pragmatism.