Together with an basic assumption of the main thesis of the theory of singular direct reference, this paper formulates two original theses grounded in the Kripkean notion of proper names. Regarding the assumption of the main thesis, efforts have been made to explicitly explain its essence as a reactionary theory against the description theory of proper names, a theory mainly due to Bertrand Russells (1905) influential article "On Denoting". Grounded in Russell, outlining the fundamental idea of proper names as abbreviated or disguised definite descriptions, this paper moves forward through the critiques of Strawsons (1950) "On Referring", Donnellans (1966) "Reference and Definite Descriptions" and Kripkes (1977) "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". With the historical background in place, in accordance with Salmons (1982) "Reference & Essence" the arguments against the theory of descriptions for proper names are put forward, which leads to the assumption of the mentioned main thesis. Regarding the papers more original theses, the first of these distinguishes between different kinds of proper names depending on whether or not they refer to an object capable of cognitive functioning. The main thrust of this paper is however made through the formulation of the second thesis, as it is being aimed at challenging Kripke's Millian notion of all proper names as being non-connoting. However, in contrast to this view in accordance with the view being put forward in this paper, cognition-referring proper names are connoting. Additionally, a finishing discussion is supplemented concluding descriptions of such connotations as being questions for pragmatism.

This thesis explores and makes explicit various aspects of Richard Rorty's rhetorical program for shifting our traditional conceptions of reference and truth. Rorty wants to persuade us to adopt verification (coping) semantics in place of correspondence seeking semantics. I argue against his intuition pumps by considering Keith Donnellan's remarks on description and reference and argue for a view of correspondence truth that is based on what the object, whatever the object, permits us to say. Making this point allows us to see a purposeful conflation in Rorty's work. If beliefs are true because they are justified, Rorty's fallibilistic remark that any of our beliefs may not be true (in the cautionary sense) would follow. But truths may pay because they follow (as "attributive representations") from 'unblocked' objects, or they may just pay. Thus, I suggest that Donnellan preserves William James' remark that we desire correspondence truth, an everyday explanatory notion.

In Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference, Saul Kripke posited two kinds of reference involved in every use of a designator—a semantic reference, to the object picked out by the meaning of the words used—and a speaker reference, to the object to which the speaker aimed to call attention by deploying the designator. Kripke tentatively defined the notion of the speaker’s referent as the object that (i) the speaker wishes to call attention to, on a given occasion, and (ii) that he believes fulfills the conditions for being the description’s semantic referent. Although offered as a definition, this account is best interpreted as a tentative statement of the normal success conditions of speaker reference. As such, it raises the question of how special a role semantic reference plays in successful speaker reference. This report addresses that question by evaluating Kripke’s tentative account in the light of an extended series of examples in which definite descriptions are used to speaker refer to objects other than the objects to which the descriptions uniquely semantically refer. The report concludes that words’ semantic characteristics are only one of several forms of evidence that audiences regularly rely on to discern what object a speaker intends to call attention to by a particular act of reference. / text

Has the theory of direct reference for general terms ontological consequences or requirements? It has normally been said that general terms should be conceived as rigid designators of natural classes”, but this is a very vague expression. What is a natural class” here? Is it a universal? Is it a class of resembling objects or tropes? It is argued that the theory of direct reference functions better in connection with an ontology of universals. The semantic model actually requires certain type of successful cognitive relation with the referent and it is difficult to explain how such a successful connection could be obtained if there are no universal properties, but only perfect resemblance classes of objects or tropes. / ¿Hay consecuencias o requerimientos ontológicos que puedan desprendersede la teoría de la referencia directa? Se ha dicho frecuentemente quelos términos generales deben ser concebidos como designadores rígidos de clasesnaturales”, pero esta es una expresión demasiado vaga. ¿Qué es aquí una clasenatural”? ¿Es un universal? ¿Una clase de objetos o tropos semejantes entre sí?Se argumenta que la teoría de la referencia directa funciona mejor en conexióncon una ontología de universales. El modelo semántico, en efecto, requiere ciertotipo de relación cognitiva exitosa con el referente, y es difícil explicar cómo podríadarse esa conexión exitosa si no hay propiedades universales, sino solo clasesde objetos o tropos perfectamente semejantes.

The purpose of my thesis is to explore and assess recent efforts by Direct Reference Theorists to explain the phenomenon of empty names. Direct Reference theory is, roughly, the theory that the meaning of a singular term (proper name, demonstrative, etc.) is simply its referent. Certain sentences, such as negative existentials ("Santa does not exist"), and sentences in contexts of fiction ("Holmes lived on Baker Street"), present the following challenge to DR Theory: Given that the semantic value of a name is simply its referent, how are we to explain the significance and truth-evaluability of such sentences? There have been various approaches DR Theorists have taken to address this problem, including the Pragmatic Strategy, Pretense Theory, Abstract Object Theory, and the Metalinguistic Strategy. All of these views are analyzed and assessed according to their various strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, overall, a Metalinguistic Strategy, supplemented by the notion of pretense, best deals with negative existentials and normal-subject predicate occurrences of empty names, Abstract Object Theory best deals with empty names in meta-fictional contexts, and Pretense Theory best deals with empty names in object-fictional contexts.

This thesis argues that there is an enigma at the heart of Webster's The Duchess of Malfi; a disjunction between the critical history of the play and its reception in performance. Historical disquiet about the status of the play among academics and cultural commentators has not prevented its popularity with audiences. It has, however, affected some of the staging decisions made by theatre companies mounting productions. Allied to other practical factors, these have impacted significantly – and occasionally disastrously – upon performances. It is argued that Webster conceived the play as a meditation on degree and, in aiming to draw out the maximum relevance from the social satire, deliberately created the multi-faceted performative role of Bosola to work his audience in a complex and subversive manner. The role's purpose was determined in response to the structural discontinuity imposed upon the play by the physical realities of staging within the Blackfriars' auditorium. But Webster also needed an agent to serve the plot's development and, in creating the role he also invented a character, developed way beyond the material of his sources. This character proved as trapped as any other in the play by the consequences of his own moral choices. Hovering between role and character, Webster's creation remains liminally poised on ‘the dangerous edge of things.' Part One explores the contexts in which Webster created one of the most ambiguous figures in early modern drama - subverting stock malcontent, villain and revenger - and speculates on the importance of the actor, John Lowin in its genesis. It includes a subsequent performance history of the role. Part Two presents the detailed analysis of a range of professional performances from the past four decades, attempting to demonstrate how the meaning of the play has been altered by decisions made regarding the part of Bosola.